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1 
-- Introduction -- 
 
The Federal Reserve’ creation dates from the year 1914, after the Congress approved the 
Federal Reserve Act on December 23, 1913. It was designed with the main purpose of 
solving the two main problems of the time. The first one relates to the significant fluctuations 
in market interest rates caused by the seasonal demand for currency, which mostly depended 
on the financing of crop harvest. The second reason was the desire to reduce the severity and 
frequency of banking crisis, as the previous thirty years had witnessed five of them. Thus, the 
Federal Reserve was created as an entity working as lender of last resort, for pooling reserves 
and lending during panics, and discounting bills to finance crop movements. Those targets 
are far from the maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates 
that have been determining monetary policy for the last decades. That change is synonym of 
having overcome those past obstacles and of the evolution in the field of monetary policy. 
However, if the economic science is already relatively young in comparison to other sciences, 
monetary policy is even a younger field and much must be still learned. While it has evolved 
to prevent banking panics and smooth seasonal demand for money, new challenges have 
emerged. Banking, financial and debt crises, bubbles, market crashes, recessions, high 
inflation levels or even deflation, have been the recurrent episodes during the last decades. 
The lack of ability to prevent these phenomena proves that our knowledge about monetary 
policy is still scarce, and even, some of the already established and accepted knowledge may 
be erroneous. Thereby, this study was born with the intention of re-examining the Federal 
Reserve’s history, what implies its policies and their consequences on the American 
economy, relearning from the lessons provided, and subsequently, to discover missing or 
misunderstood mechanisms operating between monetary policy and the real economy. The 
goal is to place us in the best possible position to foresee and prevent the harmful episodes 
named above by understanding those mechanisms whereby monetary policy operates. 
 
 It has to be recognized that despite the incapacity to avoid such episodes, the study of 
monetary policy is an ongoing process in a very early state, that nevertheless, has been able 
to improve policy management, leading the economy through steadier paths as supposedly 
exemplified in the denominated Great Moderation (McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) and 
Stock and Watson (2003)) starting in the mid-1980s and consolidated from 1990 to 2007, 
unlike the previous period of the Great Inflation (from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s). The 
2 
strong contrast between these periods triggered a debate in which researchers wondered 
whether that regime change was due to an alteration in the policies undertaken by the Fed, or 
factors external to monetary policy. This was framed into the “good luck, good policy” 
debate (Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) or Canova and Gambetti (2009) among many 
others). However, this debate was far from being a novelty because researchers had already 
experienced different regimes in the past.  The Great Depression and the previous and 
posterior periods were an example  (Wicker (1965), Brunner and Meltzer (1968), Hetzel 
(1985), Bordo and Schwartz (1999)). The particular difference between past and 
contemporaneous analysis is found on how those regime changes were evaluated. While 
more advanced methods have been used for contemporaneous studies, those examining past 
periods, resorted mostly, to narrative and qualitative techniques. This contrast exemplifies 
how monetary policy has evolved and improved the accuracy and credibility of the 
conclusions reached in those analysis. Surprisingly, both approaches share the lack of 
consensus regarding when the Federal Reserve was responsible for those periods of success 
or failure. Thus, the fact that the economy is still undergoing the episodes commented above, 
along with the researchers’ inability to unveil and agree on the factors and mechanisms 
operating behind the good or bad American economy’s performance, is a clear signal that our 
knowledge about monetary policy is defective at some stage. 
With the purpose of discovering missing knowledge or correcting any possible 
misunderstanding, the starting point of this defective knowledge hypothesis was to assume 
that although the low volatilities in inflation and output, as well as the stable and low 
inflation of the Great Moderation is the clearest and largest example of a period when the 
economy has been in state relatively desired by the central bank, obviously it was not unique. 
Given that the good or bad performance of the economy, in higher or lower degree, even for 
shorter periods, had already been experienced in the past, those periods should present 
common patterns, despite the possible existence of factors distorting them. To concentrate 
efforts on unveiling those hidden patterns, I considered that a long and wide vision was 
necessary for that purpose and hence, as many periods as possible should be compared 
together, regardless of its ordinary or extraordinary characteristics. Actually, the outstanding 
characteristic of a specific period should not be appealing for the researcher, but the opposite. 
The ordinary periods, the good and the bad ones, must be examined first, so that we are able 
to explain the particularities later. Analyzing separately the Great Depression, the period 
post-Great Depression, the 1950s, the 1960s, the Great Inflation, the Great Moderation or the 
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Great Recession will prevent us from observing the entire picture and extract those common 
patterns that may be the key explanation for the mechanisms operating between the monetary 
policy and the economy.  
 Thus, Chapter 1 reviews the narrative of the Federal Reserve’s history from the end of 
the World War I to 2007, just before the Great Recession, but skipping the 1940s, mainly 
because of the World War II and to make it consistent with the periods analysed in Chapter 2.  
The narrative covers the main events happening within the Fed regarding the learning process 
of its members about monetary policy and their reactions to economic and political episodes. 
After reviewing how the Fed used its instruments in the process of achieving their targets, not 
only some insight is acquired regarding the possible factors conditioning the American 
economy’s performance, but also that review leads to questioning whether researchers have 
been measuring monetary policy stance correctly. While it can be a recklessness to direct the 
attention to what should be considered as settled bases, one must be aware that if the 
measuring of monetary policy were erroneous, the error would be transmitted to the results. 
Consequently, the comprehension of the mechanisms whereby monetary policy is able to 
reach the economy would be poorly recognized and would disable the possibility and 
necessity of unveiling the common patterns that can help us in foreseeing and preventing 
undesired episodes as those previously commented, as policy advice will be based on false 
premises. Subsequently, the lessons learned will be translated into bad policies.  
This questioning appeared once I observed the common procedure to measure monetary 
policy stance used in the literature, in contrast with the knowledge acquired in the review of 
the Federal Reserve’s history. Thus, Chapter 2 explains how that common procedure is 
erroneous and a new approach is proposed. The standard procedure used intermediate targets 
such as short-term rates or reserves measures, although mainly the federal funds rate 
(Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1998), Boivin and Giannone (2006), Primicery 
(2005)…) as Fed’s instruments. However, this approach entails a conceptual and a measuring 
problem. Conceptually, short-term rates or reserves measures are not Fed’s instruments but 
intermediate target. The actual Fed’s instruments are, mainly, the discount rate and open 
market operations. This leads us to the second problem. The use of intermediate targets to 
measure monetary policy stance introduce bias into the models. To understand this statement, 
the money market must be conceptualized as two submarkets. In the first submarket the Fed 
is the supply side and the banking sector the demand side. In the second submarket, the 
banking sector switches to the supply side, the other agents of the economy being the demand 
side. The Federal Reserve through the discount rate and open market operations sets the price 
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and the amount of money in this first submarket, depending on its intermediate target. Taking 
the federal funds rate as example (although the same argument applies to reserves measures 
or other intermediate targets), when the Federal Reserve uses its instruments, it has an impact 
on the federal funds rate according to the level targeted. However, the federal funds rate also 
depends on how banks are pricing their reserves. That pricing is conditioned on the demand 
for loans, forecasts regarding growth, inflation, risks, Fed’s policies and so on. When the Fed 
is targeting a specific federal funds rate, to maintain it equal at two different periods, it will 
have to use its instruments differently to achieve such target, because, as already said, it 
depends also on banks pricing decisions. Thus, the different amount and price at which 
reserves are provided for the different periods, despite keeping the federal funds rate at the 
same rate, will have a different impact on the real economy. The reason is that banks set their 
loans rate, mainly conditioned on the cost of money to them, namely, the cost of the reserves. 
As the Fed provided them at different prices, but maintaining equal the federal funds rate, the 
impact on the loans rate will be different, and that different impact will be converted into a 
higher or lower demand for money, output growth and inflation. 
 Thus, using the federal funds rate or other intermediate target to measure monetary 
policy stance, what should suppose the measurement of only the supply side of the first 
submarket, also captures the demand side of the first submarket. Therefore, the results will 
not only measure monetary policy stance, but also the banking sector’s decisions. This 
argument was born from the fact that during the last century, when the spread between the 
short-term rate of reference and the discount rate was positive, borrowing at the discount 
window increased, signaling that banks were taking advantage of the arbitrage opportunities 
by borrowing cheaper reserves at the discount widow. The relatively cheaper cost of those 
reserves could have enabled banks to increase the loans rates less than the Fed raised short-
term rates. That is, when, wittingly or unwittingly, the Fed raised short-term rates, its impact 
on the loans rate was below the ratio 1:1 (as banks obtained cheaper reserves at the discount 
window), triggering an insufficient restrain of credit, and consequently, higher inflation, as 
the results confirm. In relation to this, Chapter 2 also unveils that the price puzzle, whereby 
increases in interest rates are accompanied by higher inflation (Barth and Ramey (2001), 
Boivin and Giannoni (2003), Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005), Uhlig (2005) and Hanson 
(2006), among many others), is non-existent. That puzzle is a consequence of bad policies 
that allowed positive spreads between the federal funds rate and the discount rate. Thus, the 
lesson learned in this chapter is that monetary policy stance has been measured erroneously. 
To solve that, a new procedure is developed using actual Fed’s instruments and the spread 
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between short-term rates and the discount rate. According to the results, this chapter shows 
that monetary policy was almost useless during the interwar period, that the Fed used its 
instruments differently after the mid-1960s and that the banking sector was likely to have 
changed its behavior around 1990. It also hints that monetary policy seems to be transmitted 
through prices and not through quantities. 
 Encouraged by the hypothesis that banks set their loans rate depending on the cost at 
which they obtain reserves and the possible banking sector’s behavior change around 1990, 
Chapter 3 focuses on the study of that potential channel whereby monetary policy can be 
transmitted to the real economy, and where the banking sector as transmitter of monetary 
policy, can modify Fed’s policies. While some authors debated whether monetary policies 
were transmitted through the “money channel” (Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Kashyap, Stein 
and Wilcox (1993)) or the “lending channel” (Ramey (1993), Oliner and Rudebusch (1995, 
1996), Romer and Romer (1990)), the premise for both channels is based on the fact that 
banks need deposits to lend. Thus, when the Fed removes those reserves or avoids their rise, 
banks either increase the loans rate (money channel) or reduce the amount of lending 
(lending channel). However, authors such as Moore (1983), Bindseil (2004) or Jakab and 
Kumhof (2015) presented strong arguments against that premise and claimed that banks are 
not in need of deposits to lend as the deposit multiplier theory suggests. The reality is that 
banks lend as long as it is profitable and their solvency is not in danger, and just later, the 
required reserves are obtained. Therefore, causality runs from loans to reserves and not the 
other way around. Also, they argue that the demand for loans (money) is endogenous. “The 
ability of central banks to control the rate of growth of monetary aggregates therefore hinges 
on their ability to control the rate of growth of bank lending, rather than the monetary base” 
(Moore (1983), p. 544). Further: “The assumption…is that banks set the prime rate and then 
attempt to meet the loan demand that results” (p.545). Thus, once this misunderstanding is 
overcome and taking into account Chapter 3, I elaborate what I have named the “reserves-
cost” theory. It claims that given the Fed sets short-term rates, wittingly or unwittingly, by 
providing reserves and using the discount rate, the only way whereby it can have an impact 
on the real economy is by influencing the reserves cost directly, and indirectly, with the 
impact of this cost on the loans rate. Therefore, while the spread between the federal funds 
rate and the discount rate is closed, it is more likely that the Fed has total control of monetary 
policy. Otherwise, the banking sector will modify those policies and the impact on the real 
economy will be different. The reason is that those positive spreads will cause that the federal 
funds rate has an impact ratio below 1:1 on the loans rate, which will depend on banks 
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decisions, conditioned on the cost of their reserves. As banks can obtain nonborrowed and 
borrowed reserves from different sources, the cheapest one will determine the evolution of 
the loans rate, and consequently, the demand for credit.  
 Once this theory is completely understood, I decide to drop the Fed’s instruments 
from the model, unlike in Chapter 2, for the reason implicit in the new theory. That is, to 
measure monetary policy stance, as policies have its impact on the economy through their 
influence on the reserves cost, it is sufficient to capture the price at which reserves are 
available in the money market. Thus, the spread used in Chapter 2, namely, the difference 
between the federal funds rate and the discount rate, is also used in this case as measure of 
monetary policy stance. In addition, a new variable is created to capture how the banking 
sector responds to those policies.  This variable measures the spread between the prime loans 
rate and the federal funds rate. When this spread is smaller, it signals that banks are obtaining 
cheaper reserves at the discount window than those available at the short-term rates in the 
money market. Consequently, the loans rate evolves differently in relation to the federal 
funds rate, what implies the ratification of the assumption taken in Chapter 2, namely, the 
impact of the federal funds rate on the loans rate is below the ratio 1:1. This phenomenon 
produces an insufficient restrain in lending, causing higher inflation. The results confirm the 
new “reserves-cost” theory and therefore, a new mechanism discovered. It implies that the 
banking sector is able to modify Fed’s policies and that when positive spreads are allowed, 
the Federal Reserve lose, partially or totally, its power to drive the path of the economy. The 
understanding of this mechanism teaches us that to avoid episodes as the Great Inflation, 
besides setting a short-term rate target high enough to restrain the demand for credit, the 
spread between the federal funds rate and the discount rate must be closed. The “reserves-
cost” theory may be also the explanation for Great Moderation (and the Great Inflation). The 
reason is that this episode coincides with the period when banks set a constant spread 
between the loans rate and the federal funds rate, being the largest of the period under 
analysis, unlike during the Great Inflation when the spread was smaller (or even negative) 
and more volatile. Thus, the stability or instability of this spread seems to be transmitted to 
the economy as the volatilities seen for the spread, coincide with those seen for output and 
inflation for the Great Inflation and the Great Moderation. At the same time, the amplitude of 
the spread seems responsible for the inflation levels. 
 However, the “reserves-cost” theory, as exposed in Chapter 3, leaves one case without 
explanation. While for most of the period under analysis in that chapter excess reserves were 
scarce and banks decisions on the loans rate were based on the interest rate at each period, 
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after the mid-1980s banks began to accumulate excess reserves. For this scenario, from the 
“reserves-cost” theory can be deduced that the cost of past reserves may also have an impact 
on the current loans rate. If it were the case, it would mean that the theory was incomplete, 
because it was able to explain how banks react to Fed’s policies only when current interest 
rates are taken into account. Consequently, Chapter 4 undertakes the completion of the 
“reserves-cost” theory. Further, the renewed theory is proposed as the explanation for the 
accumulation of reserves. While the literature has suggested low interest rates (Frost (1991), 
Bindseil, Camba-Mendez, Hirsch and Weller (2006), Dwyer (2010)), risk, uncertainty, 
(Goodhart (2010), Ashcraft, McAndrews and Skeie (2011), Chang, Contessi and Francis 
(2014)) or low demand for loans (Bindseil (2004) and Todd (2013)) as the most important 
factors determining the accumulation of excess reserves, I argue that the accumulation or use 
of excess reserves is explained also by the cost at which reserves are obtained. 
When banks accumulate reserves, if the cost at which reserves can be obtained at a particular 
period is below the cost of the reserves held, as profit maximization agents, banks will prefer 
to obtain reserves at current rates to maximize profits by obtaining the largest margin 
between the loans rate and the cost paid for the reserves required for loans. On the contrary, if 
reserves costs are above the price at which they can be found at that moment, banks will 
prefer to use their reserves. For the former scenario, banks will decide to accumulate excess 
reserves, while for the later, they will use those already held. Thus, the “reserves-cost” theory 
is revamped as follow: The only way whereby the Federal Reserve can have an impact on the 
real economy is through the manipulation of the cost at which banks obtain reserves. This 
cost will steer the loans rate, which is the actual rate that the real economy endures. If the 
level of excess reserves is scarce, just modifying the federal funds rate (or other the short-
term rate of reference) and the discount rate will have a direct impact on the cost of reserves 
held by banks, as long as the spread between these rates is closed. In that case, the 
movements of those rates are likely to be reflected one to one into the loans rate. If the excess 
reserves levels are significantly above the levels of required reserves and precautionary 
factors, the impact of interest rates aforementioned on the loans rate will be proportionally 
diluted to the quantity hoarded, and more aggressive policies and longer time will be 
necessary to drive the real economy through the desired path. The reason is that banks’ 
decisions about the loans rate will make it to evolve differently in relation to short-term rates 
given the reserves cost. Consequently, there will be three hands behind the steering wheel of 
monetary policy. That is, past Fed’s policies, banks’ decisions and present Fed’s policies. 
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To evaluate this new theory a new variable is created. This variable measures the 
average cost of the reserves held by the banking sector at every period. It is used along with 
the short-term rate of the money market, so that the spread between both variables indicates 
whether banks hold reserves with a cost above or below short-term rates. When the spread is 
positive, it will indicate that banks are holding reserves more expensive that the ones 
available in the market. Hence, they will obtain new reserves at current rates, accumulating 
even more, as they can maximize profits using the new reserves and lending at the loans rate 
of that period. It will also imply that banks will increase the loans rate in relation to short-
term rates, in order to decrease the probabilities of incurring in loses in case they had to use 
their expensive reserves. On the contrary, when the spread is negative, it signals that banks 
hold cheaper reserves than current rates. Therefore, accumulated reserves will be used to 
maximize profits and the loans rates will be raised less in relation short-term rate increases, 
as there is no risk of using reserves with a cost above the loans rate. In addition, a relatively 
lower loans rate will increase loans demand and therefore, profits. The results confirms that 
when the cost of excess reserves is above the current short-term rate, banks accumulate more 
reserves and increase the loans rate in relation to the short-term rate. Thereby, this chapter is 
the final response to the ambitions that originated this study, as by finding an error in how to 
measuring monetary policy stance, the mechanism whereby Federal Reserve’s policies have 
an impact on the real economy was unveiled, adding to the needed knowledge to manage 
monetary policy.  The chapter ends by describing the different scenarios that the Fed has to 
face depending on the amount and price of reserves holds by the banking sector, the spreads 
between the reserves costs and short-term rate, and the impact ratio of that short-term rate on 
the loans rate. The possession of that knowledge supposes the first step to prevent the 
harmful episodes commented at the beginning. 
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-- Chapter 1 -- 
A review of the Federal Reserve’s history 
 The first step to discover or correct the potential mechanisms whereby monetary policy 
operates is to review the Federal Reserve’s history. This review is necessary to gain insight 
regarding the learning process of those responsible for monetary policy, Fed’s responses to 
economic and political events, and the general beliefs or conclusions regarding how those 
responses have determined the path of the American economy. Several authors have invested 
their time and effort in providing that insight. Fforde (1954), Friedman and Schwartz (1963), 
Wheelock (1991), Toma (1997), Moore (1990) and Mayer (1999) are some of them. 
However, according to the level of completeness (from a personal opinion), I have decided to 
expose mostly those facts narrated in Meltzer (2003, 2009) and Hetzel (2008), but without 
positioning on whether the facts narrated are correct or not, from an ideological perspective.  
1.1 1919-1939 
By 1919, governor Benjamin Strong, chairman of the Fed of New York, realised that the 
spread between the short-term rates and the discount rate would avoid a decline in inflation, 
as it was profitable for banks to borrow at lower rates and lend.  In 1921 began what today is 
known as the federal funds market. Banks with surplus reserves sold reserves to banks with 
deficient reserves. However, its relevance was far from what that market is nowadays. By 
1922, some members of the Fed noted that reserve banks could increase “momentum” 
purchasing in the open market and at the same time reducing the discount rate. Strong 
claimed that buying in the open market was equivalent to a member bank borrowing. Thus, 
open market operations experiments began in 1922. The discount rate during those years was 
at discretion of each Reserve Bank and its use was intended to be a penalty rate. Thus, it used 
to be above short-term rates, at least until 1921-1922, because later, market rates on 
commercial paper started to be above the discount rate. Apart from that, it was supposed to 
be the tool to follow the gold standard rules, namely, increasing it in periods of surplus and 
decreasing it when there was deficit. Also in 1922, Strong noted and commented what would 
determine monetary policy for the next years. His observation was that when banks were in 
debt, they used their surplus reserves to reduce borrowing. On the contrary, when they were 
out of debt, they reduced rates and put their surplus to work. “The reduction in our rate had 
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no influence in the market. It was the competition to lend money that did it” (Meltzer 2003, 
p. 126). Thus, changes in the discount rate were supposed to be ineffective, but by selling in 
the open market, the Reserve Banks could reduce bank reserves and force them to borrow, 
thereby restoring the effectiveness of the discount policy. In 1964 Burgess reported:  
 
“First, as fast as the Reserve Banks bought government securities in the market, 
member banks paid off more of their borrowing; and, as a result, earning asset and 
earnings of the Reserve Bank remained unchanged…” (Meltzer 2003 p.153). 
 
 Given Fed’s concern about speculative credit during the 1920s, interest rates were 
raised to avoid the growth of stock exchange lending, thereby attracting more gold. 
Consequently, to maintain price stability, the Fed sterilized the gold inflows and the monetary 
expansions triggered by those gold inflows were reduced or totally cancelled. One 
characteristic of these years that led Federal Reserve Banks to follow the wrong policy is 
explained in what was the Riefler-Burgess doctrine. It was believed that banks were reluctant 
to borrow and they only did it when their reserves were deficient. This triggered that during 
many years the monetary base and borrowing moved procyclically. That is, the Fed believed 
that increased aggregate borrowing signalled a restrictive policy even if the monetary base 
and money stock accelerated. Following this reasoning, it increased the purchases in the open 
market and decreased the discount rate for those periods, and did just the opposite when 
borrowing decreased. 
  
 At the April 1925 meeting for the Governors Conference, the concern that would 
continue for the rest of the decade was expressed; credit to securities brokers and dealers. 
They feared speculative borrowing. Consequently, some Reserve Banks increased the 
discount rate later, as the open market account was thought to be too small to have a 
significant effect on reducing bank reserves. The Fed carried out open market purchases in 
May 1927 because of the recession, and continued in July. However, they were offset by a 
decline in borrowing and in the reported gold stock. Despite the increase in inflation in 1926, 
Strong’s view of supporting the pound with lower rates dominated.  By the end of 1927 
Strong had complete authorization to offset gold flows without limit. From 1927 to 1929 the 
Fed sterilized gold inflows, preventing monetary expansions and triggering, or at least adding 
to the deflation witnessed for those years. In addition, the members of the Fed were misled by 
the lower levels of discounts and borrowing, as commented above, believing that policy was 
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already expansive.  Apart from that, during this period the discount rate was higher in real 
terms given the levels of deflation, but they did not distinguish between real and nominal 
terms. Moreover, the spread between the stock exchange call loans rate and the discount rate 
became significantly large after the beginning of 1928. Given the increase in credit to 
brokers, the Fed thought that its policies were expansive and therefore, rates were not 
reduced and open market purchases decreased. During 1928, the Federal Reserve offset part 
of the net gold outflow, but it was insufficient and the monetary base declined. Thus, when 
New York stopped sterilizing gold losses, discounting increased significantly but the 
monetary base continued falling. Discounting and bank credit were in the highest levels of 
the three last years. 
 
 “…[O]n December 31, 1928, the Board adopted a resolution that  blamed the spread 
between discount rates and rates for stock exchange loans for the temptation to borrow from 
the Fed and lend to help buy or carry securities” (Meltzer 2003, p. 237). The Fed spent 1929 
trying to reduce bank lending to brokers, as it was thought to be speculative credit, but most 
of the lending came from corporations and other nonbanks. Hence, the Fed was not 
successful in reducing call loan rates. Previous to the crash on October 23, call loan rates had 
already started to decrease and by that date, they were around 6%. However, the Fed refused 
to reduce the discount rate. At the end of November 1929 the Fed noted that there was being 
a liquidation of credit against securities, what could suppose a serious threat to business 
stability, having already in mind that there were indications of a business recession. As the 
short-term rates had fallen and were expected to fall further, and discounting increased, the 
Fed approved limited purchases in the open market. Later, industrial production, stock of 
money, monetary base and borrowing fell. Fed governors thought that the open market 
purchases had failed to revive the economy. Actually, the Fed had failed to offset the decline 
in borrowing by purchasing insufficiently. However, the members of the Fed thought that the 
purchases had already permitted banks to repay borrowing, as borrowing levels had declined. 
Bank failures along with the increasing demand of the public for currency, contributed to 
contracting the money supply. 
 
 By the end of 1930, Fed’s members were deliberating how much to sell in the open 
market as they considered that policy was loose, since banks were keeping twice the level of 
excess reserves of the previous year. This offset the inflow of gold at the beginning of the 
year. Later, as those inflows did not decrease interest rates, the governors decided to purchase 
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in the open market from April to June of 1931. Nonetheless, the rise in currency holding and 
excess reserve counteracted the effect. In 1932, gold outflow started again, along with a 
higher demand for currency. The Glass-Steagall Act of April 1932 and threats of additional 
legislation led the Fed to purchase in the open market. Signs of improvements were soon 
recognized but as the purchases stopped, the improvements quickly disappeared and gold 
outflow continued. Accordingly, it was thought that the program has failed. As already 
occurred between 1927-1929, since the short-term rates were historically low, the members 
of the Fed thought that policy was easy and no further purchases were done. However, 
because of the deflation, real rates were higher. The System kept an inactive role during the 
next months. From time to time, as in January 1933, the System sold in the open market to 
keep excess reserves close to $500 million. In the beginning of 1933 short-term rates 
increased, but the Fed failed by discounting at higher rates than the market, when it should 
have set the discount rate below the short-term rates.  
The last part of the interwar period, from 1933 to 1941 is characterized by the inaction 
of the Fed, as the Treasury took most of the responsibility for monetary policy. The Fed’s 
open market account and the discount rate hardly changed during this period, and the 
variations in the monetary base were due to changes in gold stock and the devaluation of the 
dollar in 1934. Marriner S. Eccles, who became governor of the Board in 1934 believed that 
the Fed should keep market rates low, in order to facilitate private spending and government 
finance. Also, he thought that the growing volume of reserves at member banks could mean a 
threat of future inflation. Thus, reserve requirement ratios became the main instrument of the 
Fed during these years. In October and November of 1933 the Fed made the last purchases in 
the open market and it would not purchase again until April 1937.  
 In 1934, Roosevelt bought gold and silver to raise prices. The base and money stock 
increased. Also that year, he carried out devaluation up to 60% of the gold. As the president 
had acquired the gold held by the Federal Reserve banks previously, this devaluation 
supposed a $2 billion profit, which was used to set up the Exchange Stabilization Fund 
(ESF). It aimed to retire national banknotes and finance industrial loans. This devaluation 
supposed an increase in prices and flow of gold into the country. The ESF was also used to 
buy bonds, in order to keep rates low and finance the deficit. In August 1935, as excess 
reserves rose and there was fear of future inflation, the Fed decided to increase the reserve 
requirements ratio. As reserves had increased, discounting decreased and hence, the discount 
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rate could exert little influence, or at least the members of the Fed thought so. This first 
increase in the reserve requirement ratio had little effect because of the gold inflow. Given 
the fear of speculative gold inflows and increase in the monetary base, the Treasury sterilized 
gold inflows between December 1936 and July 1937. Just in this period, deflation appeared 
again. There were two further increases in the reserves requirement ratio in January and May 
of 1936. Later, and together with the sterilization, there was an increase in bond yields, what 
supposed the restart of the Fed’s purchases in the open market to lower short-term rates and 
indirectly, long-term rates. The increases in the reserves requirement ratio along with 
contractive fiscal policies supposedly made the money stock to fall, causing a recession by 
May of 1937. Thus, in September 1937 more open market purchases were undertaken and the 
Treasury desterilized part of the gold inflows. Consequently, inflation levels increased for the 
end of the year.  Around that time, the Fed proposed to manage open market operations 
(OMO, henceforth) in response to the level of excess reserves instead of the amount of 
borrowing. Thus, by 1938 the Fed’s purchases in the open market were in small quantities, 
also because rates were low and it was believed that the monetary policy was easy. However, 
deflation came back again for the end of the year and the Fed had to reduce reserve 
requirements ratios, while the Treasury continued desterilizing the gold sterilized for the 
previous years.  
 
1.2 1950-1957 
The main characteristics of monetary policy from 1950 to 1960 were that the Fed still 
considered low interest rates as loose policy, even though M1 be decreasing; the gain in 
relevance in the use of OMO in relation to discounting, and that the main target was free 
reserves, using bank borrowing as an indicator. Money growth did not receive attention 
despite it was thought to cause inflation in the long run. Still, they did not differentiate 
between real and nominal rates and continued applying procyclical policies. In 1952 banks 
borrowed relatively large amounts from the discount window, taking advantage of the spread 
between the open market rates and the discount rate. In 1954 the federal funds market 
emerged again, as it had been inactive since the late 1920s. 
 
 Regarding discount rate policies the following is found. “At the August 23 1955 
FOMC meeting Martin raised two issues: whether the discount rate should be a penalty rate, 
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and whether it should lead or follow market rates… Following the meeting… in mid-
September; the discount rate was a penalty rate” (Meltzer 2009a, pp. 127-128).  
 Later, “The Board reconsidered the role of discounting in its 1957 Annual Report… 
The Board, at last, recognized that when one bank repaid its borrowing, another might be 
forced to borrow, so that aggregate reserves did not decline. And it recognized that increased 
borrowing offset open market sales and that the attitude of member banks toward operation 
with borrowed resources varies from bank to bank…  The Board found no conflict between 
discounting and open market operations. Market and discount rates were interdependent. By 
raising the discount rate above the market rate, the System encouraged banks to adjust by 
selling securities instead of discounting. Short-term rates rose, reinforcing an open market 
policy of sales” (Meltzer 2009a, p. 78).   
1.3 1958-1970 
 
 Already for the period under analysis in the next chapter, there was a recession in 
1957-1958. In 1958, the president asked to make price stability an explicit goal of economic 
policy. The Great Inflation was underway during the 1960s, sustained by rapid money growth 
to finance the government budget and government spending for the Vietnam War. One of the 
Fed’s problems during this period was that it acted to reduce inflation only until 
unemployment rose. Given the unpopularity of inflation since 1965, emphasis shifted 
between those two goals.  
 
 Free reserves were increasing in 1960 and the Fed interpreted it as easy policy. As the 
economy slowed, discount rates decreased and free reserves and federal funds rate rose. 
During 1961-1962, the free reserves target was questioned and for the first time there was a 
target for the T-bill rate. On January 1962, an increase in deposit ceiling rates was approved. 
When the Fed began to control interest rates during those years, the problem was that they 
contained less information about the market position. “Instead of the market being a window 
through which we can observe indications of private actions that might call for policy 
changes, we have made it—in part at least—a mirror of our own intentions with respect to 
rates” (Meltzer 2009a, p.429). In 1963 the free reserve target was abandoned and more 
attention was dedicated to the federal funds rate and less to the T-bill rate. In early 1965, the 
first of several errors to control inflation was made, when the president’s Economic Report 
announced the need for further expansion, even though signs of strength had already 
appeared.  The same year, the federal funds rate became again higher than the discount rate. 
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Since the Fed targeted a short-term rate, to prevent a change on it when the deficit increased, 
the Fed had to allow the monetary base to increase. Fiscal policy contributed to inflation with 
the president Johnson’s large deficits in 1967-1968. Before Martin left the Fed in January 
1970, the Fed had adopted growth money as a policy indicator and instructed the manager to 
change money market conditions if money growth deviated from a 2% annual rate. When 
Burns became chairman of the Fed, the manager in charge of OMO lost much of his 
autonomy and the “tone and feel policy” ended forever. Money growth became the target and 
the FOMC would take decisions based on a total reserves target. Money and bank credit 
growth were used as target rather than as projection, meaning, the manager would change the 
federal funds rate when he missed the target. As the procedure began raising federal funds 
rate, the System ended up supplying more reserves, in part to prevent the failure of the 
Treasury financing.  Thus, the FOMC soon gave up on monetary control. Higher rates 
supposed higher unemployment, and Burns disliked the result. By August 2, wage and price 
controls were imposed. Also the gold window was closed, and the currency was allowed to 
float. 
 “In short, the simple Keynesian model as applied in the late 1960s had three major 
flaws. It did not generally distinguish between nominal and real interest rate changes. It 
presumed that the government could permanently reduce the unemployment rate by 
permitting the inflation rate to rise. And it did not distinguish between one-time price level 
changes and maintained rates of price change. Each of these errors continued throughout the 
1970s” (Meltzer 2009a, p.490). 
1.4 1971-1980 
This decade started with a freeze in prices and later, in interest rates, rates charged on 
mortgages, and consumer credit. Burns believed that in order to achieve full recovery without 
inflation, it was necessary to increase profits and lower wages growth, as it was understood 
that cost-push by unions was causing inflation. Another three phases of price controls were 
extended until 1973. Although in the beginning they decreased inflation, once finished, 
inflation increased even more. In the end, the public lost credibility on these controls. 
During these years, it was usual to target growth in monetary and credit aggregates, setting at 
the same time lower and upper bounds on the federal funds rate. Before the elections in 1972, 
it is said that Burns was pressured by the government to increase growth and decrease 
unemployment. Once the elections passed and the administration loosed price and wage 
control, there was an inflationary outbreak due to those expansionary policies. In 1973, 
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member bank borrowing rose to levels not reached since 1921 and the discount rate rose only 
in August 1973. Again, due to positive the spread between the discount rate and federal funds 
rate from 1972 to 1975. The Fed was also targeting the growth of reserves against private 
deposits during this period. The procedure contributed to increasing inflation as the staff 
estimated the growth of reserves and the level of federal funds rate consistent with the desired 
growth of money. Several times, they did not match and the band on federal funds rate had to 
be changed. In the end, the manager maintained the federal funds rate and exceeded the 
reserve target. As inflation increased, the federal funds rate and the discount rate reached 
levels never seen before. However, such was the spread between both rates that member bank 
borrowing increased significantly, contributing to the growth of the monetary base. It seems 
that along with the excessive monetary and fiscal expansion of 1972, the removal of price 
controls in 1973, the devaluation of the dollar after 1971, poor harvest abroad and the 
increases in oil prices, added to the rise in inflation. Beginning in 1975, borrowing declined 
and the federal funds rate came down rapidly. The FOMC continued using the federal funds 
rate as it principal target during this decade. “This period is unique in that the Fed controlled 
the funds rate so closely that market participants could identify most changes in the funds rate 
target on the day they were first implemented by the Fed, and these changes were reported by 
the market participants in the financial press the following day” (Meltzer 2009b, p. 892).  
 
 By October 1978, inflation had become a political issue as public opinion saw it as a 
major problem. In December 1978, the oil-producing countries decided to raise prices again. 
Inside the FOMC, more arguments appeared regarding how to control inflation and how this 
could reduce employment at the same time. Other concern was that the lack of credibility was 
damaging the effect of raising the federal funds rate, as the public expected that the Fed 
would not continue its restrictive policies and prices would increase again. Mark Willes 
claimed: 
 
 “We can in fact have less inflation without more unemployment in 1980 if we have 
policies in 1979 that are…firmly held to so that people really believe we are going to 
follow through on them (FOMC Minutes, February 6, 1979, 19)” (Meltzer 2009b, p.940).  
1.5 1980-1990 
In August 1979, Volcker became chairman of the Fed. At his confirmation he already 
distinguished between real and nominal interest rates and expressed inflation as his main 
  
 
18 
concern. He, following Milton Friedman, accepted that inflation could not be reduced unless 
money growth declined relative to growth of real output. The FOMC used a federal funds 
rate target and announced objectives for growth of M1 and M2 to reduce money growth. For 
that task, Volcker targeted nonborrowed reserves. However, they also paid attention to total 
reserves to move the target for nonborrowed reserves. “Monetarists criticized the procedures 
at the time, arguing that they made both interest rates and money growth more volatile. 
Growth of the money stock depends on reserve growth (or the monetary base). By holding to 
a fixed value (or growth) of nonborrowed reserves, banks had to borrow any deficiency to 
meet required reserves on deposits outstanding two weeks earlier, thereby increasing total 
reserves. …Further, keeping the discount rate as a penalty rate slightly above the average 
federal funds rate, would reduce borrowing. Most often, the Fed subsidized borrowing in 
1979-82 by allowing a wide spread, 4 or 5%, between the average federal funds rate and the 
discount rate. This encouraged borrowing and weakened control of money” (Meltzer 2009b, 
p. 1028). 
 
 The attitude change on the FOMC was apparent once despite the recession of 1980, it 
favoured slower money growth. However, although by March the discount rate was raised, 
the action was insufficient and late. Heavy borrowing continued because of the subsidy of 
around 4 percentage points. Twelve years after Friedman’s insistence on the effect of 
expectations, the Fed accepted that it could not permanently reduce unemployment by 
increasing inflation. Now, it was claimed that low inflation increased employment. The 
recession of 1980 and the posterior decrease in the discount rate in July avoided that the 
credibility on the Fed augmented. Policy tightened sharply in the spring of 1981, when the 
FOMC continued increasing the federal funds rate despite the recession and the 
unemployment rate near 8% in the fall. Market participants recognized that the Fed was 
fighting inflation. Thus, credibility increased. This was a turning point. By October, CPI 
inflation decreased quickly. The speed of the fall surprised the Fed. In part, it was 
ameliorated by the dollar appreciation undergone from 1980 to 1985. In 1982, the FOMC 
finished targeting nonborrowed reserves, and Volcker clearly began to shift to an interest rate 
target. He did not trust on M1 anymore: 
  
“On these money growth targets, in substance, I don’t care. I think either of these two 
sets of numbers [5.5 and 6.5%] will make no difference, virtually, in what we actually 
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do… [W]e are within the limits of the growth targets anyway”. (Meltzer 2009b, p. 
1114).  
 
“I, frankly, cannot live in these circumstances, given what is going on in the money 
markets, with violent moves in short-term rates in either direction. It would just be so 
disturbing in terms of expectations, market psychology, and fragility that it’s just the 
wrong policy, period, during this particular period.” (Meltzer 2009b, p.1115) 
 
 Shortly later, Volcker targeted borrowing to around $500-$600 million to prevent a 
raise in the interest rate. Thus, the System returned to the target used in 1920s and the basis 
for the free reserves target in the 1950s and 1960s. Policy became discretionary based on 
Volcker’s judgment. Despite inflation had decreased significantly by the end of 1982, it was 
still high and again, created skepticism about the Fed’s purpose of reducing it. In 1983-1984, 
long-term rates increased again. Consequently, inflationary expectations proxied by bond 
rates replaced money as intermediate target. Later, Greenspan concerns and focus on shaping 
the expectational environment would turn Volcker’s experiment into a new monetary 
standard. A renewed rise in bond rates in the spring of 1984 tested Fed’s compromise to fight 
inflationary expectations. Again, in 1984, Morris pointed out that the differential between the 
federal funds rate and the discount rate was of 2 percentage points and borrowing had 
reached $1 billion. He proposed to increase the discount rate 1 percentage point but Volcker 
replied that it would mean “an explosion in Washington”. Thus, during those years, many 
increases in the discount rate were not undertaken because of the pressure from the 
administration. When Greenspan replaced Volcker in August 1987, he set a narrow band 
around a federal funds rate target, which was adjustable depending on inflation and stable 
growth. In 1987, there was another inflation scare due to the depreciation of the dollar. 
1.6 1990-2007 
After the recession in 1990, the FOMC followed a “soft recovery” strategy and Greenspan 
focused on reducing expected inflation by reducing bond rates rather than just focusing on 
them during inflation scares. However, inflation concerns appeared in mid-1990 when Iraq 
invaded Kuwait and oil prices raised. Another inflation scare was faced in the beginning of 
1993, but the Fed kept raising the federal funds rate during the next months until February 
1995. “By the end of the decade, financial market had stopped associating high real growth 
with a resurgence of inflation. The Fed had defeated the “bond market vigilantes”” (Hetzel 
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2008, p. 205). By 1998, falling unemployment rate and low inflation created expectations 
about an increase in the federal funds rate. Nonetheless, low world growth perspectives led to 
lower the federal funds rate. Thus, the FOMC exacerbated an unsustainable rise in equity 
prices. From mid-1997 through mid-1999, the FOMC changed its procedures and raised rates 
when resource utilization rates were high. Greenspan believed that monetary policy should 
counter irrational expectations. He did not increase the federal funds rate again until February 
2000 because he did not consider inflation as a threat. He believed that productivity growth 
was restraining inflation. As inflation and unemployment fell together after 1995, Greenspan 
explained: 
 
“The lack of pricing leverage has once again concentrated the minds of business 
people on the need to increase productivity… [E]conomic experience appears to be 
running full circle, back to the early 1960s: a period of low-inflation and strong 
productivity growth …[L]ower inflation historically has been associated…with faster 
growth of productivity… Lower inflation and inflation expectations reduce 
uncertainty in economic planning and diminish risk premiums for capital investment” 
(Hetzel 2008, p.231).  
 
 After the Asian financial crisis, the FOMC began to raise the federal funds rate. The 
equity market began its rise in 1995 until its peak in early 2000. After that peak, the 
NASDAQ began a prolonged fall after September 2000 and investors lost a significant 
amount of wealth. Consumption growth rates fell and the economy weakened. In January 
2001, the Fed decreased rates, slowly and late. Thus, policy was contractionary by then. In 
2001, policy followed the lean-against-the-wind pattern, whereby the FOMC raised (lowered) 
the funds rate in a persistent, measured way if the economy grew above (below) trend. The 
characterization for the last years of the Greenspan era is that the FOMC pursued its basic 
expected inflation/growth gap procedures but raised its implicit inflation target from price 
stability to low inflation.  
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-- Chapter 2 --
Have we been measuring monetary policy correctly? Analysing the 
Federal Reserve's policies over the last century 
Unlike the standard and e,roneous practice of using the federal funds rate or 
another intennediate target to measure the monetary policy stance, a new 
procedure is developed using the actual Federal Reserve's instruments and the 
spread between short-tenn rates and the discount rate. Accordingly, I estimate 
a time-varying coefficient Bayesian SVARfor the intenvar period and 1958-
2007. The new technique unveils a new mechanism operating between Fed's 
policies and the real economy_ The results show that monetary policy was 
mostly i,relevantfor the intenvar period, but the situation changed after 1958. 
For this last case, however, the new mechanism, which focuses on the cost at 
which banks obtain reserves, explains that positive spreads between the 
federal fands rate and the discount rate contributed to increasing inflation, 
revealing that the "price puzzle" is non-existent. 
• JEL classification: E43, E51, E52, E58 
• Keywords: monetary policy, Federal Reserve, Bayesians, SV ARs, price puzzle, federal 
fands rate 
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2.1 Introduction 
 The Great Recession and, inherently, the inability to avoid it supposed, or should have 
supposed, an inflection point. It showed that monetary policy, as a tool to achieve central 
banks’ goals, was not managed correctly and therefore not properly understood. That lack of 
understanding means that our knowledge about the channels whereby monetary policy 
operates must be incorrect at some stage. To address that issue, this chapter takes not only a 
step forward, but also to the side, uncoupling from the standard and widespread approach to 
measuring the impact of monetary policy on the real economy. The step forward is 
materialized in the review of the Federal Reserve’s history from its early days to the years 
prior to the Great Recession, regarding how this institution and its members reacted to 
political and economic events, how those actions supposedly influenced the American 
economy’s performance and how monetary policy evolved until the years prior to the Great 
Recession. Thus, while the literature has focused only on certain periods of interests, the 
purpose of this review is to draw common patterns from the long-term picture and learn how 
monetary policy instruments were used and interacted with inflation, output and the money 
supply. Once a better understanding of the Fed’s instruments is acquired, the step to the side 
is inevitable and supposes the major contribution of this chapter. The federal funds rate, 
another short-term money market rate or reserve measures have been used extensively as 
Fed’s instruments in the literature to analyze the monetary policy stance and its impact on the 
real economy; however, by definition, they are intermediate targets. The actual instruments 
are open market operations (henceforth OMO), the discount rate and the reserve requirements 
ratio1. The conceptual mistake and the subsequent erroneous use of intermediate targets to 
measure the monetary policy stance introduce bias into the model (explained in section 2.2) 
and provide the wrong conclusions in relation to the impact of Fed’s policies on the 
economy. Moreover, the correct use and understanding of the actual instruments, and the 
incentives they produce for the banking sector, inevitably lead to the creation of a new 
variable that measures arbitrage opportunities for bank reserves and provides an explanation 
for the known price puzzle, whereby when interest rate are raised, inflation increases. 
Therefore, the novelty of this chapter is the analysis of longer periods with the use of the 
actual instruments and the new variable. The new set-up facilitates the study of and shed new 
light on the relationship between instruments and the real economy, and potential regime 
                                                        
1  After the 2008 crisis, new instruments were incorporated. See 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/policytools.htm. 
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changes in Fed’s policies. As a result of measuring monetary policy stance correctly, a new 
hypothetical mechanism whereby monetary policy operates is discovered. This mechanism 
focuses on the source from where banks obtain reserves, and how the different cost of each 
source has a different impact on the economy. It also provides an explanation for the price 
puzzle and claims that there is not puzzle, but bad policies applied by the Fed, when it 
allowed positive spreads between short-term rates and the discount rate. 
 While a vast literature exists covering how the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy 
stance has influenced the American economy’s performance, references to the instruments 
have been used only and occasionally for those analyzing the interwar period, although from 
a narrative perspective; whereas to the best of my knowledge, there is no reference to the 
instruments for the second half of the twentieth century, despite the use of advanced 
methodologies. For the interwar period, Miron (1988) focused on monetary aggregates, and 
referencing how the Fed used the discount rate, he claimed that Fed’s policies might have 
created more volatility in inflation and output during the 1920s and part of the 1930s. Bordo 
(1993) analyzed and compared how different monetary regimes determined the evolution of 
real variables. By estimating a bivariate VAR on the price level and output, he stated, “the 
gold standard and interwar period emerge as a relatively unstable period stressed by widely 
dispersed supply shocks” (Bordo 1993, p. 16). For those attributing the responsibility for the 
Great Depression, the debate has focused on whether the death of Governor Strong produced 
a change in policy implementation, mostly when using OMO, although also commenting 
changes in the discount rate. For example, Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Bordo and 
Schwartz (1999) and Hetzel (1985) considered Strong’s years as governor of the New York 
Fed as a period of mostly successful monetary policy, but, once he died, those who opposed 
his ideas took charge, which could have created or worsened the Great Depression. On the 
other hand, Wicker (1965), Brunner and Meltzer (1968) and Wheelock (1989, 1990) argued 
that, had Strong lived during those years, the outcome would have been the same, as the 
policies were already ineptly administrated during his lifetime. By looking at the evolution of 
some real variables, market rates, the discount rate and OMO, Hamilton (1987) concluded 
that despite the slight change in policies during the 1920s, it was insufficient to explain the 
Great Depression and that some other factors were involved. Along this line and as exception 
in methodology, Ritschl and Woitek (2000) estimated a BVAR, using non-borrowed 
reserves, the discount rate or the short-term money market rates to measure the impact of 
monetary policy on real variables. They found that positive shocks to the discount rate and 
intermediate targets had, in general, a positive impact on inflation (price puzzle) and negative 
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on output. They concluded that the monetary policy before the stock market crash did not 
cause the recession. At most, it could have produced a mild recession, which is also in line 
with Temin (1973). For the period after 1933, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Orphanides 
(2004) claimed that, despite the Fed’s inactivity during those years, the inflow of gold was 
the factor guiding the well functioning of the economy.  
 For the second part of the twentieth century, since the Fed recovered its 
independence from the Treasury in 1951, the literature has been approaching Fed’s monetary 
policy stance rather methodologically and mainly immersed in the “good luck, good policy” 
debate2, which is also related to monetary policy switching regimes. At the same time, this 
literature gathers common characteristics, such as the use of VARs and the controversy about 
the price puzzle. As commented previously, the use of the federal funds rate as Fed’s 
instrument has been the common procedure to evaluate monetary policy actions and I will 
specify when some variations are applied.  On the one hand, some authors have focused on 
Fed’s responses to movements in output and inflation. Such is the case of Clarida, Gali and 
Gertler (2000) using a GMM for a monetary policy reaction function. They observed that a 
policy change occurred during the Volcker–Greenspan era. This change is assumed to have 
brought stability to the economy, avoiding the indeterminacy equilibria existing before the 
Volcker era, by responding more aggressively to inflation. With a similar model, Favero and 
Rovelli (2003) obtained analogous results. Cogley and Sargent (2005), applying a similar 
model to the one in Canova and Gambetti (2009) indicated below, but using the 3-month 
Treasury bills rate, observed changes in the Federal Reserve’s stance toward inflation, but 
their conclusion was not decisive in disentangling the good luck from the good policy 
hypothesis. Orphanides (2004b), comparing Taylor rules with real data and the data available 
for the Fed, claimed that bad policies played a relevant role during the Great Inflation, as the 
Fed wrongly understood how the economy worked, mistakenly predicting larger output gaps 
and intervening in the economy more than necessary, thus creating instability. Once it 
focused on inflation rather than the output gap, and the interventions became fewer and more 
accurate, the situation improved.   
 On the other hand, the object of study is rather the effect of positive shocks to the 
federal funds rate or a similar variable, on the real economy and money aggregates. Firstly, 
however, the use of VARs is evaluated. Giannone, Lenza and Reichlin (2008) examined 
VAR models of different sizes and trusted more those that included more variables, arguing 
                                                        
2 This debate evaluates whether the American economy’s performance has been the result of Fed’s policies or 
external shocks. The main focus is on the pre- and post-Volcker era. 
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that the VARs supporting the good luck hypothesis, which contain fewer variables, are naïve 
models; Benati and Surico (2009), who, using a New Keynesian model via Bayesian 
methods, whereby they moved from determinacy to indeterminacy states, were able to 
demonstrate that those works based on VARs and supporting the good luck hypothesis may 
have misinterpreted good policy as good luck. In this case, inflation responded negatively to 
a positive nominal interest shock. Beyond VARs evaluation, Boivin and Giannone (2006), 
who used an SVAR, founded that a positive shock to the federal funds rate originated a price 
puzzle when analyzing the inflation responses, whereas output responded negatively. With a 
VAR, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1998) found that the Federal Reserve’s activism 
declined in the late 1960s and was neutral in the early 1970s. Then, the Fed became passive 
for the remainder of the 1970s, not increasing the federal funds rate enough to counteract 
inflation. In 1981, monetary policy became activist again until Greenspan’s term, when it 
decreased slightly but regained strength since 1993.  By using alternatively the federal funds 
rate or nonborrowed reserves, a positive shock to these variables showed mostly a negative 
impact on the money supply and output, and initially no effect on inflation, which turned 
negative after roughly a year. However, when commodity prices were excluded from the 
estimation, a price puzzle was found. Primicery (2005), using a time-varying coefficient 
Bayesian structural vector autoregression (TVC-BSVAR), argued that, despite observing a 
change in monetary policy, it was not significantly different between the pre- and post-
Volcker periods, and Canova and Gambetti (2009), with a similar method, found that the 
policy was the same for both periods, showing that the Taylor principle was not satisfied in 
any of the periods and that the transmission of monetary policy shocks to output and inflation 
remained stable over the periods analyzed, but inflation’s persistence changed over time. For 
the former, a small price puzzle is found depending on the period, which disappears quickly, 
while for the latter, both, inflation and output respond negatively to a positive federal funds 
rate shock. Using a semi-structural VAR, including the federal funds rate, nonborrowed and 
total reserves, Hanson (2006) showed that a change in the policy is noticeable after Volcker’s 
era but that it seems more probable that shocks coming from variables such as output or 
prices were important in determining the economic performance. Again, a price puzzle was 
found. 
 For those analyzing the evolution and volatility of inflation and output, but still 
using the same variables to measure monetary policy actions, Gali and Gambetti (2009), 
using a TVC-BSVAR and analyzing the variations in non-technology and technology shocks, 
concluded that monetary policy could have been among the factors explaining the decrease in 
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volatility in output after the Great Inflation. Stock and Watson (2003), examined time-
varying standard deviations and VARs with break tests and attributed the reduction of 
volatility to the decrease in shocks but also ascribed 10%–25% of the importance to 
improved monetary policy. Moreno (2004) developed a rational expectations model and 
showed that CPI inflation volatility declined in the 1980s and 1990s because of the 
propagation mechanism, but, considering the GDPD volatility, the decline is explained by 
smaller shocks. Federal funds rate and 3-month Treasury bill rate were used as Fed’s 
instruments. 
 
 This chapter uses the same model as Primiceri (2005), namely a TVC-BSVAR with 
Del Negro and Primiceri’s (2013) corrigendum, but including the actual Fed’s instrument 
along with a variable measuring the difference between the short-term rate of reference for 
the period under analysis and the discount rate.  The results suggest that monetary policy was 
almost irrelevant for the interwar period, as none of the instruments or the new variable is 
significant when analyzing its impact on output and inflation. For the second period, 
monetary policy gains relevance and the discount rate and the spread are able to influence the 
evolution of the variables under analysis. Furthermore, two regimes changes are observed 
around 1965 and 1990. While the first one may correspond to a change in Fed’s policies, the 
second one is probably due to a change in the banking sector’s behavior. Last and most 
important, the use of the spread unveils a new mechanism that explains the prize puzzle 
found in papers such as Barth and Ramey (2001), Boivin and Giannoni (2003), Bernanke, 
Boivin and Eliasz (2005), Uhlig (2005) and Hanson (2006), among many others. The reason 
for the creation of this variable is that for those periods when this spread was positive, banks 
had the possibility of obtaining higher profits by borrowing more cheaply at the discount 
window and lending at higher rates. The obtaining of cheaper reserves increased the 
possibility that banks set relatively lower loans rates in relation to the raises in the federal 
funds rate. Consequently, the insufficient restrain of credit and the money supply, triggered 
higher inflation levels. Therefore, I claim that there is no puzzle in prices behavior but bad 
Fed’s policies by allowing those positive spreads.  
 The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 develops the theoretical framework 
necessary to understand the model, which is described in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 covers the 
data sources, the identification structure of the VAR and the priors used for the model. 
Section 2.5 analyzes the results obtained. Section 2.6 gathers all the lessons and patterns 
obtained from section 2.5. Finally, section 2.7 summarizes the main conclusions. 
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2.2 Theoretical framework 
As commented previously, the common way of approaching and evaluating the monetary 
policy stance, in methodological terms, has been the use of the federal funds rate or some 
measure of reserves (typically total reserves or nonborrowed reserves) as Federal Reserve’s 
instruments. By definition, this assumption is erroneous. The federal funds rate or any type of 
reserve measure has always been and will be an intermediate target to achieve a final target 
such as price stability, stable growth or low unemployment. Actually, the Federal Reserve 
has available three instruments to achieve its intermediate and final targets. Such instruments 
are OMO, the discount rate and the reserve requirements ratio. Accordingly, to analyze the 
Federal Reserve’s role and the impact of its policies on the American economy’s 
performance, it is appropriate to use those instruments. In my model, I count with two of 
them, the discount rate and OMO, two intermediate targets, the spread between the short-
term rate of reference (call loans rate3 or federal funds rate) and the discount rate,4 what is the 
new variable commented above, and M1, and two final targets, the industrial production 
index (IPI) and CPI inflation. The reserve requirements ratio is not incorporated given that it 
hardly varies over time. 
 To understand why it is erroneous to use of the federal funds rate (or another short-
term rate)5 to measure monetary policy, the money market must be conceptualized as two 
submarkets. The first submarket includes the central bank, in this case the Fed on the supply 
side, and the banking sector on the demand side. In the second submarket, the banking sector 
switches to the supply side, the other agents of the economy being the demand side. The Fed 
                                                        
3 The call loans rate, for the interwar period, was the most similar rate to the present federal funds rate. “The 
market for brokers’ loans, as it is generally conceived, is centered around the New York Stock Exchange. 
Although some of these loans grow out of a customer relationship between banks as lenders and brokers and 
dealers as borrowers, the majority are made in the open market on a strictly impersonal basis. The market in 
which these loans are made was until recent years the most active and the most sensitive of the money markets 
of the country. It was the market where surplus funds of banks, and sometimes of other lenders, could generally 
be readily placed or from which funds could be quickly withdrawn when needed. Because of the dominance of 
call loans, the branch of the money market dealing in brokers’ loans has been designated as the call money 
market” (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), 1935–. Banking and Monetary Statistics, 
1914-1941, 1943, https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/38, p. 434). 
4  In this case, it is not really an intermediate target but a hybrid between an intermediate target and an 
instrument, because the short-term rate is an intermediate target and the discount rate an instrument. 
5 The same applies to any measure of reserves, as a reserve target will determine the federal funds rate or the 
other way around. 
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controls the federal funds rate by purchasing and selling securities in the open market and 
increasing or decreasing the discount rate. Thus, the Fed controls the amount (with OMO) 
and price (with the discount rate and federal funds rate) of money in the first submarket, 
subject to the banking sector’s demand for money and subsequent decisions about the federal 
funds rate and to considerations regarding whether that level of demand could harm the 
stability of the economy. Given the price and amount of money set by the Fed, banks will 
also decide, the amount (loans), although just in part, and price (loans rate) of money in the 
second submarket. Unlike Fed’s intentions, banks will set prices and amounts conditioned on 
their profitability. Their decisions about prices and quantities will depend, mainly, on the cost 
of money to them, namely, reserves cost, and the prospect of profits from lending.  
 Thus, the federal funds rate is affected by supply and demand forces in the first 
submarket. The banking sector (as the demand side) will set a federal funds rate depending 
on several factors, such as the demand for reserves necessary to back the amount of loans, 
banks’ surplus reserves, expectations about the adequate level of reserves to hold for the 
future or their own desire regarding the optimum level of reserves held under certain 
circumstances. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve (supply side) will target a federal funds rate 
to control the evolution of the demand side by using OMO and the discount rate. However, 
the simultaneous use of both instruments to set the same level of the federal funds rate at two 
different points in time will be different. The reason is that as the federal funds rate depends 
also on the banking sector, the Fed will have to purchase or sell different amounts of 
securities and the discount rate will have to be set at different levels, to provide banks with 
the required amount of reserves determined by the demand forces, under the federal funds 
rate targeted. In the end, the same level of the federal funds rate can produce different 
equilibria. A greater demand for money faced with a greater supply of money can have a 
price of equilibrium (the federal funds rate in this case), which can be the same with a lower 
demand and supply of money. Nonetheless, this lower or greater supply of money will have 
different effects on the economy, because under the same federal funds rate, the cost and 
amount of reserves provided will have different impacts on the loans rate, which in the end, is 
the rate determining a greater or lower demand for loans. Hence, including the federal funds 
rate in the econometric model to represent the monetary policy stance is erroneous, because, 
by capturing demand and supply forces, the supposed policies carried out by the Fed will 
produce misleading results, as the banking sector can, to some extent, modify them and the 
results will capture those demand side modifications. By using the real instruments, Fed’s 
policies, namely the supply forces, are isolated from the demand forces. However, despite 
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being isolated from the Fed’s instruments, the federal funds rate entails another problem if 
included in the model alone. Its impact on the second submarket is relative, as it depends on 
the discount rate levels. As both rates measure the cost of reserves from two different 
sources, banks will opt for the cheaper cost once arbitrage opportunities appear. This is where 
the new variable (the spread between the short-term rate of reference and the discount rate) 
plays its role. 
 Sometimes, even though the Fed increased the federal funds rate, if the spread 
between the federal funds rate (or another short-term rate) and the discount rate was positive, 
it offered profitable opportunities for banks. Thus, they continued borrowing cheaper reserves 
at the discount window and lending at higher rates than the discount rate. Lending increased 
or at least did not diminish as much as the Fed intended, because with a cheaper source for 
reserves, the federal funds rate was likely to not have a one to one impact on the loans rate, 
since the most important factor determining the loans rate is the cost of money to banks. As 
the impact ratio would be below one, the loans rate could not exert enough restrain on the 
demand for credit. Accordingly, the Fed partially lost the control of its targets. 
 Thus, in the model presented here, while Fed’s instruments capture the supply side of 
the money market, this new variable will be a representation of those periods when banks 
could obtain cheaper reserves and therefore, the loans rate could not be moving one to one 
with the federal funds rate.  Accordingly, positive spreads are likely to exert inflationary 
pressures, while negative spreads will do the opposite once the interest rate is raised, as long 
as that interest rate is high enough to restrain the demand forces. 
2.2.1 Discarding some concerns 
 
Given the novel exposure of this mechanism, it is necessary to clarify that this new procedure 
can be applied regardless of the period, the monetary regime or the financial environment. 
 Regarding the monetary regime, the advantage of using real instruments is that the 
analysis of the policies undertaken by the Fed will not be altered by the different active 
monetary regimes during the period of study, because a monetary regime implies an 
intermediate target, such as gold, the money supply, interest rate, reserves, exchange rate and 
so on. Consequently, if an intermediate target is used as a measure of the monetary policy 
stance, apart from the problem explained above about the federal funds rate (which also 
applies to the other intermediate targets), that variable must be removed from the model (a 
VAR in this case) or ordered differently as the monetary regime changes. Conversely, using 
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Fed’s instruments, regardless of the monetary regime, the same instruments have to be used 
to achieve both intermediate and final targets. The only way whereby the Fed can achieve its 
goals under any monetary regime goes through the use of the discount rate and OMO. 
 Concerns may be raised as well about how the financial environment has evolved and 
how it could have modified the relationship between the Federal Reserve and the banking 
sector.  The most important source of change could be Regulation Q, as it imposed interest 
rate ceilings on deposits rates. This regulation was active from 1933 to 1986 but was binding 
only when market rates reached ceiling levels around the 1960s. That meant that banks could 
not offer enough yields to attract depositors. Consequently, saving and loans associations 
would catch those clients. According to Koch (2015), interest rate ceilings contracted banks’ 
credit growth and affected the lending channel, because without more deposits, banks could 
not increase lending. This extra tool included in the Fed’s armory would be, therefore, a 
significant omitted variable once ceiling rates were below market rates. There is, however, a 
significant flaw in the premise that banks need deposits to lend, as banks use those deposits 
as reserves. The reality is quite different. Banks first lend, and just after, look for the 
necessary reserves to back the demand for loans. There is an extensive literature explaining 
this issue, such as Moore (1988), Bindseil (2004) or Jakab and Kumhof (2015) among many 
others. This fact is also supported by some data. In Koch (2015, Figure 1), he displayed when 
and for how much markets rates were above ceiling rates. The periods of higher rates, except 
for 1960, coincides with those periods when the spread between the federal funds rate and the 
discount rate was positive (Figure 1.1). If those periods are now contrasted with Figure 1.2, 
where the amount of borrowed reserves is displayed, the evidence is clear, as borrowing 
increased when the spread was positive. Thus, even if banks had not been borrowing for the 
opportunity of obtaining cheaper reserves at the discount window, which is the case, the 
lower amount of reserves from deposits could have been counteracted with borrowing and 
credit would have not been restrained. Also, it is not surprising Koch’s conclusion that when 
the interest rate ceiling was binding, credit decreased. As expected, for periods of increased 
market rates, at some point, lending levels will decrease. On top of that, there are also 
references in Meltzer (2009a, p.470, 608 and 648) to how banks evaded regulation by 
offering different kinds of deposits or services. However, the reader may be confused when 
reading that banks complained about ceiling rates (Meltzer 2009a, p.383). If they did not 
need deposits to lend, why did they complain? When market rates were above those ceilings, 
banks could obtain cheaper reserves from deposits, but the larger the spread, the fewer 
quantity of deposits was demanded. Therefore, even if ceiling rates were raised and banks 
0 = s C: "' 0 "' ~ w ~ ... ~ = = - 0 "' .. .. .. .. <> .. .. .. .. .. .. t; .. 0 01/01/1924 01/01/1957 
10/01/1925 01/0l/19S8 
07/01/l!J'H !!:! 
!!:! .. 05/01/19S, 0 4/01/1929 C ",'j ., 07/01/1900 
01/01/19:U " ., JOI " ;.. 09/01/1%1 JOI 10/01/1932 
N ll!J 11/01/1962 ll!J 07/0l/1934 i!I 
6 04/01/.1.')36 .. Ol/01/1964 .. a a 01/01/19~8 fll 03/01/1965 I • 0 ~ 10/01/19~9 C OS/01/1966 ., 
C 07/01/1941 ~ ., 07/01/1967 <'> wt " 04/01/1943 ~ 9 O'J/01/1968 01/01/1945 11/01/1969 
"' 10/01/J.94 6 I 01/01/1971 iJl 07/0.1/1948 " "" 04/0 I/ 11)SO 03/01/1972 Iii ~ ~ Ol/01/1952 g 0~1/1973 10/ 0l/1'%3 • 07/01/197• "' • "' 0..,/01/1955 ; O'J/Ol/197S 
04/0l/19S. 7 
;; 
ll/0!/l!l76 
I 
Ol/Ol/19S.9 
I Ol/01/1978 10/01/1960 03/01/1979 ... 07/01/1962 
[ !! OS/01/1980 I 04/0l/'964 07/01/1981 w Ot/Ol/1966 ,, 
N I 10/01/1967 [ 
®/Oi/1§8' 
07/01/1969 ~ 11/01/19U 
04/01/1971 ;; 01/0l/198S 
Ot/01/197,3 03/1)1/1986 
10/ 01/1974 ! 05/01/1987 07/01/1976 07/01/1988 0 4/01/1978 • 09/01/1989 01/01/19.80 &' 11/01/1990 10/01/19.Bl. g 
07/01/1983 
, 
01/01/1.992 -< 
0 4/01/198!> ~ 01/01/1993 
01/01/1987 OS/01/1994 
10/0l/1986 07/0l/199S 
07/01/1990 O'J/01/1996 \ 04/01/191)2 11/01/1!197 
01/01/1994 
01/01/1999 <' 10/01/19:05 
07 /01/J.99 7 03/01/2<X1J ' 04/01/1999 05/01/2001 0>/01/200~ 07/01/2002 
10/01/2002 09/01/200] 
07/0t./7004 11/0l/2004 
04/01/2006 01/01/lor.i 
03/0l/2007 
  
 
33 
had to pay more to their clients, they could still obtain cheaper reserves than from the 
discount window or the federal funds market.  
 Other source of concern is the evolution of the discount window. There are some 
misconceptions regarding its use and even though the model used in this chapter will capture 
any related variation or regime change, a couple of things need to be clarified. First, in 1955, 
the Board issued regulation A, where System orthodoxy was that banks did not borrow for 
profit but only reluctantly for need. Later, the discount rate stopped being a ceiling on the 
federal funds rate. It triggered more borrowing as seen in Figure 1.2, but the System needed a 
long time until it changed its mind and accepted that banks also borrowed for profits. 
Therefore, the supposed stigma for borrowing for that period is false. Second, the Depository 
Institution Deregulation and Monetary Act of 1980 allowed more institutions access to the 
discount window. Despite this fact, the analysis undertaken here is in aggregate level. That is, 
before some institutions could have access to the discount window, they were likely to 
borrow from the banking sector, which in turn, would borrow at the discount window if more 
reserves were necessary. Hence, no significant regime change is expected under such 
deregulation act. 
2.3 Methodology 
The model used in this chapter is the same as that in Primicery (2005), a TVC-BSVAR, in 
which, unlike other similar models, not only the coefficients vary but also the variance 
covariance matrix. The code used to estimate the model was downloaded from Gary Koop’s 
website.6 The advantage of this model is that the drifting coefficients are able to capture 
nonlinearities or time variation in the lag structure of the model, while the multivariate 
stochastic volatility is able to capture possible heteroscedasticity of the shocks and 
nonlinearities in the simultaneous relations among the variables of the model. Thereby, it 
allows the data to determine whether the possible variations observed in the relation among 
variables emanates from the shocks (impulse) or changes in the propagation mechanism 
(response). The adequacy of this model for the purpose of the chapter is founded on its 
capacity to capture continuous and smoothed switching regimes, unlike those works that 
modeled time variation with discrete breaks. For the topic addressed in this case, it is 
                                                        
6 https://sites.google.com/site/garykoop/home/computer-code-2. 
The only modifications applied to the code are made to adapt it to the data used here as well as for those tools 
necessary for the representation of the results. The process of estimation is entirely as found in the file. 
  
 
34 
expected that the Federal Reserve, banking sector and other agents of the economy learn from 
the evolution of the economy and each other. The learning process is considered to be slow 
and not to happen overnight. Hence, changes in the behavior of those agents, as a 
consequence of their learning process, will evolve smoothly. 
 
 Using the same notation as Primiceri, the model is the following: 
 
yt  = ct + B1,tyt-1 + … + Bk,t yt-k + ut        t = 1,…, T                (1) 
 
where yt and ct  are n x 1 vectors of observed endogenous variables and a vector of time-
varying coefficients multiplying constant terms, respectively.  Bi,t, i = 1,…, k, represents n x n 
matrices of time-varying coefficients. Last, ut are heteroscedastic unobservable shocks. The 
variance covariance matrix Ωt is triangularly reduced and defined by  
 
                                  At ΩtA’t=∑t∑’t                           (2) 
 
where At is a lower triangular matrix with ones in the main diagonal, αij,t being the non-zero 
and non-one elements of the matrix. ∑t is a diagonal matrix with σn,t elements in the 
diagonal. Hence, 
yt  = B0,t +B1,tyt-1 +…+ Bk,tyt-k+ At
-1∑tεt                      (3) 
V(εt) = In 
Stacking all the Bk,ts in a vector, 
 
Bt = vec(B’t) = [B0,t, B1,t,B2,t,…Bk,t]’ 
 
and with 
Xt=In⊗[1,yt-1,yt-2,…yt-k]’, 
 
the VAR can be represented and modeled as: 
                          yt= X’tBt + At
-1∑tεt                          (4) 
 
 Stacking by rows the elements αij,t of the matrix At and the elements σn,t  of the matrix 
∑t, the state vectors or transition equations representing the dynamics of the model are: 
B, = B,.1 + v, 
0, = 0,./ + (, 
log a,= loga,.1 + 11, 
(5) 
{6) 
(7) 
where both the B,s and the non-zero and non-one elements of the matrix At, a ,, follow 
random walks, while the standard deviations of equation (7) follow a geometric random walk, 
accordingly belonging to the stochastic volatility models. The innovations of the model are 
assumed to be jointly normally distributed, supposing the following variance covariance 
matrix: 
0 0 0 l Q O 0 
0 S 0 
0 0 W 
(8) 
where L, is an n-dimensional identity matrix and Q, S and W are positive definite matrices. 
As Primiceri pointed out, the zero blocks could be replaced by non-zero blocks, but there are 
two reasons for the assumptions taken. First, as Primiceri (2005) already considered the 
number of parameters to be high and adding non-zero blocks would require a sensible prior to 
prevent ill-determined parameters, I include th-e double of the variables in the model. Second, 
I do not have any structural interpretation to impose on the different sources of uncertainty. S 
is assumed to be block diagonal, with blocks corresponding to parameters belonging to a 
separate equation; that is, the coefficients of the contemporaneous relations evolve 
independently in each equation. For the estimation of the model, I refer the reader to 
Appendix A of Primiceri (2005), taking into account Del Negro and Primiceri's (2013) 
corrigendum, whereby the algorithm used for the Gibbs sampling undergoes a modification 
regarding the blocks from which the draws are taken. 
In this model the Bs are restricted to be:ing non-explosive to impose stability. As Koop 
and Potter (2011) (K-P henceforth) explained, "in the absence of such inequality restrictions 
(or a very tight prior), Bayesian TVP-V ARs will place a large amount of a priori weight on 
nonsensical paths for the states." Primiceri used Carter and Kohn's (1994) algorithm, which 
draws an entire vector of states and rejects any that violate the constraint imposed. The 
problem of applying this algorithm is that, when the number of parameters is relatively high, 
it is easy for the algorithm to become stuck drawing explosive Bs. Thus, all the draws are 
discarded and computation is not feasible, as is the case in this chapter for some cases. To 
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solve this problem, K-P developed a single-move algorithm.7 While the MCMC algorithm in 
Primiceri (2005) draws from state space models without the inequality restriction, K-P’s 
single-move algorithm draws from the state space model subject to the inequality restriction, 
drawing the states one at a time. This single-move algorithm does not become stuck rejecting 
every candidate draw, like the multi-move algorithm. It draws Bt from p(Bt|yT, Q, Bt-1),8 
accepting the single draw Bt with a certain acceptance probability if it has satisfied the 
restriction imposed. Now, although the probability of becoming stuck diminishes 
significantly, the algorithm mixes more slowly.  
2.3.1 Data, identification strategy and priors 
The sample under analysis is split into two periods. The first one covers the interwar period 
with monthly data from 1925:I to 1939:XII, and the second period encompasses the interval 
between 1958:I and 2007:IV with quarterly data. The reason for using different periodicity is 
that for the interwar period the sample size is excessively small if using quarterly data, taking 
into account that a longer sample is necessary for the priors. For the first period, the variables 
used are the Industrial Production Index (IPI), the Consumer Price Index (CPI), M1, the 
difference between the stock exchange call loans rate and the discount rate (C-D), open 
market operations (OMO)9 and the discount rate 10. The first three variables and OMO are 
growth rates, while the spread and the discount rate are in levels. For the second period, the 
variables are the same except for C-D, as the stock exchange call loans rate is substituted for 
the federal funds rate (F-D). While the call loans rate and the federal funds rate represent 
different (although similar) money markets, they perform the same role. In both cases, they 
represent the price at which bank could obtain reserves, when they were not borrowed at the 
discount window. Another difference is that for the interwar period, the Fed did not target 
short-term rates directly as in the second period, when OMO were used for that purpose. 
However, those short-term rates were involuntarily conditioned by the movements in the 
discount rate anyways. That is, the short-term rate responded to demand forces for the 
interwar period rather than to Fed’s desires as in the second period, but still, it was influenced 
                                                        
7 Koop and Potter (2011). Section 2.3, pp. 13–15. 
8 The other blocks are not included in the notation (although they are in the algorithm), as the modification only 
affects the draws of Bt  and Q. 
9 U.S. Government securities (bought outright and repurchases) and acceptances held by the Federal Reserve. 
10 Until 1948, the discount rate belongs to the New York Federal Reserve Bank as representative of all other 
Reserve Banks. Later, all of them offered a homogeneous rate. 
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by Fed’s instruments. To have all the variables on the same scale, they are standardized (yt -
E(yt*))/std(yt*). The order of the variables (contrary to that indicated above) takes the IPI as 
the last variable in the VAR and the discount rate as the first one. In this way, the relation 
among the variables has a structural interpretation: while the IPI reacts only after one lag to 
all the other variables’ movements, the discount rate reacts contemporaneously to all of them.  
The order assumed is based on the mechanism described in section 2. The first price that the 
Fed sets in the first submarket is the discount rate. From there, it controls the federal funds 
rate or whatever intermediate target it has through OMO. Even though sometimes OMO and 
the discount rate will move at the same time, the discount rate remain at the same levels for 
longer periods. During those periods, the intermediate target is adjusted through OMO. Both 
instruments, voluntarily or not, will determine the spread. The data were collected from the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the Federal Reserve Economic Data 
(FRED), the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Reserve Archival System for Economic 
Research (FRASER). 
 Regarding the lag structure, I find limitations to this model. Given the high 
dimensionality of the parameters estimated, adding more than one lag in any of the periods 
triggers the draws from the B’s distribution to be non-stationary. Having previously imposed 
the stationarity restriction, the multi-move algorithm used by Primiceri becomes stuck in the 
zone of the distribution where the draws are non-stationary; therefore, no draw is taken. 
Using K-P’s single-move algorithm, I am able to introduce one lag more (including more 
than two lags makes the algorithm collapse). Thus, for the interwar period with monthly data, 
I use K-P’s algorithm directly to have at least two lags, which are already few. For the second 
period, I present the results for one lag (multi-move algorithm) and comment the few relevant 
variations obtained with two lags (K-P’s single-move algorithm). 
2.3.2 Priors and computational details 
For the first period, an invariant VAR from 1920:I to 1924:XII (60 observations) is estimated 
to calibrate the priors’ distributions, while, for the second period, the priors are obtained from 
the period from 1948:I to 1957:IV (39 observations)11. The set-up for the priors (as written in 
Gary Koop’s code) is the following: 
 
B0~N( !OLS, 4·V( !OLS)), 
                                                        
11 For the federal funds rate series, data is only available from 1954. As a proxy, I have used the 3-months T-bill 
rate from 1948 to 1954 to estimate the priors. 
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A0~ N(#$OLS, 4 ·V(#$OLS)), 
log σ0~  N(log %&OLS, 4·In), 
Q ~  IW(k2Q · 60(or 39) · V( !OLS), 60(or 39)), 
W ~ IW(k2w · (1+dim(W)) · In, 1+dim(W)), 
S1~  IW(k2s · (1+dim(S1)) ·V(#$1, OLS), 1+dim(S1)), 
S2 ~ IW(k2s · (1+dim(S2)) ·V(#$2,OLS), 1+dim(S2)), 
 
where S1 and S2 are the two blocks of S, A1,OLS and A2, OLS are the corresponding blocks of 
AOLS and kQ = 0.01, kS = 0.1 and kW = 1. Thus, the priors are not flat but diffuse.  
 For the first and second periods, when the single-move algorithm is used, 400,000 
draws are generated, discarding the first 200,000 and using 1 in every 100 to avoid 
correlation between them. For the second period and the multi-move algorithm, 450,000 
draws are generated, discarding the first 200,000 and using 1 in every 125. The difference in 
the number of draws is explained by the computational time necessary and the percentage of 
acceptance of draws for each algorithm. Regarding the computational time to estimate the 
model, the multi-move algorithm required around 60 hours, and the single-move algorithm 
about 23 days. Convergence tests are displayed in Appendix C. 
2.4 Results  
 The TVC-BSVAR provides two different tools to evaluate the impact of the 
instruments. First, the impulse response functions will show the posterior mean of the 
response of certain variables to another variable shock. The use of time-varying coefficients 
allows the discovery of whether the interaction between two variables has undergone any 
significant change over the period under analysis. This may be the first hint regarding 
whether the Fed, at some point, modified its policies or used its instruments differently. 
Second, the posterior mean of the standard deviation of the residuals for each equation of the 
VAR will shed light on possible external shocks affecting the results, namely variables that 
are not included in the model, which could distort the relations observed between the 
instruments and the variables under analysis.  
 Before analyzing the results, I advise the reader to pay keen attention to the relations 
described in Figure 1.3 for the interwar period and Figure 1.1 for the second period between 
the discount rate, the short-term rate of reference and the levels of inflation, because they are 
important to understand what the impulse responses display. It needs to be clarified that the 
1 
3 
·I 
•l 
·1 
.9 
·11 
analysis undertaken intends to comprehend the impact of the instruments on inflation, output 
and the money supply, regardless of the reasons behind Fed' s decisions to use the 
instruments. That is, once the Fed increases the interest rate, because of correct or incorrect 
forecasts, anticipation to political events, international factors or whatever reason, that 
increase has an inipact, and that inipact is the only thing of interest in this study. This is the 
only way whereby a better understanding of the interaction between instruments and real 
variables or money aggregates can be acquired. 
Given the detailed analysis of the impulse response fonctions and the number of 
figures in three dimensions, in this section, I only analyze the response of the final targets to 
the instruments and the new variable. The evaluation of the rest of the figures is available in 
Appendix A. Ordinary inlpulse response functions to analyze the responses' significance is 
evaluated only for the relationships between instruments and final or intermediate targets, and 
for selected years. 
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2.4.1 Intenvar pe1iod (1925:1-1939:XIl)n 
The figures analyzed below display each period of the sample on the X-axis, the response to 
the shock from one to twenty months/quarters on the Y-axis and the scale of the response on 
the Z-axis. 
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Looking at the discount rate shock (Figure 1.4.1), the inflation response is positive from 1925 
to the end of 1929, with the exception of the almost-zero response around mid-1926. The 
positive response coincides with the discount rate being below or near the call loans rate 
(Figure 1.3). Those positive responses could be also capturing the inflows of gold once the 
discount rate was raised, triggering increases in the money supply and inflation, as long as 
those inflows were not offset. For 1926, the .zero response corresponds to the fact that the 
discount rate was near the call loans rate. Between 1930 and 1934, the negative or zero 
response coincides with the facts that the discount rate in real terms was higher than 
represented because of the deflation. Also, it was above the call loans rate. After six months, 
the response becomes slightly positive. From 1934 to 1939, the response is positive but 
12 The results shown for this first period belong to the model with monthly data and two Jags using K-P's 
algorithm. Even though the analysis starts in 1925, Chapter 1 presents the knowledge of the Fed since 1919, 
which is relevant to a better understanding of the policies undertaken later. 
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becomes negative after two to three months. This time, although the discount rate was above 
or at the same level as the call loans rate, it was mostly below the inflation levels, avoiding an 
initial negative response.  Despite the variations observed, none of the responses are 
significant (Figure 1.5.1). The response of CPI inflation to an OMO shock (Figure 1.4.2) is 
the same for almost the whole period: initially positive but negative after two months. The 
exception is from 1927 to the end of 1929 (a deflation period), when it is negative. It 
corresponds to the Fed’s gold sterilization. In general, this figure shows that, for the entire 
interwar period, open market purchases had an ephemeral effect.  
For the years 1930, 1931 and 1932, the Fed purchased more intensively than before but the 
consequences of the Great Depression regarding bank failures, a higher demand for excess 
reserves and currency, and gold outflows offset those purchases. After 1933, the Fed was 
relegated to the backseat, the Treasury being mostly in charge of the monetary policy. OMO 
and the discount rate were hardly used since then.  These results are supported by Figure 
1.5.2, in which again, a shock to this variable has no significant effect on CPI at any period. 
 Considering the shock to the new variable C-D (Figure 1.4.3), the response of CPI 
inflation varies depending on whether the spread is negative or positive, whether the 
economy is experiencing inflation or deflation and the position of both rates in relation to the 
inflation levels. 
Fig. 1.4.2 – CPI inflation impulse response to an OMO shock.  Note: Posterior means. 
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Fig. 1.5.2– Impulse responses to an OMO shock. IPI, CPI and M1 in columns 1, 2 and 3 respectively.  Note: The solid lines 
depict the 50-th percentile with the 16-th and 84-th percentiles for the dashed lines. 
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 When the spread is positive but there is deflation, the response is negative, as for the 
second half of 1925 and between 1928 and 1929. This could mean that the rates were too high. 
Consequently, a larger spread, meaning a higher call loans rate in relation to the discount rate 
would have tightened the economy even more. The response is positive from the beginning of 
1926 to the beginning of 1928. This was a period with a positive spread (sometimes quite narrow 
or zero) until mid-1927, with both rates around the positive levels of inflation. For the last half of 
1927, a larger spread would have exerted inflationary pressures, counteracting the deflation 
triggered by the sterilization of gold. From 1930 to 1933, CPI inflation responds positively to an 
increase in the spread, as for the last half of 1927, but under a deflationary scenario. For this 
period, the spread was almost zero or negative. It seems that a positive or less negative spread 
would have supposed an increase in inflation. Related to the last statement, the highest positive 
peak during this period occurs around the beginning of 1933, when the short-term rates increased, 
as seen in Figure 1.3. However, the Fed did not allow them to be above the discount rate. For the 
rest of the subperiod, the response is mostly positive. 
Figure 1.4.3 – CPI inflation impulse response to a C-D shock.  Note: Posterior means. 
  
 
45 
 
 
Figure 1.5.3– Impulse responses to an C-D shock. IPI, CPI and M1 in columns 1, 2 and 3 respectively.  Note: The solid lines 
depict the 50-th percentile with the 16-th and 84-th percentiles for the dashed lines. 
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During those years, the spread was zero or negative, but both interest rates were below 
inflation most of the time, which did not contribute to reducing it. For this shock, the 
response is significant, approximately, for the period 1930-1934 and again around 1937 
(Figure 1.5.3). In both cases, the spread was negative and there was deflation. Therefore, a 
lower discount rate in relation the short-term rate would have increased inflation. The 
responses are significant from the second or forth month and last beyond twenty months. 
 Focusing now on the responses of the IPI, a shock to the discount rate (Figure 1.4.4) 
produces quite a homogeneous response for the entire period. The response is initially 
positive but becomes negative after two months. The only difference occurs from 1930 to 
1932, when the response never becomes negative. Gold inflows and open market purchases 
could be the reason, along with the great decrease in the discount rate. In general, either the 
transmission mechanism of the discount rate towards the output needs more time to 
materialize or the use of two lags with monthly data may not be enough to capture the real 
effect. Furthermore, its impact is not significant for the entire period (Figure 1.5.1). A shock 
to OMO (Figure 1.4.5) has, mostly, a positive impact. There is an exception from 1926 to 
1930, when the initial response is negative for two months before turning positive. This 
figure has a similar pattern to the response of inflation to an OMO shock (Figure 1.4.2). 
Figure 1.4.4– IPI impulse response to a discount rate shock.  Note: Posterior means. 
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Regarding the positive peak seen at the end of 1928, it seems that the Fed purchased more in 
the open market after the crash, but only for some months, because the response becomes less 
positive for the following periods. This is in line with Chapter 1. Once more, its effect is not 
significant (Figure 1.5.2). Regarding a shock to C-D (Figure 1.4.6), the response is mostly 
positive until 1929. For parts of 1926 and 1927, when the spread was almost zero, the 
response is slightly negative, although only initially.  Afterwards, when the largest spreads 
are observed, the response is positive again. This positive response also occurs during periods 
of deflation, meaning that the spread could have contributed to increasing lending and 
growth, despite the sterilization of gold. After 1930, the response is negative, when the 
discount rate started to be at the same level or above the call loans rate (Figure 1.3).  Again, 
the responses are not significant at any period (Figure 1.5.3). The residuals presented in 
Figures 1.6.1 and 1.6.2 are in line with the narrative described in Chapter 1. For the equations 
of the final targets, namely the IPI and CPI, the residuals are higher during the period in 
which the Fed was relegated to the backseat, after 1933, suggesting that other variables, 
which are not the Fed’s instruments included in the model (as they were hardly used), could 
be driving the results of that period. Such factors could be fiscal policies, gold flows or the 
Figure 1.4.5– IPI impulse response to an OMO shock.  Note: Posterior means. 
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devaluation of the dollar in 1934. For the CPI equation, the residuals are also higher from 
1925 to 1929 (Figure 1.6.1), likely corresponding to gold flows. For the residuals of M1, 
there is a peak at the end of 1929, probably related to the crash, bank failures and holdings of 
currency, and between the end of 1932 and the beginning of 1933, when more bank failures 
occurred (Figure 1.6.1). Apart from those peaks, the residuals are constant for the entire 
period. For the C-D equation (Figure 1.6.2), the increase in the residuals appears between 
1928 and 1930, when the difference between rates was the largest and the Fed was unable to 
reduce the call loans rate because other institutions were giving credit. Regarding the OMO 
and discount rate equations, the residuals behavior is similar to the C-D equation, but they 
start to decrease in 1932 (Figure 1.6.2). That means that the Fed was targeting other variables 
beyond those included in the model while in charge of monetary policy. According to the 
narrative, the Fed may have been responding to gold flows or bank reserves. Afterwards, the 
residuals tend to zero, as the instruments were hardly used. These results are in line with the 
lack of significance seen in most of the impulses response. 
 
  
Figure 1.4.6– IPI impulse response to C-D shock.  Note: Posterior means. 
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Figure 1.6.1– Posterior mean of the standard deviation of the residuals in IPI, CPI inflation and M1 equations respectively. 
Figure 1.6.2– Posterior mean of the standard deviation of the residuals in C-D, OMO and discount rate equations respectively. 
2.4.2 1958:l-2007:IV13 
For the impulse response function analysis of this second period, I will only analyze the 
results obtained with multi-move algorithm with one lag. The results obtained with K-P's 
algorithm with two lags are very similar. While the figures are not presented, I will comment 
the relevant variations. 
This time, I start by analyzing the response of inflation to an F-D shock (Figure 1.7.1), 
as it provides the perfect beginning for the explanation of the next impulse responses. Until 
1968, the response of inflation is almost zero, coinciding with the period when the spread 
between the rates was zero or negative. However, that response is not significant (Figure 
1.8.1). From 1968 to 1982, the response of inflation practically mimics the evolution of the 
spread (Figure 1.1). Thus, when it becomes larger, inflation is higher. Those positive peaks 
are reversed once the spread is zero or negative, and after the federal funds rate has visited 
maximum levels. 
0 2005 2000 1995 19-00' 1985 1980 l97S 1970 
Figurel!l.7.1-11:Pllinflalionlimpulseliesponse!loll'·Dlilhock.lllllote: ll'osterior!iileans.l:I 
13 The historical context is in Chapter I and the remaining figures in Appendix A.2. 
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However, the responses are still positive, as inflation is above both rates. From 1982 to 1990, 
the pattern is the same. However, despite observing even larger spreads, inflation responses 
are not as positive as in the 1970s or early 1980s. For these periods of positive spreads, 
Figure 1.8.1 shows that the spread has a significant and long-lasting impact on inflation. 
Shortly after 1990, around mid-1992, the response of inflation turns negative until the end of 
the sample. It could be expected that, at least in 2001 and 2002, or even 2003, the response of 
inflation would be positive given that inflation is above the discount and federal funds rate, or 
from 1994 to 2000, when, despite not being large, the spread is positive. However, this does 
not happen and coincides with the decrease in borrowing observed in Figure 1.2. Besides, the 
responses are not significant for this last period (Figure 1.8.1). 
 Encouraged by this regime change, I discovered some literature that sheds light on it. 
In the Federal Reserve Bulletin of November 1994, Clouse (p. 965), apart from supporting 
the fact that a larger spread led to higher borrowing and that the relationship was quite stable 
until 1980, given the failing bank situation during the 1980s and 1990s, stated:  
 
… changes became evident during the 1980s in the willingness of healthy 
institutions to turn to the discount window. Many banks apparently became 
more reluctant to turn to the window for fear of provoking market concerns 
about their financial condition. The greater reluctance to borrow weakened the 
historical relationship between the discount borrowing and the spread of the 
federal funds rate over the discount rate. 
 
Furthermore, “This reluctance became acute during the economic downturn in the 
1990-1991 …” (Clouse 1990, p. 969).  Kasriel and Merris (1982) added that the Fed, 
before 1979, did not pay attention to borrowed reserves and the relation between the 
discount window and the federal funds rate. Pearce (1993) showed that the 
relationship between borrowing and the spread changed under different target 
regimes. Thus, from January 1975 to October 1979, under a federal funds rate target, 
there was a strong nonlinear relationship between the spread and borrowing, whereby 
a larger spread led to higher borrowing, although to a certain extent.14 From October 
                                                        
14 Peristani (1991) found an S-shaped pattern when analyzing the period 1959–1988. Thus, although the 
spread led to higher borrowing, when the difference was around 4%, borrowing hardly, if at all, 
increased. 
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1979 to October 1982, under a nonborrowed reseive targeting procedure and lagged 
reseive accounting, the relationship weakened and the amount of borrowing 
decreased. Last, after October 1982, under a borrowed reseive targeting procedure and 
contemporaneous reseive accounting, the relationship was even weaker and the 
borrowing decline more pronounced. Therefore, it seems that this negative no 
significant response and regime switd1 indicate that some factor related to the banking 
sector triggered that positive spreads did not increase inflation. Figure 1.7.1 also 
shows that, as commented in the introduction, the "price puzzle" is non-existent, 
because inflation increased with rises in the federal funds rate, mostly when the spread 
was positive and borrowing increased. Therefore, there is no puzzle but an inadequate 
Fed's policy by allowing those positive spreads. The response of inflation to an OMO 
shock (Figure 1.7.2) is negative until 1967, with the spread being generally negative 
or zero. Thus, it seems that while the Fed did not target short-tenn rates, purchases in 
the open markets were scarce to boost inflation. Since then, under an interest target 
and in line with the figure analyzed previously, positive peaks occur for those periods 
when the spread was positive. This means that, despite banks already were borrowing, 
taking advantage of that spread, the Fed purchased (although perhaps in a relatively 
smaller proportion than when the spread was zero or negative) in the open market, 
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contributing even more to increasing inflation_ Nonetheless, the responses are not significant 
for the entire period (Figure 1.8.2). The results above support the response of inflation to a 
discount rate shock (Figure I. 7.3), which is not expected. Its response is negative until 1966, 
a period when the discount rate is either above or equal to the federal funds rate. For the first 
row in Figure 1.8.3 (1961:Q2), the response is slightly significant. Afterwards, the response 
becomes positive either because, when the spread was narrow or negative, the Fed offset the 
rises in the discount rate by increasing its purchases in the open market ( although in those 
cases the positive response was reduced) or because, when the spread was positive, the Fed 
exacerbated the amount of borrowing at the discount window with more purchases. Since 
positive spreads emerged, the discount rate has a positive and significant impact on inflation, 
except for the last years of the sample, when the response is not significant (Figure 1.8.3). It 
is important to highlight that since 2003, the discount rate was set above the federal funds 
rate as a penalty rate, but it allowed borrowing with no question asked. 
The response of the IPI to an F-D shock (Figure 1. 7. 4) is, for almost the entire period, 
negative and almost proportional to the leve]s of the federal funds rate. The lowest peaks 
coincide with the highest federal funds rates. Almost similar to inflation, the response is 
55 
oa 
O.G 
Q.4 
0 .7 
0 
-0.2 
1~ 15 18 
l"l!IA,• Nllf!OllH O'f fll, 1968:ql 
i:E:~~~-1 
3 6 9 ~ ~ 18 
lmp,ilM .. lp)llMt1fCPI, 1~:01 
~ 12 15 16 12 g 16 
~g~;~~;:l ,:g~·::J 
3 6 @ 1:? 16 18 '3 G & 12 15 HI 
lmp(JN te,ponM off>I, 19T5.1)t lmp.llH tuponcat at CPI, tt 75:Q1 
::~---~=~~==1 :;~-=-=-~ 
' U 15 18 ~ 6 !I ,,. 15 1!1 
lfnoUM ~OIW& oflPI. 1980:Qt lmp,jls& rftrXlntat (l(CPI. f980:01 
1 
::h=-~--:~:~--~--j ·:~::::::::~ 
a 6 Q 1~ 1$ 18 a S II 1t IS 18 
~:E'-----------1 \ ---=-----
. (1.~ \' -----
e • " " 
,. 9 ,:: i !: 1$ 
1r1..,.ui- IUf)<'l#fMI of lf'S, 1900:Qf l~~NOf CPl, 1!t!I0:01 
:~b::::-::l . ' ' " .. 
::p~~, 
·<l'G 
$&9 t2lS 18 
lml)UM t•$l)MIM 01 11'1, 200401 
• • ,, ,, •• 
::t ----~-~-~J 
j 8 d IS 18 
~,..,q:onM otMI, 19G!i:01 
::E_-----~ 
•• 
S 69'2t51a 
lrnl)Uke19ill)O!IM Of Ml, 1970:01 
,,-- , 
{l,t / --~-
., '/---------- -------,~-----------~ 36/J l:!'518 
:~~ I --,11 / __ _ ____ _ .... __ _ 
' "--------------' 
:'1G9 12 tS 1a 
::~~=:~ 
3 11 P 12 Hi 1,1 
lrrp!IM 1,:r.pc1..,,. OfM1, 19)5.'01 
Figurel!l.8.3-llmpulseliesponses!lola!iliscountliatelilhock.!IPl,!l:Pl!and!Mlliillilolumnsl!l,!'.!!andlS!iespectively.lllWote:!lrhelilolidl:I 
Uneslilepictllhel50·thlj,ercentilelivithllhel!l6·thiandlB4·th!percentilesllorllhelilashedlliues.l:I 
56 
  
 
57 
significant from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, with an horizon of two years or more 
(Figure 1.8.1). For the discount rate shock (Figure 1.7.5), the response of the IPI is positive 
until 1965 and then becomes negative. Since then, as in the last figure, the negative peaks 
occur around the highest peaks of the federal funds rate. For this case, however, the impact is 
not proportional since the beginning of Volcker’s era. After approximately 1970, the 
responses are significant, although most of them just after some quarters (Figure 1.8.3).  
Regarding the response of the IPI to an OMO shock (Figure 1.7.6), it is negative with the 
exception at the beginning of the sample, when it becomes positive after two quarters. 
Similar to the last figure, the responses are mostly significant after 1970, although this time 
they are weak and only for one quarter (Figure 1.8.2). This response is not expected. As 
explained for Figure A.7.11 in Appendix A.2, the transmission between the two variables 
may need more lags, because for those periods when lending was decreasing as a 
consequence of the high rates, what also led to a decline in output, the Fed would have been 
purchasing more securities to decrease interest rates.  
To sum up, a regime change is observed around 1965, when the Fed began to pay attention 
and target short-term rates. The other regime change, although represented not in the 
instruments’ impulse responses but in the spread, is around 1990. Although the figures of the 
instruments mostly maintain their sign and shape since 1965, this happens under different  
 
Figure 1.7.4– IPI impulse response to a F-D shock.  Note: Posterior means. 
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Figure 1.7.5– IPI impulse response to a discount rate shock.  Note: Posterior means. 
Figure 1.7.6– IPI impulse response to an OMO shock.  Note: Posterior means. 
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Figure 1.9.1– Posterior mean of the standard deviation of the residuals in IPI, CPI inflation and M1 equations respectively. 
Figure 1.9.2– Posterior mean of the standard deviation of the residuals in F-D, OMO and discount rate equations respectively. 
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circumstances. Therefore, a change in the banking sector’s behavior seems to be the most 
likely explanation. This statement is supported by the counterfactual exercise developed in 
Appendix B, where I find no variation in how the Federal Reserve applied its policies for the 
period under analysis, and where inflation expectations are also taken into account. 
For the residuals of the IPI equation (Figure 1.9.1), an increase is observed at the beginning 
of the sample, which quickly disappears. Thereafter, the residuals maintain roughly the same 
levels, being slightly higher in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. For inflation (Figure 
1.9.1), the residuals increase in the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s. This is a period 
when money growth or some type of reserve measure was supposedly targeted. The residuals 
decrease until 2000, to increase again until the end of the sample. For M1 (Figure 1.9.1), the 
residuals increase in the second half of the 1970s, remain at roughly the same levels until 
2005 and then rise again. While, for the IPI behavior, external shocks could have determined 
the results at the beginning of the sample and slightly during the 1970s and part of the 1980s, 
the residuals of the inflation equation show that external shocks could affect the results in the 
1970s and since 2000. The same is applicable to M1. Bank reserves and banking sector’s 
behavior, expectations, fiscal policies, exchange rate or political pressures are factors that are 
not included the model and could have influenced the results. For the equations of the Fed’s 
instruments (Figure 1.9.2), the 1970s also seem to be a period when external shocks could 
have influenced their behavior, as the Fed may have been aiming other targets. The same 
applies to the small peak around 2000, and the rise since 2006.  
2.4.3 Alternative identifications 
For both periods, alternative orders were tested by locating OMO the first and third in the 
VAR. While most of the responses to an OMO shock change and remain no significant, the 
relationships between the other variables stay almost identical. Another identification scheme 
was tried allowing the instruments and the spread to react contemporaneously to each other 
and imposing zeros in some of the relationships between OMO and the spread with M1 and 
the final targets (so that the decomposition of the variance covariance matrix was no longer 
lower triangular), using the algorithm developed in Canova and Forero (2014). However, 
none of the draws overcame the stationary restriction and the exercise could not be carried 
out. 
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2.5 What lessons can we learn? 
The picture of monetary policy in the U.S. for the last century shows some recognizable 
patterns in the instruments of monetary policy and intermediate and final targets. Before 
analyzing the instruments individually, from a general perspective according to the results, 
the Fed’s instruments were not the main drivers of the American economy’s performance for 
the interwar period, while for good or for bad, they gained relevance for the second period. 
The lack of significance obtained for the interwar period is supported with some of the facts 
described in Chapter 1, such as the Fed’s inability to differentiate between nominal and real 
interest rates, the lack of experience operating in the open market or the period when the 
Treasury took the responsibility for monetary policy. Also, as commented in the literature 
review, it seems that gold flows had an important role in determining the path of the 
economy. 
Focusing now on the instruments, I start by analyzing the discount rate.  Its impact on 
inflation varies according to two scenarios. First, when it is above the short-term rate and 
above the inflation levels, its impact on inflation is negative. There is an exception for the last 
years of the sample, when its impact is positive but not significant, coinciding with the 
increase in the residuals of the inflation equation. Therefore, other factors could be distorting 
that relationship for those years. The second scenario occurs when the discount rate is below 
the short-term rate, the inflation levels or both. In this case, inflation responds positively. 
While these patterns were also found for the interwar period, the results displayed for the 
residuals and the narrative analysis, seem to explain why those impulses responses are not 
significant for that period. For the IPI, when the discount rate impact has a significant 
response (what happens only after 1965), its sign is negative. From 1958 to 1965 the response 
is positive as in the interwar period, although in this last case, the sign is negative after some 
months. In any case, those responses are not significant. The conclusion here is that while no 
other factor is influencing the relationship discount rate-output, increases in the discount rate 
should decrease output. Last, the M1 response is different for each period and could be 
related to the different Fed’s procedure about OMO and targets. One the one hand, for the 
interwar period (negative and significant response) when purchases in the open market were 
scarce, the discount rate had a more important impact on short-term rates and therefore, on 
M1.  The reason is that short-term rates, conditioned on the discount rate but not manipulated 
by the supply of reserves with OMO as under an interest target, responded directly to demand 
forces, influencing the path of M1. On the other hand, around 1965 (positive significant 
response) the Fed began to target short-term rates, what required a more intensive use of 
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OMO. As the raises in the interest rates intended to reach the Fed’s target were insufficient to 
restrain the demand for credit and inflation continued increasing, to keep the federal funds 
rate under its target, more purchases were needed and the money supply increased along with 
the discount rate. Despite the more “natural” relationship between interest rates and the 
demand forces for the interwar period, unlike under an interest rate target, the use of the 
discount rate, implicitly and unwittingly, conditioned short-term rates anyways. This 
mechanism makes both periods comparable despite the different targets and short-term rates. 
 
Evaluating the spread, it is the only one having a significant response for both periods in 
relation to the inflation levels. A shock to this variable shows different responses depending 
on the sign of the spread, whether both rates are below or above inflation levels and whether 
those levels are positive or negative. When the spread is positive or both rates are below the 
inflation levels, the response is positive. For the interwar period, those two scenarios had a 
positive but no significant impact on inflation. However, the response was significant and 
positive as well, when the spread was negative for periods of deflation. This suggests that 
decreases in the discount rate in relation to short-term rates would have contributed to 
increasing inflation. The reason why the positive spread had a no significant inflation 
response for the interwar period is probably due to the fact that real interest rates were too 
high given the levels of deflation, which were caused by other factors such as gold 
sterilization. For the second period, the analysis shows that positive spreads above inflation 
levels contributed to increasing inflation. Moreover, it is likely that the banking sector 
changed its behavior around 1990, because the positive and significant responses turned 
negative and no significant even for periods with positive spreads. The different Fed’s 
procedures explained previously, together with the positive and significant responses of 
inflation when the spread was positive, are in line with the fact that M1 responded positively 
and significantly to positive spreads, despite it implied higher rates. Regarding the IPI, 
increases in the spreads are negative and significant only for the period 1965-1990, unlike the 
discount rate case, in which that significant and negative impact was extended to the end of 
the sample. Therefore, the spread itself seems to not decrease output, and the high inflation 
levels related to that spread could be the cause of that negative impact. 
Last, although OMO has a significant impact on the IPI for some periods after 1965, they are 
ephemeral and weak. Therefore, the results suggest that monetary policy can be transmitted 
through prices but not quantities. That is, even though the amount of money supplied will 
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drive short-term rates in the first submarket, only interest rates will determine the demand for 
money in the second submarket.  
 
These lessons also provide an explanation for the price puzzle, a problem that has occupied 
the literature for years. Apparently, a shock to the federal funds rate produces, at least 
initially, a positive inflation response. It has been argued that missing variables and the 
consequent lack of information in VARs produce the so-called “price puzzle.” According to 
the results obtained for the second period (Figure 1.7.1), most of the increases in the federal 
funds rate were accompanied by large spreads. This led to an increase in money growth and 
inflation because banks could borrow cheaper reserves at the discount window and set a 
relatively lower loans rate. This would trigger a lower restrain in credit than the intended by 
the Fed. Thus, there is not a price puzzle but a real positive relation between the increase in 
the federal funds rate and inflation as a consequence of the bad policies that allowed positive 
spreads. 
Last, Primicery (2005) used unemployment, inflation and the federal funds rate in his 
model and concluded that the change in policies did not differ between the pre- and post-
Volcker periods, and no regime switch was observed. According to the counterfactual, I 
reach the same conclusion regarding the change in policies for those periods; however, I 
observe two regime switches. The first one is around 1965 in OMO and the discount rate. 
The second regime switch appears in the F-D spread around 1990. In the latter case, it seems 
probable that the responsibility could belong to the banking sector. Apart from that, while 
Primicery obtained standard deviations of the residuals of the CPI inflation equation three 
times higher in the 1970s than at the beginning of the sample, here they are smoother, 
increasing in 1975 by only half of the levels seen in the 1960s. Therefore, it seems that the 
inclusion of the spread along with the instruments explains a great part of the inflation 
behavior. 
2.6 Conclusions 
A re-evaluation of the mechanisms operating between the Federal Reserve’s policies and its 
intermediate and final targets is undertaken in this chapter, from nearly the birth of the 
Federal Reserve to the period before the Great Recession. For that purpose, however, the 
standard procedure to evaluate monetary policy is questioned and declared erroneous, given 
the measuring problems associated to the use of intermediate targets as Fed’s instrument, and 
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a new procedure is proposed. This new procedure uses the actual instruments and the spread 
between short-term rates and the discount rate. Thus, a TVC-BSVAR was performed, 
applying the algorithms already used by Primiceri (2005) and Koop and Potter (2011). To 
gain a better understanding of the results obtained, they were contrasted with a narrative 
review of the Federal Reserve’s history. Summing up, the Fed’s lack of knowledge and 
inactivity for the interwar period, supported by the results, indicated that monetary policy was 
unable to influence output and inflation for that period. After 1958, monetary policy gained 
power to influence the path of the American economy. However, the management was 
inadequate and the results showed that increasing the federal funds rate is not enough to 
decrease inflation. The increase in the federal funds rate should be accompanied by discount 
rate increases, avoiding positive spreads. Otherwise, they will provide profitable 
opportunities for banks, triggering an increase in borrowing, and preventing enough restrain 
in the demand for loans. The mechanism behind these relationships is that as banks obtained 
cheaper reserves at the discount window, they were likely to raise the loans rate less in 
relation to the increases in the federal funds rate. Consequently, the demand for credit was 
not restrained as much as the Fed intended. These facts deny the existence of the “price 
puzzle,” as the increase in inflation when the federal funds rate was raised was due to bad 
policies by allowing those positive spreads. In the case of aiming to reduce output, it seems 
sufficient to increase the discount rate. Last, the results suggest that the monetary policy 
transmission channel is effective only through prices, even though those prices are driven by 
quantities and other prices. That is, OMO can modify short-term rates, but in the end, the 
demand side will respond to the price at which money is supplied, namely, the loans rate 
influenced by the short-term rate and the discount rate. These results leave open questions for 
future research as a consequence of the regime changes observed around 1965 and 1990. 
What is the role of the banking sector in transmitting to the real economy the monetary 
policies undertaken by the Fed? Could bank determine the impact of monetary policy 
regardless of the Fed’s intentions and to what extent?  
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-- Chapter 3 -- 
The transformer of monetary policy: The banking sector 
 
 
 
 
 
A new theory is proposed, called “reserves-cost”, which explains the 
mechanism whereby the Federal Reserve’s policies reach the economy 
through the banking sector. The theory states that the Fed can have an impact 
on the real economy by directly influencing the cost of reserves, and indirectly, 
with the impact of that cost on the loans rate. To evaluate it, a time varying 
coefficients Bayesians SVAR is estimated for the period 1958-2007. The 
results support the new theory and show that when the spread between the 
federal funds rate and the discount rate was positive, banks could obtain 
cheaper reserves at the discount window and increase the loans rate less than 
the Federal Reserve raised the federal funds rate. The consequence was an 
insufficient restrain in the demand for loans, triggering more lending and 
higher inflation. This theory is also proposed as the explanation for the 
different inflation and output volatilities and levels witnessed during the Great 
Inflation and the Great Moderation.  
 
 
 
n JEL classification: E43, E51, E52, E58 
 
n Keywords: monetary policy, Federal Reserve, Bayesians, SVARs, reserves cost 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
During the last decades, monetary policy has gained in relevance and attention as the 
instrument capable of achieving stability in, mostly, prices and output.  Accordingly, central 
banks have evolved as institutions with an increasing responsibility for that task. To 
accomplish such goals, the successful use of central banks’ instrument depends on the 
understanding of the channels through which monetary policy works.  When certain policies 
are undertaken or evaluated, if the channels are forgotten or misunderstood, the effectiveness 
of monetary policy will be conditioned on the degree of modification carried out by the 
agents responsible for those channels. While this situation will lessen the central banks’ 
power to drive the path of the economy, it will not exempt them from responsibility. The 
main channel through which central banks’ policies operate is the banking sector. Central 
banks decide the amount of reserves to be provided and their price. Influenced by those 
policies, the banking sector will determine the conditions for lending. Accordingly, this 
chapter aims to analyse whether the banking sector, guided by its profitable prospects, is 
capable of modifying the policies undertaken by the Federal Reserve for the period 1958-
2007 and how these possible modifications impacted on the real economy in relation to the 
Fed’s intentions. While some authors have already examined this transmission channel, I 
address it from a totally different perspective, enlightened by other two literature blocks, 
which are fundamental to understand the right functioning of that channel. Therefore, three 
different literature blocks are linked here for the purpose of the hypothesis under analysis. 
The first one exposes some of the most accepted theories regarding how the banking sector 
channel operates. The second literature block, more contemporaneous, overthrows those 
theories by explaining that they were developed under wrong premises and subsequently, sets 
the correct ones. The last block introduces a fundamental detail regarding the interaction 
between the banking sector and the Fed, which is essential for the posterior elaboration of the 
theory that explains the channel whereby monetary policy is able to have an impact on the 
real economy. 
 
 The first literature block introduces the debate between those who defend that 
monetary policy has its effect on the real economy through the “money channel” (or “money 
view”) and those who defend the “lending channel” (or “credit view”). Bernanke (1993) 
explained the “money view” as that whereby to slow down aggregate demand, the Fed sells 
in the open market to lessen bank reserves, reducing the money supply and putting upward 
pressure in interest rates, what will decrease the aggregate demand. For this story to hold, it is 
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assumed that all nonmonetary assets are perfect substitutes, and that money and bank 
deposits have no perfect substitutes. He describes the “credit view” as the channel whereby 
monetary policy, apart from affecting short-term rates, determines aggregate demand by 
altering the availability of bank loans.  This channel requires that loans and other forms of 
credit are not substitutes for borrowers. In a nutshell, the “money view” implies that the 
Federal Reserve removes reserves from the banking sector to reduce their deposits. Having 
less money on their balances, banks will increase interest rates. The “credit view” involves 
also the removal of reserves, but in this case, with the aim of forcing banks to reduce the 
amount of lending. As Bernanke exposed some examples of nonmonetary assets which are 
not perfect substitutes, and assets which are substitutes for money and bank deposits, he 
focused on the “credit view” and factors that weakened and will weaken the effect of 
monetary policy over this channel. Supporting the “lending view” were also Bernanke and 
Blinder (1992). They used a VAR and claimed that the federal funds rate was a better 
forecaster of real variables, as it was less contaminated by endogenous responses than the 
money growth rate. The results showed that an increase in the federal funds rate triggered, 
firstly, a decrease in securities in banks’ balance sheets, which recovered after eight months, 
and a fall in loans after approximately six months, which did not recover in the horizon of the 
impulse response displayed. Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) supported also the “lending 
view” by showing a decline in loans supply once there was monetary tightening. Kashyap 
and Stein (2000), using a VAR, added that the “lending channel“ was stronger for banks with 
less liquid balance sheets, namely, small banks.  
 On the “money view” side, Ramey (1993) using a VECM showed more predictive 
power in M2 velocity for output than in bank loan velocity.  Oliner and Rudebusch (1995, 
1996) claimed that the lending channel did not operate, as a monetary shock did not affect 
bank debt very differently from nonbank debt. Therefore, a negative monetary shock to bank 
reserves had no effect on lending, because, as argued in Romer and Romer (1990), banks 
have available other means to obtain funds with little cost in terms of reserve holdings. Thus, 
monetary policy influences the economy through the stock of transaction balances. The 
Romers supported the “money view” and the previous conclusion by analysing the behaviour 
of money and bank lending around episodes when the Fed carried out shifts in monetary 
policy regardless of the real economy performance.  
 
 However, both “views” are born from a flawed premise. Actually, banks do not need 
reserves for either opening deposits or lending. Causality runs the other way around. Deposits 
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and loans lead to more demand for reserves, which under an interest rate target, will be 
provided to keep the interest rate targeted15.  Thus, the second literature block discusses the 
concept of the money multiplier (intrinsic part of the channels described above) and its 
existence, as it is essential to comprehend that causality runs from loans to reserves. Against 
the monetarists’ argument, Moore (1983) claimed that money growth is endogenous and that 
“the ability of central banks to control the rate of growth of monetary aggregates therefore 
hinges on their ability to control the rate of growth of bank lending, rather than the monetary 
base” (p. 544). Further: “The assumption…is that banks set the prime rate and then attempt to 
meet the loan demand that results” (p.545). Lombra (1992) and Goodhart (2007) also 
mentioned the endogeneity of the monetary aggregates once interest rates are set. Holmes 
(1969) stated: “…commercial banks are … creators of money and credit…” (p.70); “In the 
real world, banks extend credit, creating deposits in the process, and look for the reserves 
later” (p.73). Following the same argument, Jakab and Kumhof (2015) explained that banks 
do not need savings to build deposits and use them for lending, as the deposit multiplier 
theory suggests. Actually, banks lend while it is profitable and does not endanger their 
solvency. They lend depending on the demand for loans and afterwards, borrow the necessary 
reserves. Under the current interest rate target as the authors claimed: “modern central 
banks… are committed to supplying as many reserves (and cash) as banks demand at that 
rate, in order to safeguard financial stability. The quantity of reserves is therefore a 
consequence, not a cause, of lending and money creation” (p.5). As they explained, when a 
customer enters the bank asking for a credit, the bank opens a liability (a deposit) and an 
asset (a loan). Thereby, the bank is able to create money without the necessity of savers’ 
deposits as many textbooks suggest. Regarding deposits, when a customer carries his savings 
to a bank, the funds in bank A increases. However, at the same time, a deposit from bank B is 
removed. Therefore, in aggregate levels, those deposits are unable to create any money. 
                                                        
15 If the reader is remembering now that during the Volcker’s experiment monetary aggregates were targeted 
instead of interest rates, the opposite can be deduced from the following quotes. In Bindseil (2004) the 
following Goodhart’s statement is found: “if properly analyse [the episode], reveal that the Fed continued to use 
interest rates as its fundamental modus operandi, even if it dressed up its activities under the mask of monetary 
base control…there was a degree of play-acting even deception…” (Goodhart (2001), p.30). In Bindseil words 
“The “smokescreen” created by Volcker would thus have been simply a necessary condition for bringing 
inflation to an end under conditions of imperfect central bank independence”(Bindseil (2004),p.30). Even 
Volcker in 1982 stated: “On these money growth targets, in substance, I don’t care. I think either of these two 
sets of numbers [5.5 and 6.5%] will make no difference, virtually, in what we actually do… [W]e are within the 
limits of the growth targets anyway” (Meltzer 2009b, p. 1114). Further: “I, frankly, cannot live in these 
circumstances, given what is going on in the money markets, with violent moves in short-term rates in either 
direction. It would just be so disturbing in terms of expectations, market psychology, and fragility that it’s just 
the wrong policy, period, during this particular period” (Meltzer 2009b, p.1115). 
  
 
70 
Likewise, the reserves required to bank A for the new deposit will translate in a reduction in 
required reserves in bank B. Hence, again, reserves levels remain the same in aggregate 
levels. These authors, using a DSGE model and the financing through money creation (FMC) 
model view, based on the previous argumentation, found larger and faster changes in lending 
and money and a larger effect on the real economy than when identical shocks were applied 
to the same model with the deposit multiplier theory, which they called the intermediation of 
loanable funds (ILF) model view. As conclusion, the FMC model was more consistent with 
procyclical bank leverage and rationing of credit during downturns. Other authors explaining 
the fallacy of the deposits multiplier were Bindseil (2004), Borio and Disyatat (2009) and 
McLeay, Radia and Thomas (2014a and 2014b). Also, Carpenter and Demiralp (2010) using 
a SVAR explained that the causality works from loans to banks liabilities and there is not 
money multiplier. They based their argument on the current situation, in which despite the 
Fed has provided banks with an enormous amount of reserves, they are kept in banks’ 
balance sheet without reaching the real economy through loans. 
 
 The last block of literature refers to the spread between the federal funds rate and the 
discount rate. Why is this important? It has been argued that the demand for money is 
endogenous and will depend on the loans rate. But what does determine that rate? To the 
same question sent by email to the Federal Reserve “Contact Us” option, the following was 
answered: “The prime rate is a rate established by commercial banks as a lending rate or base 
off which their commercial loans are priced. In other words, the banks set their own rates 
based on the demand for various kinds of loans, on the cost of money to the banks, and on the 
administrative costs of making loans…” Here, the important piece for the third block is “on 
the cost of money to the banks”. That is, the spread is important because it determines the 
source from where banks obtain their reserves and at which cost. Subsequently, that cost 
influences the prime loans rate, what in turn, determines the endogenous demand for money. 
Therefore, this spread is the starting point for explaining the channel whereby Fed’s policies 
reach the real economy (which is developed in the next section).  
 The literature exposes that a larger spread between the discount rate and the federal 
funds rate triggered more borrowing at the discount window. Pierce (1993) claimed that the 
changes in the Fed’s operating procedures from 1975 to 1991 transformed the relationship 
between the spread and the borrowing function.  According to Pierce, the period from 1975 to 
1979 was the period of federal funds rate target, from 1979 to 1982, of nonborrowed reserves 
target and a lagged reserve accounting, and from 1982 to 1991, of borrowed reserves with 
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lagged accounting, which changed to contemporaneous reserve accounting after 1984. He 
showed that for the first period there was a strong non-linear relationship between positive 
spreads and borrowing. Thus, the larger the spread, the more borrowed reserves were 
demanded. For the second period, when the spread was larger and for longer time, the 
relationship was looser. For the last period, the relationship became weak. Also, he pointed 
out that during the contemporaneous reserve accounting period, the excess reserves ratio 
increased and borrowing fell to its lowest level despite the large spreads. Hence, while the 
lagged reserve accounting was in place, the relationship between spreads and borrowing was 
more or less strong depending on the Fed’s operating procedure, but it weakened under the 
contemporaneous reserves accounting. Peristiani (1991) identified a nonlinear relationship 
between the spread and borrowing (for the period 1959-1988) with an inverted S-shape. The 
number of banks going to the discount window increased when the spread was larger, but 
borrowing decreased at the highest levels of the spread due to restrictions, further costs and 
the collateral required to back the amount of borrowing. In the same line, Hamdani and 
Peristani (1991) with a disaggregated approach, differentiating between small and large 
banks, observed the same non-linear relationship as the authors above. Also, they found that 
borrowing was positively autocorrelated for small banks but not for large banks. Kasriel and 
Merris (1982), following the preceding conclusions, claimed that borrowing also depended 
on expectations about the spread. That is, if banks expected a larger spread in the future, they 
would borrow less at that moment. They also added that before 1979, under the federal funds 
target, the Fed was careless about the relation between the spread and borrowing. Later, 
under the nonborrowing reserves target and lagged reserves accounting, the relationship 
weakened because of the greater uncertainty and volatility of the spread, as also mentioned in 
Goodfriend (1981). Clouse (1994) mentioned the banks’ reluctance to borrow after the active 
involvement of the discount window during the 1980s and 1990s to avoid bank failures. As 
explained by the New York Fed (Fedpoint 2015), institutions that borrowed at the discount 
window expressed their concern about the signal of weakness that it represented. More 
facilities were provided in 1999 to avoid this situation. Although after 1990 the discount rate 
was fixed 0.25-05% below the fed funds rate, what incentivised institutions to borrow, they 
must have exhausted before other available funds sources. It could be also important to 
highlight that after the Monetary Control Act in 1980, from 1980 to 1982, when the spread 
was positive, the Fed imposed a surcharge in addition to the discount window rate, varying 
between two and three percentage points, for institutions with deposits of $500 million or 
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more or those who borrowed frequently. Last, since 2003 the discount rate was set above the 
federal funds rate as a penalty rate, but borrowing was allowed with no question asked. 
 
  In order to evaluate the hypothesis regarding whether the banking sector has potential 
to transform monetary policy, and learn about the functioning of that channel, as well as 
about its impact on the real economy, a time-varying coefficient Bayesians vector 
autoregressive (henceforth, TVC-BSVAR) is estimated as Primiceri (2005), with the Del 
Negro and Primiceri’s (2013) corrigendum. To assess that hypothesis, firstly, monetary 
policies must be measured correctly. Unlike the standard procedure that uses the federal 
funds rate (or another short-term rate and some reserves measure), the approach undertaken 
here is based on Chapter 2 where it was explained that the federal funds rate is not an 
instrument but an intermediate target and its inclusion in the model would lead to misleading 
results. The reason is that, beyond the conceptual error, to measure monetary policy stance, 
only the supply side of the money market, namely Fed’s policies, must be captured. The 
federal funds rate, however, captures demand and supply forces of that market.  Taking a step 
forward, in this chapter I drop the Fed’s instrument form the model used in Chapter 2 and 
focus on two variables to measure monetary policy stance and banking sector behavior. The 
first variable, already used in Chapter 2, is the spread between the federal funds rate and the 
discount rate, which represents the Fed’s policies when using its instruments, as it captures 
the different prices at which reserves can be obtained. The second variable is the spread 
between the prime loans rate and the federal funds rate, which measures whether the banking 
sector is modifying Fed’s policies, according to the cost at which reserves were acquired. The 
results confirm the new proposed “reserves-cost” theory and show that when the Federal 
Reserve allowed positive spreads between the federal funds rate and the discount rate, the 
banking sector set a lower loans rate in relation to the federal funds rate, inasmuch as the 
reserves needed to back the demand for loans could be obtained at the discount window at a 
lower rate than the federal funds rate. Thus, as the federal funds rate had an impact ratio 
below one on the loans rate, the demand for credit was not restrained sufficiently and 
triggered higher inflation.  Thereby, the Fed’s lack of attention or knowledge about this 
channel, led to a reduction in its control over monetary policy.  
 This chapter is structured as follow. Section 3.2 explains the theoretical framework. 
Section 3.3 describes the model and data, as well as the identification strategy, priors for the 
estimation of the model and the computational details. In section 3.4, the results are presented 
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and all the lessons and patterns from those results are connected and interpreted in section 
3.5. Finally, section 3.6 summarizes the main conclusions.  
 
3.2 Theoretical framework 
 
To evaluate whether the banking sector is able to modify the Fed’s policies, as already 
mentioned, it is necessary to capture correctly the monetary policy stance. In the literature is 
common to use the federal funds rate (or other intermediate target) as Federal Reserve’s 
instrument. As explained in Chapter 2 this approach is erroneous because the federal funds 
rate is an intermediate target, not an instrument. The real instruments available for the Fed 
before the Great Recession were the reserve requirement ratio, open market operations (OMO 
henceforth) and the discount rate 16 .  Beyond this conceptual error, the consequence of 
introducing the federal funds rate in the model for measuring monetary policy stance is that 
the results will be misleading, as this interest rate captures the demand and supply forces of 
the money market, when only the supply side should be captured, namely, Fed’s policies. To 
understand this statement, the money market must be visualized as two submarkets.  The first 
one includes the central bank, in this case the Fed, on the supply side, and the banking sector 
on the demand side. In the second submarket, the banking sector switches to the supply side, 
the other agents of the economy being the demand side. In both cases, the supply side 
receives that denomination because of its ability to create money. The Fed controls the 
federal funds rate by purchasing and selling securities in the open market and increasing or 
decreasing the discount rate. Thus, the Fed controls the amount (with OMO) and price (with 
the discount rate and the federal funds rate) of money in the first submarket, according to the 
impact it intends to exert on the real economy and subject to the banking sector’s demand for 
money and its consequent decisions about the federal funds rate.  Given the price and amount 
of money set by the Fed in the first submarket, banks will also decide the amount (loans), 
partially, and the price (loans rate) of money in the second submarket. However, on the 
demand side of the first submarket, banks also set the federal funds rate according to the 
credit demand and other factors determining the amount of reserves required or desired. 
Forecasts about the evolution of those factors and Federal Reserve’s policies will also 
influence the federal funds rate at which they will offer their reserves surplus. Thus, in order 
to achieve the same targeted federal funds rate at two consecutive periods, the Fed will have 
                                                        
16 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/policytools.htm 
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to use its instruments differently, by injecting different amounts of money into the market and 
setting the discount rate at different levels, depending on the aggregate demand for money 
and banks decisions on the amount of reserves they desire to hold, as well as how they price 
them. Consequently, the different amount of reserves and their price in the first submarket 
will suppose that the banking sector establishes a different loans rate in the second 
submarket, resulting in a different impact on the real economy under the same federal funds 
rate. That different impact is the final and definitive reason against the use of the federal 
funds rate (or other intermediate target) as a measure of monetary policy, because it also 
captures the modifications carried out by the banking sector, namely, the demand side of the 
first submarket. 
 
 While this argument was already developed in Chapter 2, the different impact of the 
federal funds rate on the loans rate was only hypothesized. Starting from there, now I 
elaborate the mechanism (which is evaluated and confirmed later) operating between both 
rates, which explains the functioning of the banking sector channel. To begin with, it must be 
acknowledged that banks are profit maximization agents. As in every profit maximization 
problem, profits depend on costs. When banks lend, they need to back those loans with 
reserves to fulfil their level of required reserves or the levels they desire to hold. 
Notwithstanding, as commented previously, banks do not need reserves to lend. Rather, they 
lend and later, obtain the reserves. Accordingly, banks observe previously the associated cost 
to reserves, and set the loans rate17.  Regarding the cost associated to reserves, banks can 
obtain two types of reserves: borrowed and nonborrowed reserves. Borrowed reserves can be 
obtained at the discount window, where the cost is the discount rate. Regarding nonborrowed 
reserves, the source from where banks obtain them is either the federal funds market, where 
the cost is the federal funds rate, or the open market18. For this last case, when banks sell 
                                                        
17 Risk, liquidity, required capital ratios…are also factor influencing the loans rate, as well as the amount of 
credit already extended. However, I am using the prime loans rate, which is the rate that commercial banks 
charge to their most credit-worthy customers. This rate drives the other loans rates. Therefore, the 
aforementioned potential factors influencing the loans rate either do not apply to the case under study, namely, 
the prime loans rate, or they are significantly diminished.  
18 Another source from where banks can obtain reserves is deposits. In any case, in Figure 2.3, taking as 
reference the rate paid on the 3-months Eurodollar deposits, it is seen that the cost is either the same as the 
federal funds rate or slightly higher. Until the late 1980s, a cheaper source was time and saving deposits, as 
under regulation Q banks could not offer an interest rate above the ceiling rate established, and several times 
short-term rates were above the ceiling. Therefore, those reserves were cheaper than the costs displayed in 
Figure 2. 3. Nonetheless, given the alternatives yields, depositors looked for better interest rates in Eurodollar 
deposits or in loans and saving associations. Additionally, commercial banks evaded those regulations by 
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securities in the open market to obtain reserves, they are renouncing to the interest rate paid 
on those securities. The cost (or opportunity cost) of getting those reserves is the interest rate 
not received. Minimum, the cost of those reserves will be the 3-months T-bill rate, which in 
general, is around the federal funds rate levels19. If the term of those securities is longer, the 
cost will be higher. Hence, it can be considered that the cost of borrowed reserves is the 
discount rate and the cost of nonborrowed reserves is the federal funds rate. Obviously, these 
measures are not accurate, but they are a good approximation for the reserves cost. Thereby, 
when the spread between the federal funds rate and the discount rate (FR-DR) is positive, the 
cost of reserves (at least, a high percentage) will be the discount rate, as banks will prefer to 
borrow more cheaply at the discount window. When both rates are similar, the source will be 
indifferent, as the cost will be approximately the same. When the spread is negative, banks 
will avoid the discount window, unless it is strictly necessary. Once banks are aware of the 
cost of those reserves, they will set the prime loans rate to maximize their profits and avoid 
any potential solvency problem. This is the key for explaining the functioning of the banking 
sector as the channel for monetary policy. When banks obtain “cheaper” reserves at the 
discount rate because the spread FR-DR is positive, even though the federal funds rate is 
raised, banks have the capacity of increasing the loans rate relatively less than the federal 
funds rate. Consequently, the demand for credit is not restrained as much as the Federal 
Reserve intends. This is the main reason why the use of the federal funds rate is not adequate. 
Thus, what I have decided to call the “reserves-cost” theory, explains the channel whereby 
monetary policy operates and is described as follows: Given the Fed sets short-term rates, 
wittingly or unwittingly, by providing reserves and using the discount rate, the only way 
whereby it can have an impact on the real economy is by influencing the reserves cost 
directly, and indirectly, with the impact of this cost on the loans rate. Therefore, while the 
spread between the federal funds rate and the discount rate is closed, it is more likely that the 
Fed has total control of monetary policy. Otherwise, the banking sector will modify those 
policies and the impact on the real economy will be different. 
 
 Although to the best of my knowledge this theory is a novelty in the literature, 
Thornton (1982), when analysing the effect of the discount rate on market interest rates, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
offering different services and deposits (Meltzer 2009a, p.470, 608 and 648). Thus, it is not expected that a 
significant amount of reserves came from that source. 
19 If looking at Figure 2.1, it is seen that the 3-months T-Bill rate normally tracks the federal funds rate, except 
for those periods when the spread FR-DR is larger. Yet, the 3-months T-Bill rate remained above the discount 
rate in those cases and banks would prefer to borrow at the discount window. 
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already visualized part of this transmission channel:  “Changes in the discount rate affect 
market interest rates through their impact on borrowing from the Federal Reserve” (p.1). 
Later, he claimed “It is not simply the level of the discount rate that influences a depositary 
institution’s decision to borrow, but the level of the discount rate relative to rates on  
 
alternative adjustment asset. […] Thus, the important variable in the decision to borrow is the 
so-called least-cost spread between the rate on the next best reserve adjustment asset and the 
discount rate” (p.2). 
 
 Once the theory has been explained, there is empirical evidence that seems to support 
it. First, in Figure 2.2 three facts are to be highlighted. The first one is that when the spread 
FR-DR was larger, it coincided with higher inflation levels. However, this effect smoothly 
disappeared after the second half of 1980s, as showed in Chapter 220.  Apart from that, when 
this spread was larger, the spread between the prime loans rate and federal funds rate (LR-
FR) became smaller, what was more noticeable in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the 
spread even turned negative. Likely, the loans rate did not restrain the demand for money as 
                                                        
20 See Figure 1.7.1  
Figure 2.1 – Data source: FRED 
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much as the Fed intended with the raises in the federal funds rate, because banks could obtain 
more cheaply reserves at discount rate cost and increase less the loans rate. The smaller the 
spread LR-FR, the lower pressure was exerted on the money market, causing a higher 
demand for loans and inflation. The second fact is that after the late 1960s, the spread 
between the loans rate and discount rate (LR-DR) was quite volatile, but between mid-1985 
and 1987 was constant, occurring again from 1989 to 1994.  For those years, the loans rate 
seems to have been pegged to the discount rate. The spread between the loans rate and the 
federal funds rate was also more volatility after the late 1960s and became constant from 
1990 to the end of the sample. Hence, the loan rate seems to have been pegged to the federal 
funds rate for that period. Surprisingly, in Chapter 2 a regime change was also observed 
around 1990 for the response of inflation to a FR-DR shock (Figure 1.7.1). The third fact is 
that not only the spread LR-FR was pegged since 1990, but also it was almost the largest of 
the whole sample. Therefore, it was the period when the loans rate was tightening most the 
money market, in relation to the federal funds rate.  
 
 Figure 2.3 displays free, excess and borrowed reserves as percentage of total reserves. 
The variable of free reserves offers a good picture of the source from where most reserves are 
Figure 2.2 – Data source: FRED 
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obtained. When the Fed provides banks with enough nonborrowed reserves through open 
market purchases to cover the level of required reserves, free reserves are positive. Therefore, 
banks have most of their reserves at the cost, minimum, of the 3-months Treasury bill rate or 
the federal funds rate. When the amount of nonborrowed reserves is not enough to back the  
 
 
demand for credit, banks have to borrow at the discount window to reach the level of required 
reserves. Thus, the level of free reserves is negative. Those reserves have, mostly, the cost of 
the discount rate. Another three interesting facts are found in this figure in relation to those 
observed in Figure 2.2. First, the higher percentages of borrowed reserves coincided with the 
periods of positive spreads FR-DR, and also with those periods when the spread LR-FR was 
more volatile. Second, after approximately the end of the supposed Volcker’s experiment, 
free reserves levels became positive and increased until the end of the sample. Third, since 
free reserves became that up trending path, excess reserves have kept track of free reserves. 
Linking these three facts and those form Figure 2.2 the following can be extracted: borrowed 
reserves increased for the periods of positive spreads FR-DR and decreased significantly after 
1990. For the latter case, the vast amount of reserves held by the banking sector came from 
Figure 2.3 – Data source: FRED 
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nonborrowed reserves. This means that the use of the discount window decreased and banks 
had their reserves mostly at the nonborrowed reserves cost, namely, minimum at the 3-month 
T-bill rate (or at the federal funds rate) 21. This occurred after 1990, just when the loans rate 
was pegged to the federal funds rate. Thus, since banks received most of the required reserves 
from the Fed through the open market, banks fixed the loan rate to the federal funds rate.  On 
the other hand, when banks borrowed reserves at the discount window at a cheaper cost 
(given the positive spread FR-DR), they had more leeway to set a lower loans rate in relation 
to the federal funds rate. In consequence, the spread LR-FR was more volatile and smaller. 
This caused that the Fed lost, at least partially, control over monetary policy, as the loans rate 
produced different effects on the real economy in relation to monetary policy intentions. 
3.3 Methodology  
 
The model used in this chapter is the same as that in Primicery (2005), a TVC-BSVAR. The 
code used to estimate the model was downloaded from Gary Koop’s website22. In this model, 
not only the coefficients vary, but also the variance covariance matrix. It uses drifting 
coefficients, in order to capture nonlinearities or time variation in the lag structure of the 
model, while the multivariate stochastic volatility is meant to capture potential 
heteroscedasticity of the shocks and nonlinearities in the simultaneous relations among the 
variables of the model. The combination of drifting coefficients and the variance covariance 
matrix allows the data to resolve whether the possible variations observed in the relation 
among variables emanate from the size of the shocks (impulse) or changes in the propagation 
mechanism (response). The advantage of this model is founded on its capacity to capture 
continuous and smoothed switching regimes, unlike those works that modeled time variation 
with discrete breaks. For the topic addressed in this case, it is expected that the Federal 
Reserve, banking sector and other agents of the economy learn from the evolution of the 
economy and each other. The learning process is considered to be slow and not to happen 
overnight. Hence, changes in the behavior of those agents, as a consequence of their learning 
process, will evolve smoothly. 
                                                        
21 A factor that could have contributed to the accumulation of free and excess reserves in the mid-1980s is the 
fact that the contemporaneous reserves accounting started in 1984. The uncertainty created by not knowing the 
demand for credit and consequently, the reserves necessary for loans, could have led banks to be more cautious 
and hold more excess reserves. That regime, however, ended in 1998. 
22 https://sites.google.com/site/garykoop/home/computer-code-2. 
The only modifications applied to the code have been to adapt it to the data used here, as well as for those tools 
necessary for the representation of the results. The process of estimation is entirely as found in the file. 
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 Using the same notation as Primiceri, the model is the following: 
 
yt  = ct + B1,tyt-1 + … + Bk,t yt-k + ut        t = 1,…, T.                (1) 
 
where yt, and ct  are n x 1 vectors of observed endogenous variables, and a vector of time-
varying coefficients multiplying constant terms respectively.  Bi,t, i = 1,…, k, represents n x n 
matrices of time varying coefficients. Last, ut are heteroscedastic unobservable shocks. The 
variance covariance matrix Ωt is triangularly reduced and defined by  
 
                                  At ΩtA’t=∑t∑’t                           (2) 
 
where At is a lower triangular matrix with ones in the main diagonal, αij,t being the non-zero 
and non-one elements of the matrix. ∑t is a diagonal matrix with σn,t elements in the diagonal. 
 
Hence, 
               yt  = B0,t +B1,tyt-1 +…+ Bk,tyt-k+ At
-1∑tεt                       (3) 
V(εt) = In 
Stacking all the Bk,t ’s in a vector, 
 
Bt = vec(B’t) = [B0,t, B1,t,B2,t,…Bk,t]’ 
 
and with 
Xt=In⊗[1,yt-1,yt-2,…yt-k]’, 
 
the VAR can be represented and modelled as: 
                     yt= X’tBt + At
-1∑tεt                         (4) 
 
 Stacking by rows the elements αij,t of the matrix At and the elements σn,t  of matrix ∑t, 
the state vectors or transition equations representing the dynamics of the model are: 
                Bt = Bt-1 + vt                                                         (5) 
                α t = α t-1 +  ζt                                                     (6) 
                log σ t = log σ t-1 + ηt                                   (7) 
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where both, the Bts and the non-zero and non-one elements of the matrix At, α t, follow 
random walks, while the standard deviations (7) follow a geometric random walk, 
accordingly belonging to the stochastic volatility models. 
The innovations of the model are assumed to be jointly normally distributed, supposing the 
following variance covariance matrix: 
 
V = Var   !t#$%&t't()    =  % 
*+ 0 0 00 , 0 00 0 - 00 0 0 .(                         (8) 
 
where  In  is an n-dimensional identity matrix and Q, S and W are positive definite matrices.  
As Primiceri pointed out, the zero blocks could be replaced by non-zero blocks, but there are 
two reasons for the assumptions taken. First, for the case under study, I include in the model 
two more variables than Primiceri (2005), who already considered the number of parameters 
to be high. Therefore, adding non-zero blocks would require a sensible prior to prevent ill-
determined parameters. Thereby, given the even higher number of parameters used, the 
algorithm gets stuck in non-stationary draws if more parameters need to be estimated. As a 
restriction of stationarity has been imposed, it would mean that no draw is taken. This 
limitation prevents the inclusion of more variables or lags apart from those already included, 
and of course, the substitution of these zero blocks for non-zero blocks.  The second reason is 
that I do not have any structural interpretation to impose on the different sources of 
uncertainty. S is assumed to be block diagonal, with blocks corresponding to parameters 
belonging to separate equation. That is, the coefficients of the contemporaneous relations 
evolve independently in each equation. For the estimation of the model, I refer the reader to 
the Appendix A of Primiceri (2005), taking into account the Del Negro and Primiceri‘s 
(2013) corrigendum, where the algorithm used for the Gibbs sampling undergoes a 
modification regarding the blocks from which the draws are taken. 
 
3.3.1 Data and identification strategy 
 
The period under analysis is 1958:II - 2007:IV and the source for the entire database is FRED 
(St. Louis Fed). The model includes the following variables: 
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· Real GDP (RGDP): Growth rate 
· CPI Inflation (CPI): Growth rate 
· Loans: It measures the growth rate of the sum of commercial, industrial, real state, 
 consumer loans and other loans and leases. 
· Federal funds rate-Discount rate spread (FR-DR): It measures the difference between 
the rate at which depositary institutions trade federal funds with each other overnight, 
and the rate charged to commercial banks and other depository institutions when they 
borrow at the Federal Reserve’s discount window. 
· Prime loans rate-Federal funds rate spread (LR-FR): This variable is the difference 
between the base rate used by banks to price short-term business loans, posted by a 
majority of 25 insured U.S.-chartered commercial banks, and the aforementioned 
federal funds rate.  
 
 This model is intended to capture the banking sector’s response to Federal Reserve’s 
policies, and in turn, how it affects the demand for credit, inflation and output. The Fed’s 
policies are captured by the spread FR-DR. The spread LR-FR measures the banking sector’s 
behavior in relation to Fed’s policies. This spread is the first variable in the VAR because it is 
expected that banks, as already explained, before setting the loans rate, take into account the 
price at which reserves can be obtained (FR-DR).  Then, loans, inflation and real GDP will 
respond to monetary policies and the loans rate after one period, in that order, to have a 
structural interpretation. That is, the order of the variables in the VAR is LR-FR first 
followed by FR-DR, loans, CPI inflation and real GDP. 
 There are two reasons why the Fed’s instruments included in Chapter 2, namely, 
OMO and the discount rate, are now removed. First, the results obtained in Chapter 2 showed 
that OMO had no significant impact on output, inflation or money supply and therefore, 
monetary policy was transmitted through prices. Second, the “reserves-cost” theory implies 
that to measure monetary policy stance, as policies have its impact on the economy through 
their influence on the reserves cost, it is sufficient to capture the price at which reserves are 
available in the money market. 
 In order to have all the variables on the same scale they have been standardized (yt-
E(yt*))/std(yt*). The periodicity chosen for the model is quarterly and it has been estimated 
with 1 lag. Given the periodicity of the data, I consider one quarter enough for the spreads to 
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affect the rest of variables. Further, the use of more lags would be incoherent for the 
relationship between the spreads, given the mechanism described in section 3.2. 
3.3.2 Priors and computational details 
 
An invariant VAR from 1949:II to 1957:IV (35 observations) 23 is estimated to calibrate the 
priors’ distributions.  The set-up for the priors (as written in Gary Koop’s code) is the 
following: 
 
B0~N( !OLS, 4·V( !OLS)), 
A0~ N(#$OLS, 4 ·V(#$OLS)), 
log σ0~  N(log %&OLS, 4·In), 
Q ~  IW(k2Q · 35 · V( !OLS), 35), 
W ~ IW(k2w · (1+dim(W)) · In, 1+dim(W)), 
S1~  IW(k2s · (1+dim(S1)) ·V(#$1, OLS), 1+dim(S1)), 
S2 ~ IW(k2s · (1+dim(S2)) ·V(#$2,OLS), 1+dim(S2)), 
 
where S1 and S2 are the two blocks of S, A1,OLS and A2, OLS are the corresponding blocks of 
AOLS, and kQ = 0.01, kS = 0.1, and kW = 1. Thus, the priors are not flat but diffuse. 500,000 
draws were generated, discarding the first 200,000 and using 1 in every 150 to avoid 
correlation between them. Convergence tests are displayed in Appendix D. Regarding the 
computational time, the model needed around 20 hours.  
3.4 Results 
 
The TVC-BSVAR provides two tools to evaluate the “reserves-cost” theory. First, the 
impulse response functions show how a certain variable responds to another variable shock. 
Time varying coefficients allow disentangling or at least, providing some insight, regarding 
when there is a change either in the Federal Reserve’s policies or in the banking sector’s 
behavior. Later, the posterior mean of the standard deviation of the residuals for each 
equation of the VAR will shed light on the possibility of external variables, namely, variables 
not included in the model, with potential to distort the results obtained. The figures analyzed 
                                                        
23 For the federal funds rate series, data is only available from 1954. As a proxy, I have used the 3-months T-bill 
rate from 1948 to 1954 to estimate the priors. 
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below display each period of the sample on the X-axis, the response to a positive shock from 
one to twenty months/quarters on the Y-axis and the scale of the response on the Z-axis. 
 The first set of figures belongs to the banking sector and the real economy’s responses 
to Fed’s policies, represented by FR-DR. Figure 2.4 displays the banking sector’s response 
(LR-FR) to an FR-DR shock. The response is completely negative, although its values are 
quite heterogeneous. The same happens regarding the quarters at which the responses tend to 
zero. In Figure 2.15, ordinary impulse responses are represented for isolated periods but the 
same impulse response function. Except for the very last years of the sample, the response is 
significant for every period. Thus, the main point of the “reserves-cost” theory is confirmed. 
That is, when banks can obtain cheaper reserves because of positive spreads between the 
federal funds rate and the discount rate, banks raises the loans rate relatively less than the 
federal funds rate is increased. Figure 2.5 represents the response of loans to an FR-DR 
shock. The response in this case is subtler and needs a deeper analysis. The first relevant fact 
is that the response is positive or becomes more positive for periods of positive spread FR-
DR. Those periods are 1965-1967, 1968-1970, 1972-1975, 1979-1981 and 1983-1984, which 
connects with the period 1985-1989. Between 1993 and 2000 the response is positive, but the 
values are lower in comparison with previous periods. However, positive responses occur 
also between 1960-1963, 1990-1993 and 2000-2004. A common characteristic of these last 
periods is that the federal funds rate was around two to three percentage points, being the 
lowest values of the entire sample. Also, an interesting detail is found for the period 1960-
1963, because while the discount rate and the federal funds rate were increasing being 
approximately equal, the loans rate remained at the same level. That is, even though the Fed 
increased interest rates, the loans rate endured by the economy did not vary. Last, the 
negative responses or those positive responses after a decrease from the highest peaks 
correspond to periods of negative or zero spread FR-DR. For the positive spread in 1989, 
however, the positive peak starts to decrease before the highest level is reached. The 
responses are, nevertheless, rarely and weakly significant. Thus, in Figure 2.16, the loans 
response is significant only for the periods of positive response of the impulses response 
belonging to 1961 and 1980. Figure 2.6 shows that the response of CPI inflation to an FR-DR 
shock is positive for the entire period except after 2004, when the discount rate was already 
set as a penalty rate. In Figure 2.16 is seen that the positive responses are significant for 
around 17 quarters for every period, except after 2000 when the responses are no longer 
significant. Last, Figure 2.7 displays the response of real GDP to an FR-DR shock. 
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The shape of this figure is very similar to Figure 2.5, with the exception that from 1970 to 
1975 the response is negative. The interesting thing about this is that whereas the response is 
not significant for the periods with similar response to Figure 2.5, the negative response for 
1975 is significant after 3 quarters (Figure 2.16). This may indicate that despite the positive 
spread, the federal funds rate was already high enough to restraint the demand for money, 
because it was the longer period that the loans rate remained below the federal funds rate. 
That is, banks could not increase the loans rate more, given the demand for credit. 
 
 The next set of figures corresponds to the analysis of the banking sector’s behavior, 
conditioned on Fed’s policies.  Figure 2.8 shows that the spread FR-DR responds positively 
to an LR-DR shock except after 2002. This relationship is however, unimportant for the 
analysis. Figure 2.9 depicts the response of loans to an LR-FR shock. The response is 
negative for the entire period. The response is significant and tends to zero only after 20 
quarters, except again for the last years of the sample (Figure 2.17). Figure 2.10 shows a 
negative inflation response to a LR-FR shock. Nonetheless, it is not significant at any period 
(Figure 2.17). The similarity between the real GDP and loans response to an FR-DR shock, 
occurs again between the real GDP and loans response to a LR-DR shock (Figure 2.11). In 
this case, the negative response is significant for the entire period and tends to zero only after 
20 quarters (Figure 2.17). Last, Figures 2.12 and 2.13 represent the inflation and real GDP 
response to a loans shock, respectively. Both of them respond positively, although after 1995 
the former has a negative response after two quarters and the latter, from the beginning.  
While inflation responses are not significant, for real GDP, the response corresponding to the 
periods 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1990 are significant for the three first quarters (Figure 
2.18). When the residuals are evaluated, Figure 2.14 shows that real GDP and loans present 
higher residuals until the early 1980s. However, RGDP residuals remains low until the end of 
the sample, while loans residuals increase again around 1995, at the same time that inflation 
residuals. Inflation residuals were also from the early 1970s to the late 1980s. For the 
variables capturing Fed and banking sector’s behavior, in both cases residuals are slightly 
higher in the first half of the 1970s. Later, for the early 1980s, an outstanding peak is found. 
Therefore, the early 1980s seems to hide some factor or factors that could distort the results 
obtained. The same can be said for the loans and inflation results after 1995 and for real GDP 
and loans until 1980. 
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 Given that a shock to the spread LR-FR has a no significant inflation response, unlike 
the shock to FR-DR, but the opposite is found for the loans and real GDP, the same model 
was estimated dropping the variable FR-DR, in order to evaluate whether LR-DR has no 
power to decrease inflation, or it is simply that FR-DR is stronger in capturing the inflation 
behaviour. The results (not presented) show that a shock to LR-FR has a negative and 
significant impact on inflation. However, the real GDP response turns no significant for most 
of the periods. At the same time, a shock to loans compensate that lost of significance, as the 
real GDP responses are significant almost for every period, and the significant responses last 
slightly more than those in the baseline model. 
3.5 What lessons can we learn? 
 
The results confirmed the proposed mechanism operating between the Federal Reserve’s 
policies and the banking sector, whereby when the Fed’s influence on the reserves cost opens 
the door for arbitrage opportunities, banks obtain their reserves from the cheapest source. The 
implication of this phenomenon is that Fed’s raises of the federal funds rate, due to the 
cheaper cost of the reserves obtained at the discount window, has an impact on the loans rate 
below the ratio 1:1. Consequently, the demand for credit is restrained less than the Fed’s 
policies intend, triggering higher inflation. According to the model, while a smaller spread 
LR-FR has a positive and significant impact on loans and output, the variable having a 
positive and significant influence on inflation is the one capturing Fed’s policies, namely, a 
positive spread FR-DR. Therefore, the Fed should include as a target the tracing and control 
of the reserves cost, in order to have full control over monetary policy. This statement 
confirms that monetary policy has its impact through prices and not quantities, despite the 
quantities influence those prices, as claimed in Chapter 2. These results answer the unknown 
regarding the switching regime around 1990 also commented in Chapter 2. Indeed, that 
regime switch belongs to a change in the banking sector’s behaviour when the loans rate was 
pegged to the federal funds rate. Its confirmation is based on the fact that the results analyzed 
are mostly homogeneous, without presenting any switching regime. It is the consequence of 
including the adequate variable in the model, namely, the spread LR-FR that captures the 
banking sector’s behavior. In relation to this, it is important to stress that after 1990, when 
banks obtained most of their reserves as nonborrowed reserves at the federal funds rate cost, 
not only the loans rate was pegged to the federal funds rate, but also it was the period when 
the spread was constant and the largest of the whole period (Figure 2.2).  This period 
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coincides perfectly with the decline in the volatility of inflation and output levels that gave 
name to the known Great Moderation (1990-2007), discussed by authors such a McConnell 
and Perez-Quiros (2000)24, Stock and Watson (2003), Moreno (2004) or Gali and Gambetti 
(2009). In the same line, the Great Inflation (1965-1982), characterized by high volatility in 
inflation and output, coincides with the smallest and more volatile spread LR-FR. Therefore, 
the “reserves-cost” theory could also be the explanation for both episodes, because when the 
federal funds rate impact ratio is not constant, the economy faces a different loans rate, which 
transmits more volatility into the economy.   
 
 However, this theory leaves one case without explanation. It can be perfectly 
applicable while excess reserves are scarce, because banks will take their decisions based on 
the interest rates of the moment. Conversely, when they accumulate a significant amount of 
excess reserves, as for the last years of the sample (and posterior years), monetary policy can 
be even more powerless. With a significant amount of excess reserves, banks could set their 
loans rate depending on the rate at which reserves were obtained in the past. A possible 
consequence is that they could facilitate lending conditions only when it is profitable for 
them, causing higher inflation levels, as under the already evaluated positive spread FR-DR 
scenario. Another consequence would be that if past reserves were acquired at a relatively 
expensive cost, and the current interest rate is lower than that cost (as it is the case now), they 
will accumulate more reserve25 to not incur in loses when using them, and consequently, the 
inflation levels will remain low. In relation to the present situation, after the huge liquidity 
injection from the quantitative easing, as banks do not need reserves to lend, and their past 
reserves were expensive compared to the current low interest rates (Figure 2.1), it is not 
surprising that liquidity injections do not reach the real economy until interest rates rise or the 
demand for credit increases significantly, what simultaneously would suppose an increase in 
interest rates.  
 
 The last thing deserving attention is that even though this theory seems to explain the 
high inflation during the 1970s and 1980s, and offers a lesson regarding how policies should 
be managed to avoid those episodes again, or even why inflation has remained in low levels 
after the spread LR-FR was almost the largest of the sample, it also shows the scarce 
                                                        
24 These authors observed a break in the volatility of U.S. output around 1984, what just matches with initial the 
uptrend of free reserves (Figure 2.3).  
25 Apart from the low interest rates nowadays, the current monetary policy of paying interest rates on required 
reserves (IORR) and excess reserves (IERR) might be contributing as well. 
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knowledge possessed regarding the behaviour of the demand for money. The residuals 
displayed in Figure 3.14 increase around 1980 for all the variable of the model. At the same 
time, an increase in the residuals for the inflation and loans equations was observed after 
1995. While the spread LR-FR was negative and the spread FR-DR positive for the late 
1960s and mid-1970s, pointing out that banks were unable to increase the loans rate above 
the federal funds rate as a signal of low credit demand, that phenomena did not repeat again 
for the following FR-DR positive spreads. This fact may suggest that the models estimating 
the optimum federal funds rate for the economy according to Fed’s targets were erroneous 
and the demand for money and inflation could be also influenced by uncontrolled factors not 
included in those models.  
 As it is widely known, credit flowed more than it should for the last year of the 
sample and the consequence was the Great Recession. A reason why hidden or not accounted 
factors may be driving the demand forces is because our knowledge and measuring tools are 
insufficient to evaluate and control those forces. Consequently, the required interest rate to 
lead the economy through a steady path cannot be set accurately. For the case of the 
measuring tools, the available technology and the own definition of a variable could be the 
cause of that inaccurate measurement. For example, although the available data for output, 
output gap or inflation as a sole entity for representing the whole economy may be efficient 
for a quick and general glance about the state of the economy, that generality is likely to 
generates blind spots. Then, a sector may be growing faster than others, where prices increase 
much faster than in other segments of the economy. Thus, for the case of inflation, the 
standard measure can underestimate the evolution of that sector, and the interest rates set for 
the entire economy will be wrongly set for that specific case. The consequence will be more 
credit flowing towards that sector given profit prospects, causing dangerous debt 
accumulation or bubbles, even though the other sectors are under control given the interest 
rate targeted. 
3.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter undertook the search of the responsibility for American economy’s performance 
from 1958 to 2007, as well as the consequences of who owns it, under the proposition of a 
new theory that explains the mechanism working between the banking sector and the Federal 
Reserve’s policies. The so-called “reserves-cost” theory proposes that the Fed is able to have 
an impact on the real economy, directly, by its influence on the cost of reserves, and 
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indirectly, by the impact of that cost on the loans rate set by banks. For that task, a TVC-
BSVAR was estimated, given its adequacy for capturing smoothed regime changes over time. 
The results have confirmed the mechanism proposed by the theory, showing that the Fed, by 
not targeting the cost at which reserves were obtained, granted the monetary policy steering 
wheel to the banking sector, causing episodes such as the Great Inflation. However, while the 
banking sector could be considered as the direct responsible for the American economy’s 
performance for such episodes, the first responsibility falls on the Federal Reserve, as it is the 
one able to control the reserves cost mechanism. 
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-- Chapter 4 -- 
Why do banks accumulate reserves and how do they influence 
monetary policy? An explanation from the “reserves-cost” theory  
 
 
 
Low interest rates, risk, uncertainty, or low demand for loans have been 
proposed as some of the most important factors determining the accumulation 
of excess reserves in the American banking sector during the Great 
Depression and the Great Recession. Estimating an SVAR for the period 1922-
2017 and using the new “reserves-cost” theory I complement some of the 
factors aforementioned, and propose that when banks are holding reserves 
obtained at a higher rate than the present short-term rate, banks will hoard 
reserves, in order to not use those acquired at higher cost and incur in loses. 
At the same time, the cost of those reserves will determine how banks set the 
loans rate in relation to the short-term rate. This mechanism is important 
because it implies that Federal Reserve’s policies can be transformed by the 
banking sector, and their impact on the real economy may be far from the 
desired. 
 
 
 
 
n JEL classification: E43, E51, E52, E58 
 
n Keywords: monetary policy, Federal Reserve, SVARs, excess reserves, reserves cost 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
After the Great Recession, comparisons arose between the causes and consequences of this 
unfortunate episode and the Great Depression. One of them was the hoard of excess reserves 
in the banking sector. At the end of 1940 in the United States, banks’ holding of excess 
reserves was around seven billion dollars (about 6.8% in relation to GDP), while in the last 
quarter of 2014 they were holding around 2,700 billion dollars (almost 15.4% in relation to 
GDP). After those dates, these balances initiated their decline. For the first case, those levels 
reached a minimum at the beginning of the 1970s. For the second case, it is still unknown 
when it will happen. Were we able to completely comprehend the reasons and mechanisms 
behind the accumulation of reserves, its consequences could be anticipated.  The reason why 
the consequences must be anticipated is because of the impact that reserves have on the real 
economy. To understand that statement, it is necessary to know what is the key point for the 
theory exposed later; that banks set their loans rate conditioned on the cost of their reserves. 
To the question “what does determine the prime loans rate?” sent by email to the Federal 
Reserve “Contact Us” option, it was answered: “The prime loans rate is a rate established by 
commercial banks as a lending rate or base off which their commercial loans are priced. In 
other words, the banks set their own rates based on the demand for various kinds of loans, on 
the cost of money to the banks, and on the administrative costs of making loans…” That 
“cost of money” is the price at which reserves are obtained. As the loans rate is the rate that 
the real economy actually endures and it is connected to reserves, that accumulation of 
reserves will determine, to some extent, and through certain mechanisms, the path of the 
American’s economy performance. Therefore, three questions must be answered. What 
determines the levels of excess reserves? What are the consequences of those levels for the 
real economy? And from these two questions arise the third one, what can central banks do 
about it, if total control and responsibility to lead the economy through an optimum path is 
expected from them? 
 
 For the first question, three main reasons have been highlighted. First, low interest 
rates prevent banks from investing in alternative assets. Second, financial shocks, what could 
gather also uncertainty and risk factors, lead banks to accumulate precautionary reserves 
against reserves withdrawals or liquidity scarcity in the market. Third, oversupply of reserves 
and low credit demand. Regarding the accumulation of reserves for the 1930s, Frost (1971) 
defended what he called the “adjustment-cost” hypothesis, whereby banks hold substantial 
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amounts of excess reserves at low interest rates because brokerage costs, commissions, 
spreads…prevent them from adjusting their reserve position, as these costs are greater than 
the interest earned on short-term securities. Thus, the demand function for excess reserves is 
kinked at a certain rate, when it is lower than the costs aforementioned. Lindley, Clifford and 
Mounts (2001) and Dwyer (2010) also claimed a negative relationship between interest rates 
and excess reserves. However, the former authors added that an increase in deposits 
decreased excess reserves. This claim is contrary to the risk factor, as banks would increase 
their holding of excess reserves, as a preventing measure before the possibility of deposits 
outflows. This result is outstanding, as the period they analyze underwent an increase in 
deposits and excess reserves. After new estimations, they reached the conclusion that banks 
received reserves which were unable to convert into income-earning assets given the low 
demand for credit. Subsequently, they had to hold unintended reserves balance. Wilcox 
(1984) refuted Friedman and Schwartz’s (1963) claim that excess reserves increased as a 
consequence of the increase in reserve requirements (or other shocks such as bank runs), 
because despite it may be able to explain the initial hoarding of excess reserves in the early 
1930s, it cannot explain the greater pile up after 1934 and 1937.  Instead, low interest rates 
seemed to be a more powerful factor in explaining those increases in excess reserves. Also, 
Calomiris, Mason and Wheelock (2011) by using microeconomic data on Fed member banks, 
stated that excess reserves did not increase between June 1936 and June 1937 because banks 
curtailed credit as Friedman and Schwartz’s (1963) claimed. On the contrary, banks increased 
lending by 750 million dollars, but reduced their holding of government securities by 1,100 
million dollars. They concluded, “as bank profits and loan opportunities increase, and as 
macroeconomic risk recedes, banks will reduce excess reserves to finance loan expansion.” 
The increase in lending accompanied by the decline in government securities aforementioned 
could be explained by Cagan (1969)’s claim that when the spread between the discount rate 
and the short-term rate of the funds market was positive, banks preferred to borrow at the 
discount window. When the spread was zero or negative, as it was the case for the 1930s, 
banks sold securities to finance the expansion in loans. In general, he argued that the 
accumulation of excess reserves in the 1930s was due to the cost of investing in short-term 
securities, supplemented by the lack of demand for loans and the risk of investing in long-
term securities. At very low yields on short-term securities, the transaction costs of buying 
and selling may equal or exceed the return and therefore, idle reserves will remain with 
banks. Todd (2013), regarding the connection between credit and excess reserves, claimed 
that the accumulation of excess reserves in the 1930s went away only once banks were 
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offered government-guaranteed lending alternatives, which funded defense production 
programs. Thus, in comparison to the Great Recession episode, he stated that the quantitative 
easing (QE) aimed to encourage banks to ease the terms of credit was not accomplished and 
excess reserves were hoarded. The reason is that while commercial and industrial loans had 
increased 13.6% from August 2007 to April 2013, the monetary base, as a consequence of the 
monetary stimulus, had increased 367%. This belongs to the third factor commented above, 
namely, oversupply of reserves in comparison to credit demand. This author also claimed that 
the new policy tool, which is the interest rate paid on reserves by the Federal Reserve, is 
encouraging banks to retain excess reserves. 
 For those analyzing the accumulation of reserves for more recent periods, Dow (2001) 
estimated the demand for excess reserves for the 1990s and obtained that one percentage 
point increase in the federal funds rate decreased excess reserves in $120 millions, while an 
increase in deposits of one billion dollars increased excess reserves in three million dollars. 
Regarding the years around the Great Recession, the debate for the factors behind the 
hoarding of excess reserves hardly varies. Chang, Contessi and Francis (2014), analyzing 
bank-level data for commercial banks and saving institutions found that banks accumulate 
excess reserves when there is a deterioration between capital adequacy and loans loss 
provisions (what could be classified as precautionary motive due to weak balance sheet), 
when the opportunity cost of holding low-interest-bearing assets is low, and when the penalty 
for holding insufficient reserves increases. However, measuring economic uncertainty by the 
volatility index (VIX) and industrial production index (IPI) variance, the estimations showed 
that the uncertainty factor did not influence the level of excess reserves. Ennis and Wolman 
(2015) found that banks did not substitute reserves for liquid securities, but they 
complemented them contributing to increasing bank liquidity, partially, because the Fed is 
paying interest rates on reserves. Also, the increase in reserves did not pressure insured 
banks’ balance sheet capacity, because the Fed’s purchase programs flooded with reserves, 
mostly, those banks with abundant capital. Therefore, banks could have lent without any 
pressure on their capital ratios. Ashcraft, McAndrews and Skeie (2011) analyzed the daily 
behavior of large and small banks in the federal funds market form 2002 to 2008, and 
observed that the reluctance to lend and the desperation to borrow for 2007 and 2008 
triggered more volatility (extreme spikes and crashes) in the federal funds rate and 
accordingly, banks held more precautionary reserves. 
 Japan underwent the same episode of reserves accumulation during the 1990s. Ogawa 
(2004) also pointed out to low interest rates and precautionary reasons as explanatory factors. 
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While he highlighted an important increase in excess reserves after the bankruptcies of 
financial institutions in 1997, that increase was overshadowed by the rise of excess reserves 
levels in the second half of 2000, when the Bank of Japan undertook its QE. Again, banks 
seemed to be forced to hold unintended reserves. That is, the supply side was the main 
contributor to those accumulation levels. For the case of the ECB, Bindseil, Camba-Mendez, 
Hirsch and Weller (2006) supported the already commented negative correlation between 
excess reserves and interest rates. They also argued that excess reserves are not the 
mechanism whereby banks can expand loans and create inflation. However, it was 
highlighted that if the level of excess reserves is not forecasted correctly, open market 
operations can induce more volatility on short-term rates and make monetary policy 
transmission more noisy and inefficient. Goodhart (2010) summarized all the factors behind 
the accumulation of excess reserves into risk of lending, capital ratios, regulation, lower 
demand for loans, interest rates paid on reserves, increasing public deficit and almost zero 
interest rate in public sector debt. 
 
 Regarding the second question about the consequences of hoarding excess reserves, 
the most feared has been an inflation outburst as commented in Meltzer (2009) and Plaser 
(2011) to name someone. However, there is strong opposition against that belief. Martin, 
McAndrews and Skeie (2016) developed a model for the U.S. banking system, where interest 
rates are paid on reserves, in order to shed light on the debate about the potential 
consequences on credit and inflation of the current level of excess reserves. They showed that 
lending was not related to the amount of reserves, because the key determinant of lending is 
the expected profits between the return obtained on a loan and the opportunity cost of it. 
“Banks expand their balance sheets so long as the marginal cost of funding is less than the 
marginal return on bank lending, abstracting from credit and liquidity risk” (p. 195). 
According to Bindseil (2004) the inflation fears have no foundation and they come from the 
erroneous “Reserve Position Doctrine” which has been in textbook for decades. Under an 
interest rate target, banks do not need reserves to lend. Banks first lend, if its profitable for 
them, and then, obtain the necessary reserves. Therefore, the result of an injection of reserves 
to make banks expand credit will result in a drop of interest rates to zero (if there is no 
deposit facility), and once this occurs, the money multiplier should fall with every further 
reserves injection, as the amount of reserves provided overcomes the demand for credit. 
Moore (1998) had clearly exposed that argument previously as reflected in the following 
statements: 
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“So long as reserves with the central bank do not bear interest, and interest rates are 
sufficiently positive to cover marginal costs, profit maximization alone implies that 
individual banks will have an incentive to lend out any reserves in excess of their 
legally required minimum ratios” (p. 372). 
 
“Loans make deposits. […] Increases in bank loans are made at the initiative of bank 
borrowers, not the bank themselves. Bank may unilaterally increase their advertising 
budgets, shade their lending rates, or ease their collateral requirements. But as with 
any other business, the amount of good or service they can sell depends ultimately on 
the demand for their product” (p. 373). 
 
“…while the Federal Reserve can directly determine de quantity of nonborrowed 
reserves, it cannot directly determine de quantity of total reserves” (p. 374).  
 
“The Federal Reserve has no choice but to accommodate and provide all increases in 
required and excess reserves demanded, albeit at a supply price (interest rate) of its 
own choosing.” (p.380). Last, “The money supply is endogenously determined by 
market forces” (p.381). 
 
 The third question regarding what central banks can do, has been answered by paying 
interest rates on excess reserves, either by building floors for the interest rate levels or 
corridors, as explained in Goodfriend (2005), Keister, Martin and McAndrews (2008), 
Bernanke (2010) and Bowmman, Gagnon and Leahy (2010). According to these authors, it 
can be considered as a measure to separate the control of the interest rate from the amount of 
reserves. In that way, the Fed can inject liquidity into the market when there are liquidity 
problems like in September 2001, without altering the policy about interest rates. It also helps 
the Fed to implement more efficiently its policies, as otherwise, the volatility in the federal 
funds rate and reserves in the funds market, makes difficult to achieve the targeted level for 
the federal funds rate.  Last, the Fed can control the level of excess reserves as banks are 
receiving interests on those reserves and they will not look for alternative assets unless they 
offer a higher return. 
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 In this chapter, the main goal is to answer the enigma about the accumulation of 
reserves to extract some insight about its consequences. This will shed light on which actions 
may be necessary to undertake, so that monetary policy has a direct impact on the economy 
and lead it through the desired path, without undergoing any transformation on its way 
through the banking sector. However, I depart from the standard factors enumerated above 
and develop a new explanation, which can be considered mainly based on the interest rate 
factor. This new explanation is an extension of the “reserves-cost” theory explained in 
Chapter 3. That theory claimed that the Fed can control the real economy, directly by 
influencing the reserves cost, and indirectly by the impact of that cost on the loans rate. 
While that theory focused only on the reserves cost at current market rates, it did not take into 
account the cost of the reserves accumulated through time. In the next section, I explain the 
creation of a new variable that measures the reserves cost by way of inventory. That variable 
is important to explain the reason behind reserves accumulation and its impact on the real 
economy. It measures the average cost of the reserves held at every period and represents, 
depending on its position regarding short-term rates, the price at which banks will decide 
either to use their excess reserves or obtain them form other source. When banks are holding 
reserves with a cost higher than the current short-term rates, they will not use the reserves 
held and borrow at the current short-term rate, which is cheaper. In this way, they obtain the 
highest profit from lending, or at least, they do not incur in losses by lending at lower rates 
than the cost of their reserves. On the contrary, when the short-term rate of reference is 
higher than the cost of the reserves held, excess reserves will diminish as banks obtain more 
profits by using those cheaper reserves when lending.  Also, this variable is able to determine 
the evolution of the spread between the short-term rate of the money market and the prime 
loans rate. The higher the difference between the cost of reserves held and the short-term rate, 
the higher banks will set the loans rate in relation to the short-term rate of reference, in order 
to diminish the risk of incurring in loses when lending. Thus, this variable is also relevant for 
explaining how banks’ decisions about the loans rate, conditioned on monetary policies, will 
influence Fed’s final targets, such as inflation or output. These results have been obtained by 
estimating a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) for the period 1922-2017. 
 The chapter is structured as follow. Section 4.2 develops the extension of the 
“reserves-cost” theory. Section 4.3 describes the variables and the model estimated. Section 
4.4 displays the results obtained and their interpretation. Section 4.5 analyses the new policy 
of paying interests on reserves and potential consequences of hoarding reserves. Last, section 
4.6 summarizes the main results and its implications. 
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4.2 The “reserves-cost” theory. Part II 
 
The “reserves-cost” theory developed in Chapter 3 can be briefly explained as follows: 
 Banks can obtain borrowed and nonborrowed reserves at their corresponding cost, 
which may differ or not. Borrowed reserves can be obtained at the discount window at the 
cost of the discount rate.  For the case of nonborrowed reserves, the source from where banks 
obtain them is the federal funds market, where the cost is the federal funds rate, or the open 
market. When banks sell securities to obtain reserves, they are renouncing to the interest rate 
paid on those securities. The cost (or opportunity cost) of getting those reserves is the interest 
rate not received. Minimum, the cost of those reserves will be the 3-months T-bill rate, which 
in general, is around the federal funds rate levels. If the term of those securities is longer, the 
cost will be higher. Hence, it can be considered that the cost for borrowed reserves is the 
discount rate and the cost for nonborrowed reserves is the federal funds rate. As profit-
maximizing agents, banks will prefer to obtain as much reserves as possible (as long as they 
are needed or desired) from the cheapest source. When there are positive spreads between the 
federal funds rate (or other short-term rate, depending on the period under analysis) and the 
discount rate, banks will borrow at the discount window. If this spread is zero, banks will be 
indifferent from where obtain reserves. When the spread is negative, banks will avoid the 
discount window, unless it is strictly necessary. 
 As mentioned in the introduction, banks lend and afterwards, obtain the necessary 
reserves for fulfilling the necessary required reserves and their desired excess reserves levels. 
To lend, banks will avoid to incur in loses. Therefore, they adjust previously the loans rate 
according to the reserves cost in the money market at that moment. As the loans rate is the 
rate that the real economy endures, the theory proposes that the Federal Reserve can have an 
impact on the real economy only through how its policies affect the reserves cost (discount 
rate and short-term rate of reference), because this cost will determine the loans rate and 
consequently, the demand for money in the real economy. One must be aware that as the 
Fed’s main policy is to control the federal funds rate, considered the short-term rate of 
reference, if positive spreads are allowed between the short-term rate and the discount rate, 
the Fed will be losing power to modify the performance of the economy. The reason is that 
banks will arbitrage as consequence of the different costs and will be able to increase the 
loans rate less in relation to the raises in the federal funds rate. Consequently, policies 
intended to tighten the economy, will not be accomplished, or at least not to the extent 
desired. 
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 However, this theory was incomplete. It claimed that the cost of reserves could 
determine the loans rate depending solely on current interest rates (static reserves-cost 
theory). This argument is reasonable for those periods with scarce excess reserves, because 
the different sources of reserves commented above would have to be used at the rate that they 
offer at a particular moment. Nonetheless, when banks accumulate excess reserves, they do 
not need to obtain reserves to back the demand for loans. As those reserves were obtained at 
past rates, the interest rate of the moment would lose its influence on the loans rate for that 
period. It would be the cost of past reserves along with current rates what would determine 
the loans rate. This reasoning implies that if banks are holding reserves with a higher cost 
than the loans rate that can be applied in relation to the other market rates, they will retain 
those reserves until interest rates are higher, so as to not incur in loses. Likewise, if the cost 
of reserves held is above current rates they will decide to obtain more reserves at market rates 
to make more profits, rather than using their relatively more expensive reserves. Therefore, it 
is probable that they accumulate more reserves under those circumstances.  
 Once the “reserves-cost” theory has been renewed (dynamic “reserves-cost” theory), 
it is time to prove that it is able to explain the evolution of excess reserves and influence the 
loans rate in relation to short-term rates. The consequences of that relationship on the real 
economy are not the goal of this chapter, because they were already examined in Chapter 3. 
The results showed that smaller spreads between the prime loans rate and the federal funds 
rate triggered a higher demand for credit and increases in inflation, even when the federal 
funds rate was raised. 
 In order to visualize how the cost of reserves evolves, a new variable has been created 
as follows. Starting from 1919, when the level of excess reserves was near zero, the 
difference between the quantity of borrowed reserves held in period t and t-1 is calculated at 
each period of the sample. The same procedure is applied to nonborrowed reserves.  When 
the difference for borrowed reserves is positive, that quantity is registered at its cost, namely, 
the discount rate of that period, by way of inventory. The same process has been carried out 
for nonborrowed reserves, but the interest rate applied is the short-term rate of reference 
(weighted average of open market rates for New York, 3-months Treasury bill or federal 
funds rate, depending on the period)26. When the difference between periods for any type of 
reserves is negative, that quantity is removed from the lowest interest rate where reserves 
were registered in the inventory. In that way, banks maximize profits by using the largest 
                                                        
26 Appendix E 
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difference between the reserves cost and the current loans rate. Once reserves are added or 
removed from the inventory at each period, each quantity of reserves remaining and 
registered until that period is multiplied by its cost. Thereafter, I calculate the average cost. 
As result, I obtain the average cost that banks have paid in period t for one dollar of reserves.  
This procedure has to be repeated for every period. The new variable is called reserves cost 
(RC). Yet, it is far from accurate, because apart from accounting the reserves obtained at each 
period with a standard and simple method, which obviously is not exact, if banks are trapped 
holding reserves at higher costs than the interest rates of the moment, the image of the 
inventory becomes distorted once cheaper reserves are accumulated, as they drag down the 
RC average value. In the end, there would not be any clue regarding the level at which banks 
would be free of using all their reserves without incurring in losses. Therefore, to 
complement RC, I have also created a variable measuring the maximum interest rate (either 
the short-term rate of reference or the discount rate) at which banks obtained reserves until 
period t. Thus, this variable (MAX[STR], henceforth) measures the level at which banks 
could be trapped with expensive reserves.  
 These two variables are plotted in Figure 3.1 along with other variables of interest. 
The green line represents the logarithm of excess reserves as percentage of required reserves 
(ER). The graph is cut above for the sake of the explanation; therefore the ER line disappears 
after 2009 given the high levels since then. ER increased after the Great Depression and 
initiated their decline around 1940, reaching its minimum around the mid-1970s, when they 
increased again. The increases corresponding to the Great Depression and the Great 
Recession can be mostly explained by Figure 3.2, where the level of nonborrowed reserves is 
displayed as percentage of loans. This variable is able to measure when the Fed over 
exceeded the supply of reserves, given the demand for loans. Despite the common believe 
that the injection of reserves was greater during the Great Recession, it is observed that in 
relation to lending, the amount of nonborrowed reserves provided during the Great 
Depression was twice the levels of the Great Recession. Returning to Figure 3.1, the violet 
line is the short-term rate of reference (STR), the red line is the prime loans rate (LR), the 
dark blue line is RC, and the light blue line is MAX[STR]. Finally, the orange line shows the 
difference between the loans rate and MAX[STR] (LR-MAX STR henceforth). 
The graph displays three facts that seem to support how the “reserves-cost” theory can 
explain the accumulation of reserves: 
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• ER seems to increase every time after the short-term rate turns down from its local or 
global maximum (except in 1970). After reaching a minimwn, when interest rates rise 
again, even if it does not reach the last maximwn, the amount of ER diminishes. This 
fact is in line with some authors' arguments reviewed in the literature who highlighted 
the importance of interest rates in detemiining the evolution of excess reserves. 
• After a maxinmm in the short-term rate, RC stays mostly above the prime loans rate 
(except for the periods around the Great Recession and Great Depression, as the 
average cost is dragged down given the large supply of reserves at low cost). That 
means that unless banks keep the reserves already in possession and obtain further 
reserves from other sources, they may have to asswne losses by using those with a 
higher cost than the current loans rate. Also, they would obtain lower profits than 
using reserves at ctUTent market rates. 
Once the federal funds rate reached its maximun1 in the beginning of the 1980s, RC 
has been above the loans rate. Therefore, it seems that banks have been accumulating 
more and more reseives, being unable to use those obtained at higher rates. 
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• There is a clear negative correlation between the spread LR-MAX STR and ER 
(There is an exception for the period 1969-1973). Therefore, it seems that when banks 
are trapped with expensive reserves, the further is the loans rate from that critical 
level to get rid of them, the more reserves are held. 
FigurelS.3ofll>atalilource:ll'RED!andll'RASER 
Figure 3.3 shows how the "reserves-cost'' theory may be also able to explain the 
evolution of the loans rate. The graph displays the spread MAX (green line), which is the 
difference between MAX[STR] and STR, the spread between the RC and STR (RC-STR, red 
line), and the spread between the loans rate and the short-term rate of reference (LR-STR, 
blue line), already used in Chapter 3. This graph displays two important facts: 
• The spread MAX is positively correlated with LR-STR. This fact seems to indicate 
that the larger (smaller) is the spread MAX, the less (more) likely is that banks can 
use the reserves obtained at those maximum levels. Subsequently, they will increase 
(decrease) the loans rate in relation to the short-term rate of reference, in order to 
diminish the probability of incurring in losses, and spend those reserves as soon as 
possible when interest rates reach nearby levels. 
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• There is also a positive correlation between the spread LR-S1R and RC-STR. It 
means that the further (nearer) is the average reserves cost from market rates, the 
higher (lower) banks set the loans rate in relation to the short-term rate. 
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The last evidence in favor of the ' 'reserves-cost" theory is observed in Figure 3 .4, 
where excess reserves (blue line) and borrowed reserves (green line) as percentage of 
required reserves are displayed. Again, the graph is cut above because the amount of reserves 
during the Great Depression and Great Recession. It is observed that despite the positive 
excess reserves levels after the 1930s, once the demand for credit increased as commented in 
the literature, positive borrowed reserves levels arise. Why would banks borrow reserves 
when they are already holding enough amounts of them? Despite the spikes found in 1984 
and 2001, due to exceptional risky situations, one reason could be that they would incur in 
losses if they spend some of the reserves held. For the end of the 1960s and 1970s, borrowed 
reserved increased because excess reserves levels were low and the Fed allowed positive 
spreads between the federal funds rate and the discount rate. Banks, therefore, arbitraged and 
obtained cheaper reserves at the discount window. 
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 Once some evidences have been showed, the “reserves-cost” theory can be revamped 
as follows: the only way whereby the Federal Reserve can have an impact on the real 
economy is through the manipulation of the cost at which banks obtain reserves. This cost 
will steer the loans rate, which is the actual rate that the real economy endures. If the level of 
excess reserves is scarce, just modifying the federal funds rate (or other the short-term rate of 
reference) and the discount rate will have a direct impact on the cost of reserves held by 
banks, as long as the spread between these rates is closed. In that case, the movements of 
those rates are likely to be reflected one to one into the loans rate. If the levels of excess 
reserves are significantly above the levels of required reserves and precautionary factors, the 
impact of interest rates aforementioned on the loans rate will be proportionally diluted to the 
quantity hoarded, and more aggressive policies and longer time will be necessary to drive the 
real economy through the desired path. The reason is that banks’ decisions about the loans 
rate will make it to evolve differently in relation to short-term rates, conditioned on the 
reserves cost. Consequently, there will be three hands behind the steering wheel of monetary 
policy. That is, past Fed’s policies, banks’ decisions and present Fed’s policies.  
 As clarification, although uncertainty or risk shocks hitting the economy at a specific 
time will contribute to accumulating reserves for a while, and although at some point 
variables controlling those factors will be included in the model, the theory exposed aims to 
unveil the underlying factors behind the accumulation of reserves for the long term at 
aggregate levels. 
4.3 Methodology and variables27 
 
The model set-up is as follows. Consider the VAR standard form 
 
yt = c + Γ1 yt-1 +Γ2 yt-2 … + ut        (1) 
 
where yt  is an n x 1 vector of endogenous variables at time t, c is an n x 1 vector of constant 
terms, Γt := ßtA-1, are n x n matrices of coefficients and ut := εtA-1B is an n x 1 vector of error 
terms, with ut  having variance covariance matrix Σu =B A-1Σε A-1’B’. Normalizing the 
variances of the structural innovations to one, i.e., assuming εt~ (0, In),  Σu =B A-1 A-1’B’. 
Therefore, the model can be rewritten as 
 
                                                        
27 The definitions and details regarding the construction of the variables are explained in Appendix E.  
  
 
116 
yt = c + Γ1 yt-1 +Γ2 yt-2 … + BA-1εt        (2) 
 
However, to recover the parameters of the structural form, at least 2n2 – ½n(n+1) restrictions 
are to be imposed in B and A to identify all 2n2 elements of these matrices. In this way, the 
structure of the model follows the AB-model described in Lutkepohl (2005). Before 
proceeding with the identification scheme, a previous knowledge of the variables included 
and the effects they intend to capture is necessary.  
 The aim of this model is twofold. First, to shed light on the influence of the reserves 
cost on the amount of excess reserves held. Second, to unveil the impact of the reserves cost 
on banks’ decisions about the loans rate.  Hence, the variables to consider are: 
 
- ER (growth rate): Excess reserves as percentage of required reserves. It measures the 
desired percentage of reserves held by banks, regardless the variations in required 
reserves. 
 
- NBR (growth rate): Nonborrowed reserves as percentage of loans. It intends to 
measure the supply levels of reserves in relation to the loans provided. Thus, it will 
capture when the Fed is oversupplying or undersupplying banks with reserves. It is 
expected that an oversupply of reserves have a positive effect on excess reserves. 
Besides, part of nonborrowed reserves belongs to deposits. Therefore, the deposits 
effect will be included in this variable, although inseparable from the oversupply or 
undersupply of reserves. 
 
- MAX (levels): the spread between the maximum interest rate at which banks obtained 
reserves up to period t (MAX[STR]) and the short-term rate at period t (STR). It 
measures how far the short-term rate is from the maximum cost at which banks could 
be trapped with relatively expensive reserves. The larger (smaller) the spread, the 
more (less) the loans rate will be increased, so that banks are able to use as soon as 
possible all their reserves without losses. Furthermore, the larger the spread, the more 
excess reserves will be accumulated, as banks will prefer to use reserves at current 
rates to obtain higher profits.  
 
- RC-STR (levels): the spread between the reserve cost variable and the short-term rate 
of reference. As RC is only an average of how much banks have paid for one dollar of 
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reserves, a positive (negative) spread implies that the probability of banks using 
reserves incurring in losses is higher (lower), as they may have to lend at a rate below 
the average cost.  Likewise, a positive (negative) spread entails higher (lower) 
probability that banks keep their reserves and obtain more at cheaper cost, so that 
their profits are greater.   
 
- LR-STR (levels): the spread between the prime loans rate and the short-term rate of 
reference. It measures the dissonance (in case they evolve differently) between Fed’s 
policies (short-term rate targeted) and banks’ decisions about the loans rate. 
 
Setting equation 2 as A(Ik + ß1L + ß2L2…)yt = Bεt  where L is the lag operator, the order 
of the variables and the restrictions are set as follows: 
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Initially, this identification scheme assumes that ER is affected just after one lag for all the 
variables. That is, only after banks observe the price at which reserves have been obtained, 
their loans rate has determined lending levels, and the Fed has provided them with reserves to 
cover the demand for loans according to their estimations and targets, banks decide how 
many reserves to hold. NBR responds contemporaneously to ER either because for some 
periods the Fed targeted the amount of excess reserves or simply because the level of excess 
reserves influences the short-term rate and therefore, the Fed has to provide different amounts 
of non-borrowed reserves to control it. However, the relationship between this variable and 
the three spreads is troublesome for the identification. While loans (as part of NBR), 
adequately, respond after one period to the loans rate in LR-STR and the supposed reserves 
cost that drives the loans rate (RC-STR), non-borrowed reserves determine the short-term 
rate instantaneously. Given the purpose of the model here and the spreads set-up, likewise 
that in quantum physics one particle seems to be in two different positions at the same time 
but the observer can only locate it at one place, here, I cannot measure at once how 
nonborrowed reserves affects immediately the short-term rate, at the same time that the 
lending levels responds to the loans rate after one period. Therefore, different orders will be 
tested. Regarding the two variables measuring reserves costs, the logical order is with RC-
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STR responding contemporaneously to MAX, as the average RC is influenced by the 
reserves obtained at the maximum cost. At the same time, these variables react 
contemporaneously to excess and nonborrowed reserves and loans, because they determine 
the amount of reserves and therefore, their average cost. The spread LR-STR responds 
contemporaneously to all variables, because banks set the loans rate taking into account the 
reserves costs to maximize profits, and partially, also, the demand for credit.  
  Last, the period under analysis is 1922:I-2017:III (382 observations). According to 
BIC criteria, the model is estimated with one lag. Whereas AIC criteria and HQIC 
recommended two and seven respectively, given the evolution of the variables observed in 
Figure 3.1 and 3.3, and the inherent characteristics of the “reserves-cost” theory, it is 
unrealistic to use more than one lag (one quarter lagged). The reason is that banks will decide 
at each period the quantity of excess reserves to be held and later, the loans rate depending on 
the reserves costs at the current period, so as to not incur in losses. For the next period, the 
costs will be analyzed again, and new decisions will be taken regarding excess reserves and 
the loans rate. In any case, alternative models are estimated with further lags, new variables 
measuring factors such as risk or uncertainty, and finally, the structural identification is 
altered given the problems exposed above. 
4.4 Results 
 
In this section, I analyse the impulse response functions and the forecast error variance 
decomposition for the model developed above. Figures 3.5.1 to 3.5.5 displays the impulse 
response functions for the period 1922:I-2017:III with the identification scheme described in 
the previous section.  
 Figure 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 gather the relevant results for the “reserves-cost” theory. Figure 
3.5.2 shows the responses to a positive RC-STR shock. The first panel displays that banks 
increase excess reserves (ER) about 0.018 percentage points after one quarter when the 
spread RC-STR grows one percentage point, and the effect slowly decreases for nine 
quarters. The opposite is found for NBR (panel 2), where the response is negative and 
significant until quarter seven. The explanation is that greater costs are caused by higher 
rates. In order to increase rates, the Fed diminishes nonborrowed reserves.  Panel 4 shows 
that banks increase the spread LR-STR by 0.05 percentage points immediately after RC-STR 
is one percentage point larger. The response is significant and positive for two quarters. 
Regarding the responses to a positive MAX shock, that is, when the maximum rate at which 
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banks are trapped with expensive reserves is one percentage point higher than the short-term 
rate of reference, Figure 3.5.3 (panel 1) displays that banks increase ER also by 0.018 
percentage points. As in the previous figure, the response is positive and significant for nine 
periods. However, the NBR response is no significant in this case (panel 2). In panel 4, it is 
seen that a shock to MAX triggers an immediate increase in the loans rate around 0.2 
percentage points more than the short-term rate. The effect lasts around 20 quarters.  
 In Figure 3.5.4, ER responds (panel 1) positively to a NBR shock, but surprisingly it 
is not significant. The second and fourth panel have positive and significant MAX and LR-
STR responses respectively. The reason is that when the Fed intends to lower interest rates, 
more nonborrowed reserves are provided. Consequently, banks get trapped with reserves at 
higher costs. Thus, when nonborrowed reserves increase and banks accumulate excess 
reserves, the spread MAX becomes larger, and banks set a higher loans rate in relation to the 
short-term rate (LR-STR).  
 
 Looking at Table 1, the forecast error variance decomposition shows that the variation 
in ER is mostly explained by itself. While NBR is the second variable with more relevance in 
the first quarters, the reserves cost variables are ahead since quarter eight. As explained in 
section 2, the reserves cost will have effect on excess reserves only after the quantity of non-
borrowed reserves provided in relation to the demand for credit is accounted. If the demand is 
relatively low, nonborrowed reserves will have a higher explanation power. NBR presents 
similar results, except that the reserves cost variables remains in the third and fourth place for 
the 20 quarters. MAX can be mostly forecasted by itself, followed by NBR and ER, although 
LR-STR takes over since quarter eight. For RC-STR, apart from its own explanatory power, 
MAX displays similar percentages, and is followed by ER. Last, regarding LR-STR, 
approximately 65% of its variation is explained by itself at the beginning, reaching about 
50% after 20 quarters.  It is followed by MAX, which explains around 27% in quarter one, 
but end ups with almost a 40%. ER and NBR can explain together between 4-6% of its 
variation, while RC-STR is left behind with around 1-2%.  
 
 Summing up, the results confirm the mechanism proposed by the “reserves-cost” 
theory, because a higher reserves cost increases ER and LR-STR. Whereas for ER, either the 
average cost or the maximum cost seems to have similar effect and explanatory power, the 
loans rate in LR-STR, seems to be more influenced by the maximum cost at which banks are 
trapped with expensive reserves. 
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Proportion of forecast error variance h periods ahead accounted for by 
Forecast error Forecast horizon innovations in 
in h ER NBR MAX RC-STR LR STR 
ER 1 1 0 0 0 0 
2 0,9923 0,0039 0,0017 0,0018 0 
3 0,9904 0,0041 0,0026 0,0026 0,0001 
4 09887 0,0042 00033 00033 00002 
8 0,9845 0,0043 0,0052 0,005 0,0007 
12 0,9825 0,0043 0,006 0,0057 0,0012 
20 09814 0,0043 00065 00061 00015 
NBR 
1 0,0524 0,9475 0 0 0 
2 0,048 0,9503 0,0003 0,001 0,0001 
3 0,0487 0,9459 0,0009 0,0028 0,0005 
4 0,049 0,9439 0,0014 0,0045 0,0008 
8 0,0499 0,9355 0,0023 0,0092 0,0018 
12 00504 0,9335 00024 00111 00022 
20 0,051 0,9313 0,0028 0,0124 0,0023 
MAX 
1 0,0146 0,0351 0,9501 0 0 
2 0,0264 0,.0466 0,9206 0 0,0062 
3 00301 0,0542 0899 0 00165 
4 0,0329 0,059 0,8796 0 0,0283 
8 0,0406 0,.0512 0,8214 0,0002 0,0704 
12 0,0462 0,0101 0,7857 0,0009 0,0969 
20 0,0545 0,0724 0,7484 0,0033 0,1212 
RC-STR 
1 0,2322 0,0142 0,3727 0,3808 0 
2 0,165 0,0136 0,4079 0,4094 0,0038 
3 0,1437 0,0143 0,4177 0,4133 0,0108 
4 01301 0,0149 0 4224 0 4107 00193 
8 0,1061 0,0168 0,4229 0,4018 0,0521 
12 0,0976 0,0178 0,4187 0,3932 0,0724 
20 0093 0,0183 04143 03872 0 087 
LR-STR 
1 0,0183 0,.0342 0,2771 0,0168 0,6532 
2 0,0177 0,039 0,2881 0,0151 0,6398 
3 0,0189 0,042 0,2982 0,0136 0,6272 
4 0,0202 0,0441 0,3078 0,0123 0,6155 
8 0,0254 0,0491 0,3403 0,0093 0,5757 
12 00299 0,0518 03646 00086 0 5448 
20 0,0367 0,055 0,398 0,0093 0,5007 
Table€18fforecast.lirrorlilecompositionEI 
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4.5 Robustness tests 
The figures corresponding to the following sections are available in Appendix F. 
4.5.1  Alternative orders 
 
When NBR is located below LR-STR, so that it responds instantaneously to all variables, the 
results are almost identical (not presented). However, the results change slightly when RC-
STR and MAX are interchanged. Figures F.6.1 and F.6.2 display the response of each 
variable to an RC-STR and MAX shock respectively, as their responses are the only ones that 
vary. The differences in Figure F.6.1 regarding F.5.2 are found in the non-significant NBR 
response (panel 2), the positive and significant MAX response beyond 20 quarters (panel 3), 
and the larger LR-STR response (11 quarters instead of 2, panel 4). In Figure F.6.2 
(compared to Figure 3.5.3), ER lost its significance (panel 1). NBR response remains no 
significant (panel 2), but it changes its sign. Last, RC-STR response turns no significant to a 
MAX shock (panel 3). Thus, with this order, RC-STR has a greater impact on LR-STR and 
ER, while MAX loses its importance in determining ER. Despite this variation, the logical 
order is the one applied in the baseline model. 
 
4.5.2  Risk and uncertainty 
 
 I have also introduced two variables in the model as proxies for risk and uncertainty 
(two different models), ordered after ER. For the former, I have used the growth rate of 
public debt (DEBT), while for the latter I have calculated the IPI standard deviation for an 
interval of four years (16 observations) and rolling it one period ahead (GDPD). The results 
are almost identical to those obtained in the original model (not presented). A shock to DEBT 
increases instantaneously ER around 0.05 percentage points but the effect disappears after 
one quarter. It also increases the spread LR-STR by the same amount. In this case, however, 
the effect is permanent. The impact of a GDPD shock on LR-STR and ER is no significant. 
Therefore, it seems that banks take into account risk, but not uncertainty, in line with Chang, 
Contessi and Francis (2014). On the contrary, NBR increase slightly with a shock to GDPD. 
Hence, the Fed seems to inject more reserves for periods of uncertainty. 
4.5.3 Subperiods 
 
 Other source that potentially could modify the results obtained is the different 
episodes over the period under analysis. From 1922 to 2017, there are two episodes when the 
  
 
127 
Fed flooded banks with reserves and could be distorting the impact of the variables under 
consideration. Consequently, I analyse the entire period divided in three subperiods using as 
criteria the level of ER displayed in Figure 3.1. The first one, from 1922 to 1960 (156 
observations), includes the first great reserves injection into the banking sector and the 
consequent increase in excess reserves. Around 1960, ER levels are near the levels before the 
Great Recession. Therefore, it signals the end of the first subperiod and beginning of the 
second one. The second subperiod, from 1960 to 2006 (188 observations), can examine the 
period when the reserves supplied by the Fed can be considered as normal and the 
relationship between variables could be clearer.  Last, the third subperiod analyses the same 
window as the second subperiod, but including the QE episode (1960-2017, 231 
observations). For the last subperiod, as the results are quite similar to those of the baseline 
model, they are not presented.  
4.5.3.1 Subperiod 1922-1960 
 
When looking at Figure F.7.2, the shock to RC-STR shows variations in NBR and MAX 
responses (panels 2 and 3 respectively), which are now positive and not significant. Figure 
F.7.3 shows the responses to a MAX shock. Unlike the baseline model, ER response (panel 
1) is initially positive and no significant for the first quarters, but negative and significant 
after eight quarters. This result is likely due to the fact that MAX remains equal for the entire 
subsample (Figure 3.1).  
4.5.3.2 Subperiod 1960-2006 
 
Regarding the subperiod 1960-2006, a RC-STR shock (Figure F.8.2) offers similar results to 
the original model. The only difference is that NBR response is not significant. For the shock 
to MAX (Figure F.8.3), results are similar. Figure F.8.4 presents quite a different picture in 
relation to Figure F.5.4. ER response to an NBR shock (panel 1) is negative and significant 
after one quarter, but positive and significant in quarter three. Probably, the ER low levels led 
to a more heterogeneous relationship between both variables, depending on the demand for 
loans. Last, Figure F.8.5 shows that the shock to ER has a no significant NBR response 
(panel 1), unlike the original model. Thus, the Fed seems to not have paid attention to the 
reserves held during that period. The other panels show similar results. 
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4.5.4 Fmiher lags 
E~1imating the model with more lags (results no presented), specifically until seven, from 
lags two to four, the impulse responses keep their shape in general, despite becoming more 
j agged the more lags are included. However, most of the significant responses obtained in the 
original model disappear. From lags five to seven, the jagged shapes remain but the responses 
to MAX and RC-STR shocks recover their significance as in the original model. More lags 
trigger that RC-STR has a longer positive and significant impact on LR-STR. 
4.5.6 Monthly data 
The same baseline model was estimated changing the periodicity from quarterly to monthly 
(results not presented). The sample starts in 1947, as the data for loans (in the denominator of 
NBR) is available with monthly data only since then. Following the original model, it has 
been estimated with one lag and the results obtained are similar. As I increase the nun1ber of 
lags, the results present the same behaviour as commented in the previous section. 
- U\-STft - at-STR - ~ewtMX: 
Figure!S.9S1New!MAX1hriable 
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4.5.7 New MAX variable 
Given the variable MAX only measures the maximum rate at which banks obtained reserves, 
it may be the case that it is not representative of the cost of those reserves held above current 
short-term rates. The reason is that as the amount of reserves hold at those maximum rates 
could be small in relation to the expensive reserves held, banks could consider them as 
insignificant when setting the loans rate. To solve that issue, using the same method as for the 
creation of RC, I have calculated the average cost of the reserves, but this time accounting 
only for those held above short-term rates. Even though the idea may seems adequate, the 
outcome does not. Figure 3.9 displays again Figure 3.3, but using this new variable 
(NewMAX) instead of MAX. As easily seen, it evolves almost parallel to the variable RC 
(above 93% correlation). As one can expect, including this variable into the model does not 
add much information. Even so, the model was estimated again with it and the only variation 
obtained is that ER does not respond significantly to a NewMAX shock, and an RC shock 
double its impact on ER. 
4.6 Interest on reserves and its potential future consequences 
 
Nowadays, the Federal Reserve pays interest on required reserves (IORR) and excess 
reserves (IOER). With this tool, central banks intend to control separately interest rates and 
excess reserves. During and after the QE, the federal funds rate has been zero or nearby and 
without interest paid on reserves, the Fed would have had to operate massively in the open 
market to control the federal funds rate, given the excessive liquidity in the banking sector. 
Since January 2016, when the Fed began to normalize monetary policy, excess reserves have 
decreased around 25%. Thus, whereas the federal funds rate has increased from 0.35 to 2-
2.25 percentage points since then, excess reserves have decreased from 2279 billion dollars to 
around 1700 billion dollars until October 2018. Approximately, the same decrease is 
observed in non-borrowed reserves. While in January 2016 the loans growth rate was about 
8%, at the end of 2018 was near 5%. Those rates are around ordinary levels, and as predicted 
by Bindseil (2004), we have not seen any inflation outburst.  
 Todd (2013) and Ennis and Wolman (2015) argued that interests paid on reserves are 
encouraging banks to hold reserves. It is important to highlight that the federal funds rate and 
the IOER or IORR are almost the same. Then, why have I not included those rates in the 
models estimated? There are two reasons. First and most important, the interest paid on 
reserves would appear only in the last part of the sample, coinciding with the QE. Excess 
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reserves started to decline only in 2016 and therefore, there would be only 8 observations for 
which excess reserves declined once interest rates started to be paid on reserves. There are 
not data for interest rates paid on reserves during “ordinary” periods. Hence, avoiding sample 
selection bias I decided to not use a variable capturing this new tool. Second, while IOER and 
IORR are increasing along with the federal funds rate, excess reserves are decreasing 
anyhow, as nonborrowed levels are declining in relation to the demand for credit. This 
supports the argument exposed previously by Moore (1998), Lindley, Clifford and Mounts 
(2001), Dwyer (2010), Calomiris, Mason and Wheelock (2011) among others, that banks 
lend when there is demand for credit and is profitable. Therefore, those interests paid on 
reserves, despite being a good tool to control the federal funds rate, seems to not influence 
banks’ decisions between reserves held and lending. The reason is that once banks can lend 
because there is demand, as the loans rate is higher than the federal funds rate and the interest 
on reserves, they will lend and use their excess reserves.  
 
 Beyond that the interest rates paid on reserves are effective to isolate the federal funds 
rate from the amount of reserves and cannot avoid that banks use their excess reserves when 
the demand for credit is higher, it is not clear whether they could be used to control the 
impact that the cost of past accumulated reserves has on the loans rate, as exposed in the 
“reserves-cost” theory. There are two ways under which they could be used for that task: 
 
 -First, the Federal Reserve, being able to control the federal funds rate regardless of 
the amount of reserves, could drain whatever level of excess reserves is held on the banking 
sector and allows banks to borrow the same amount of reserves drained or that desired by 
banks, at the discount window. This would suppose the elimination of the influence of past 
reserves on the loans rate. Consequently, as the new reserves would have been obtained at the 
current discount rate, the Fed would have again an impact ration 1:1 over the loans rate with 
raises in the discount rate, and setting the same rate for the federal funds rate. This process 
would have to be undertaken every time that banks accumulate past reserves and that 
accumulation modifies the impact ratio of Fed’s interest rates on the loans rate. The 
feasibility of this procedure is beyond my knowledge, but if possible, it would be effective.  
 
 -Second, and depending totally on banks decisions, as they are receiving interest on 
their reserves, at some point, they may price those past reserves with the interest rate that 
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they are receiving, so that the impact ratio would be readjusted again (1:1) just because of 
that fact. 
 
 In case that none of these situations happens, the interest rate paid on reserves would 
be useless to control the impact of past reserves on the loans rate, and those fearing an 
inflation outburst given the current level of reserves could be right, although the mechanism 
working there is more complex than simply more excess reserves leading to higher inflation, 
and the consequences could also be different. That mechanism can only be explained from 
the “reserves-cost” theory and three scenarios are considered: 
 
 -For the first scenario, we have as example the 1960s and 1970s, where excess 
reserves were scarce. Under those circumstances, the Fed is able to have direct impact on the 
loans rate when using the federal funds rate (and interest rates on reserves). Therefore, one 
percentage point increase should force banks to increase the loans rate by the same quantity. 
The problem by then was that as the Fed set the discount rate below the federal funds rate, 
banks could borrow cheaper reserves at the discount window and increase the loans rate 
relatively less than the federal funds rate was raised. This led to more credit and inflation as 
showed in Chapter 3. Thus, the “reserves-cost” theory establishes that, under a scenario of 
low excess reserves, if the discount rate is at the same level or above the federal funds rate, 
the only factor able to cause bubbles (given the higher demand for credit) or high inflation 
would be a faulty model and policymakers setting lower rates than required. Otherwise, the 
Fed loses part of its power by allowing banks to borrow cheaper reserves at the discount 
window and increase the loans rate less in relation to the federal funds rate. 
 
 -For the second scenario, the present can be taken as example. Given high excess 
reserves levels, a positive demand shock could lead banks to use their reserves without 
necessity for obtaining them from another source. Bubbles or high inflation could come from 
two sources in this case. The first source is again a faulty model and policymakers setting 
lower rates than required. In this case, banks could lend almost as much as the demand side 
wishes to borrow at that low interest rate, either because banks can use their excess reserves 
(as long as their cost is below the federal funds rate) regardless of the interest paid on 
reserves, as the loans rate is above them, or because under an interest rate target the Fed 
would provide banks with all the necessary reserves to maintain the aimed low interest rate 
target. The second source would emerge if, under current levels and prices for excess 
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reserves, the Federal Reserve increases the federal funds rate faster than banks can get rid of 
their cheaper reserves. In that case, banks could increase the loans rate below the ratio 1:1 in 
relation to the federal funds rate, by using their cheaper reserves.  
 However, the Federal Reserve may be lucky under a particular situation and this 
second source would be cancelled. The results have proved a positive relationship between 
the spread RC-STR and LR-STR, and MAX and LR-STR, the last one being more important 
and durable. Thus, while banks are trapped with reserves at higher rates, the loans rate tends 
to increase more than the federal funds rate. In Figure 3.1 is observed that when the federal 
funds rate declined after its maximum in the early 1980s, banks got trapped with expensive 
reserves. Consequently, they increased the loans rate more in relation to the federal funds rate 
(impact ratio above 1:1), but the spread reached a maximum of three percentage points. This 
spread has been constant since 1990 and is the largest of the entire period. It is the case that 
the interest rates reached in the 1980s are far from the current ones and while this condition 
remains, the loans rate will likely move one to one with federal funds rate as after 1990 (even 
if the Fed increases the federal funds rate faster than banks can get rid of their cheaper 
reserves), because there seems to be a ceiling for that spread28. That is, when the rate at 
which banks are trapped is too far from current rates, banks seem unable to widen more the 
spread and the loans rate is anchored to the federal funds rate. 
 
 -The process until that ceiling is reached, the third scenario, implies an impact ratio 
above one. Contrary to the inflation outburst and asset bubbles, in this case the Federal 
Reserve may find problems to increase inflation, as every increase in the federal funds rate 
will suppose a greater hardening in its policies through a further increase in the loans rate. 
This hardening will provoke a posterior decrease in interest rates, triggering an impact ratio 
above one with a spread even higher for the next rise of the federal funds rate. When this 
process is extended without reaching the last global maximum, as it has been the case since 
the early 1980s, interest rates will evolve in a descending trend, with a local maximum lower 
than the previous one. Lower interest rates for such a long time can lead to debt 
accumulation. Under those circumstances, the next time that the interest rate is raised, as the 
loans rate will continue increasing above the ratio 1:1 and the spread will be larger, 
probabilities for recessions and defaults will be higher, making even more difficult to 
                                                        
28 The answer to the email reproduced in the introduction ended as follow: “…It is important to know that some 
states have laws that set a ceiling on the amount of interest that banks can charge for certain loans, but these 
ceilings are not set by the Federal Reserve or any other federal agency.” 
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increase interest rates in the future. This situation can be extended to the exceptional case 
commented for the second scenario, namely, the spread ceiling. When the loans rate is finally 
anchored to the federal funds rate, if the process of the impact ratio above one has been long 
enough to accumulate high debt levels as a consequence of interest rates being pushed to the 
floor, what was considered a lucky situation in the second scenario will become an 
unfortunate episode of low inflation, recessions and defaults.  
 
 In order to have an idea of the banking sector’ reserves inventory nowadays and its 
potential consequences for the next years or even decades, a snapshot has been taken (Figures 
3.10 and 3.11) for the last period available for RC (June 2018). The Y-axis displays the 
amount of excess reserves (billion), while the X-axis represents the interest rate at which they 
were obtained. Figure 3.10 shows that banks are holding most of their reserves at 0.25%, 
followed by reserves at 0.5%, 1.25% and 2.25%. Overall, those four costs account for 
approximately 1,860 billion dollars of reserves held by then. If those points are removed, the 
quantity of reserves remaining is insignificant in relation to the previous figure (Figure 3.11). 
Summing all of them, the result is around 3,1 billion and yet, most of them are below 5%.  
 Therefore, if the American economy were to face an increasing credit demand in the 
near future and interest rates surpassed five percentage points, dangers of inflation and/or 
bubbles would be likely if: excess reserves with lower cost than the federal funds rate (and 
therefore, IORR and IERR) remains in the banking sector, so that the federal funds rate does 
not have an impact ratio 1:1 on the loans rate, or, evidently, if the federal funds rate is set 
sufficiently low to not restrain the demand for credit. For the first case, however, as banks 
seems to have fixed the spread between the federal funds rate and the loans rate because of 
the much higher cost of past reserves, the impact ratio 1:1 is likely to continue. The situation 
may change once short-term rates reach the zone near 7%, because banks started to peg the 
loans rate to the federal funds rate around those levels. In the meantime, during the process of 
normalizing interest rates, given the maximum spread LR-STR of 3%, the Fed may find 
difficulties not only to increase inflation above certain levels, but also interest rates, due to 
the higher probabilities of defaults, given debt accumulation during low interest rates periods. 
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 Having this in mind, as policy advise, a more efficient monetary policy would imply 
to keep an eye on the federal funds rate impact ratio on the prime loans rate. Thereby, when 
the ratio is below one, the Fed must increase further the federal funds rate (keeping the 
discount rate at the same level or above it), so that the loans rate has the desired impact on the 
real economy. Besides, after relative high interest rates, the Federal Reserve should pay 
attention to how banks accumulate excess reserves in the process of lowering rates, namely, 
to prices and quantities. The reason is that, on the one hand, if banks hold excessive levels of 
reserves, they may able to modify the impact ratio in the future, when interest rates are raised 
again. On the other hand, an impact ratio above 1:1 will increase the probabilities of 
remaining in a low interest rates scenario for too long. Deflation and increasing debt may be 
some of the consequences. For this last case, only a strong and increasing demand that wipes 
out the high excess reserves levels and is able to endure higher interest rates (what entails the 
reduction of debt) would be the solution. Again, these would be the possible scenarios and 
advices, just in case that the IOER and IORR are not able to control the cost of past 
accumulated reserves through the two ways explained above. 
4.7 Conclusions 
 
Periods of great accumulation of excess reserves as during the Great Depression and the 
Great Recession have attracted the interest of researchers, who have tried to unveil the 
reasons behind that hoarding and its consequences. However, periods with normal levels 
have fallen into oblivion. Being those periods of vital importance to understand the 
mechanisms determining the evolution of excess reserves and its consequences, and driven 
by the need to complete the “reserves-cost” theory initiated in Chapter 3, a SVAR is 
estimated for the period 1922-2017. The renovated “reserves-cost” theory proposes, in 
summary, that banks consider the different costs at which reserves are obtained, so that, in 
relation to market rates, those costs will determine the accumulation of excess reserves and 
the evolution of the loans rate. Thus, the only way whereby the Fed can influence the real 
economy is directly by the impact of its policies on the reserves cost, and indirectly by the 
influence of that cost on the loans rate, which in the end is the rate that the real economy 
endures. The results have supported this theory by showing that when the average cost of 
excess reserves is above short-term rates, banks accumulate more excess reserves and the 
loans rate increase in proportion more than the short-term rate. The same is observed when 
short-term rates are below the maximum rate/cost at which banks obtained reserves. For this 
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last case, it seems that this factor is stronger in explaining the evolution of the loans rate in 
relation to the short-term rate. 
 Therefore, the main lesson is that the accumulation of reserves (quantity) does not 
cause by itself increasing lending and inflation levels. It is the interest rate (price) that the 
demand side of the money market faces. Accordingly, the Federal Reserve should include as 
target the tracing of banks reserves, what implies the price at which those reserves are 
obtained. The lack of attention over this matter is likely to grant a significant part of 
monetary policy management to the banking sector. This factor can create either, inflation 
outbursts or asset bubbles when the short-term rate has an impact ratio below 1:1 on the loans 
rate, or deflation and higher debt levels for remaining with low interest rates for too long, as a 
consequence of enduring an extended impact ratio above 1:1. 
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-- Final conclusions -- 
 Discussion 
 
This thesis has unveiled a fundamental mechanism for monetary policy management in the 
United States, which has been either ignored or unknown for the Federal Reserve. This 
mechanism, described in the “reserves-cost” theory, implies that the banking sector is able to 
modify Federal Reserve’s policies and hence, lessen its power to conduct monetary policy. 
This, however, does not exempt it from the responsibility for the American economy’s 
performance. This mechanism operates through the cost of reserves. As banks can obtain 
borrowed or nonborrowed reserves from different sources, if the Federal Reserve aims to be 
the only agent driving the path of the economy, the same cost must be targeted for both types 
of reserves, starting from a scenario where excess reserves are scarce. By having reserves at 
the same cost at the discount window or in the money market, banks will set the loans rate 
according to the evolution of the unique reserves cost available. Under these circumstances, 
an increase in short-term rates aimed by the Fed will have the same impact on the loans rate 
and hence, the economy will absorb that impact directly as the Federal Reserve intended. 
When banks accumulate excess reserves or the Federal Reserve provides arbitrage 
opportunities for the reserves cost, the impact of short-term rates on the loans rate will be 
different from the ratio 1:1. When this ratio is below 1, the economy will endure a loans rate 
that will restrain the demand for credit insufficiently in relation to Fed’s desires, triggering 
higher inflation levels. When the ratio is above 1, the consequences will be just the opposite, 
with the risk that if these periods are long lasting, the economy will face a situation of low 
interest rates, where debt accumulation is likely. Under these circumstances, the future raise 
of interest rates will find difficulties given those debt levels. In this case, deflation can be also 
probable. In addition to the impact ratio of short-term rates, its variability is also important. 
Regardless of the ratio being below or above one, if it is constant over time, the Federal 
Reserve will still have a great influence on the economy, as the spread between short-term 
rates and the loans rate will be constant, and the economy will accommodate every 
movement equally. On the contrary, when the ratio is varying over time, the Federal Reserve 
power will be weaker, and the variability of the spread will be transmitted into the economy, 
as the agents will be experimenting different impact ratios every time that the Fed is aiming 
its targets. Higher volatilities in inflation and output as those seen during the Great Inflation 
will be the result. It has also been showed that the reserves cost is able to explain the 
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evolution of excess reserves on the banking sector. Thus, when banks hold reserves above the 
cost at which current reserves are offered in the market, they will obtain further reserves at 
current rates to maximize profits by using those cheaper reserves and maximizing the spread 
between the reserves cost and the loans rate. Also, they will accumulate reserves with the 
intention of not incurring in loses by using those reserves with a cost superior to the rate at 
which money is lent. On the other hand, when banks hold reserves with a cost below market 
rates, they will use their excess reserves for the opposite reasons just commented. Last, this 
theory in its early development also unveiled that the known price puzzle whereby inflation 
increases despite the federal funds rate is raised, is actually the consequence of those 
arbitrage opportunities previously commented. Thus, when banks could obtain cheaper 
reserves at the discount window given the positive spread between the federal funds rate and 
the discount rate, increases in the federal funds rate had an impact below 1 on the loans rate. 
Consequently, lending was insufficiently restrained and inflation increased as result of those 
bad policies that allowed positive spreads. 
 While this study is only focused on the American economy, posterior studies should 
ascertain whether this mechanism could be applied to other economies and central banks’ 
policies. 
 Main contributions 
 
While the “reserves-cost” theory is the main contribution of this thesis, several steps were 
necessary before reaching the completeness of that theory, each step being a minor 
contribution. First, the standard procedure whereby monetary policy stance has been 
measured during the last decades has been declared erroneous, as by using intermediate 
targets that measures supply and demand forces in the first submarket of the money market, 
bias is introduced into the models. Therefore, given that to measure monetary policy only the 
supply side must be captured, that procedure cannot be applied. Using the actual Fed’s 
instruments and the spread between short-term rates and the discount rate, which is a hybrid 
instrument, was proposed as the right procedure to capture monetary policy stance, this being 
the first contribution. From there, another one was extracted, as that procedure unveiled the 
inexistence of the price puzzle. The increase in inflation when the interest rate was raised was 
not a puzzle, but the consequence of bad policies undertaken by the Fed when it allowed 
positive spreads between the federal funds rate and the discount rate, providing arbitrage 
opportunities for the cost at which reserves were obtained. The last minor contribution from 
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the new procedure was found in those results showing that monetary policy is transmitted 
through prices and not quantities. 
 A deeper reflexion about the new procedure to measure monetary policy stance led to 
the next contribution. The first version of the “reserves-cost” theory suggested that to 
measure monetary policy stance the instruments are not necessary, and based on the premise 
that prices are the ones transmitting monetary policies, it proposed that just measuring the 
price at which reserves are obtained is enough to capture monetary policy stance. Thus, 
measuring Fed’s policies and the banking sector’s behaviour with the spread between the 
federal funds rate and the discount rate, and the spread between the loans rate and the federal 
funds rate respectively, it was discovered that the extent to which monetary policies can reach 
the real economy depends on banks’ decisions regarding the loans rate, which is previously 
conditioned on the cost of reserves obtained, that cost being determined by Fed policies. This 
mechanism is proposed as the one explaining the high inflation levels, as well as the higher 
volatilities in inflation and output during the Great Inflation, and the lower volatilities and 
inflation witnessed during the Great Moderation. 
 The last step and contribution that led to the final “reserves-cost” theory was the 
explanation of why banks hold reserves and the impact of those reserves in the loans rate. 
Introducing excess reserves levels and their price into the theory shed a clearer light on how 
monetary policy is transmitted into the real economy through the banking sector, namely, the 
loans rate, and how it determines the evolution of inflation, output, and their volatilities, 
depending on different scenarios. Those scenarios are the amount and price at which excess 
reserves are held in relation to short-term rates and the spread between the loans rate and 
those short-term rates.  Thus, when banks hold reserves above short-term rates, they 
accumulate more reserves and use the ones available in the market to maximize their profits. 
At the same time, the loans rate is raised in relation to short-term rates to lower the 
probability of incurring in loses in case of having to use their expensive reserves. 
 Therefore, the final lesson and contribution is that the intermediate target that the 
Federal Reserve should aim to achieve its final targets is the cost at which banks obtain their 
reserves. As long as this mechanism is not under control, banks will modify Fed’s policies, 
weakening its power, but without exempting it from the responsibility for the American 
economy’s performance. 
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Open gates for future research 
 
The most logic step that should be taken after discovering this mechanism is to ascertain 
whether it is applicable to other economies. If it were not the case, it should be considered 
only for the American economy and even, re-tested under different approaches to discover 
whether the original intention of this thesis, namely, to discover missing or misunderstood 
knowledge of monetary policy at some stage, should be also applied to this theory. 
Additionally, a more accurate accounting measure for the cost of reserves should be 
developed, so that the impact ratio of the short-term rates on the loans rate is exactly 
quantified. That knowledge would facilitate the analysis regarding how increases in interest 
rates drive the evolution of variables such as output, inflation, money supply or lending. 
 The last line of research that this thesis should open is related to the low inflation 
levels, which may also unveil further factors determining the periods of high inflation. When 
banks are trapped with expensive reserves, as it has been happening from the early 1980s, the 
impact ratio of the federal funds rate on the loans rate was above one until the spread reached 
a hypothetical ceiling of three percentage points, being almost the maximum of the period 
under analysis. A ratio above one implies stronger restrictions on the economy that little by 
little push inflation, and subsequently, interest rates, to lower levels. If during that descending 
path and once interest rates reach a floor, the accumulation of debt is significant, more 
difficulties will be found to raise interest rates in the future without causing a recession or a 
worse episode. Thus, given the current situation where banks are holding reserves at a cost 
above market rates, an urgent analysis is necessary to solve how to wipe out the significant 
amount of excess reserves in the banking sector. Thereby, the ceiling seeing on the spread 
could be reduced and the loans rate could increase in the future along with short-term rates 
without damaging output growth and employment, and allowing a smooth recovery in debt 
and inflation levels. The interest rate paid on required and excess reserves may provide some 
options to achieve it. 
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Appendix A - Impulse response functions 
 
In this section the reader can find the remaining impulses responses from section 5. 
Even though they are not essential to understand the results obtained, they offer some 
details about the mechanisms working between instruments and final targets. 
 A.1 - Interwar period 
Paying attention to an M1 shock (Figure A.4.7), the response of the inflation shows no 
clear pattern.  Between 1925 and 1927 an increase in the money supply have a mostly 
positive response, although only after one month. During the period when gold inflows 
were accelerating but the Fed was offsetting them (1927-1929), increases in M1 would 
have increased the inflation more than in the rest of the period given the levels of 
deflation.  From 1930 to 1933, the response is mostly negative, except for a delayed 
positive response between the second half of 1931 and first half of 1932. The stagnation 
of business, bank failures, the increase in currency and reserves holdings, and the gold 
outflow, could have contributed to this mostly negative response, without forgetting the 
negative spread. The delayed positive response between 1931 and 1932 could 
correspond to gold inflows and the pressures that the Fed received to purchase in the 
open market. Since 1933 the response of the inflation is initially negative and becomes 
slightly positive after three-five months. Again, accumulation of excess reserves, 
increases in reserve requirements and the negative spread could have contributed. 
 A shock to M1 (Figure A.4.8) shows mostly a negative response of the IPI 
between 1928-1929, years of deflation and sterilization of gold inflow. From 1925 to 
1927, the response is mostly positive, except for the initial negative response in 1925 
and part of 1926, again, periods of deflation or low inflation. Thus, deflation could have 
restrained output growth. Contrary to those periods of deflation, the response is positive 
from 1930-1932, (brief open market purchases and gold inflows for those years) 
becoming negative in the second half of 1932 and having a negative peak in 1933, 
likely due to banking failures. The negative response continues until the end of 1935, 
slightly after the devaluation and the purchase of silver and gold. It turns positive since 
1936, when the Treasury desterilized the gold flows from previous years. 
 Regarding the impulse responses of M1, a shock to both, the discount rate 
(Figure A.4.9) and to C-D (Figure A.4.11) has a negative response, although for the last  
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figure, it becomes positive after two months and it is not significant (Figure 1.5.3). 
When the shock is to OMO (Figure A.4.10) the response is positive as expected, but not 
significant (Figure 1.5.2). There is a positive peak in 1929 belonging to the moment 
when the Fed perceived indications of a recession. Accordingly, the Fed purchased in 
the open market, the money supply increased, but it was not enough (as observed in 
1.4.2) to increase inflation. Only the discount rate has a significant impact on M1 for 
virtually the entire period (Figure 1.5.1), except for 1930-1932 and 1937, corresponding 
to the sterilization of gold and deflation periods. For the other cases, the responses are 
significant mostly after the second month and last beyond the impulse response horizon. 
The response of C-D to a discount rate shock (Figure A.4.12) has a positive response 
that becomes negative or zero after approximately nine or ten months, from 1925 to the 
end of 1929. This is the period when the discount rate was below the call loans rate. 
From 1930 to the end of 1937 the initial response is negative, becoming positive after 
approximately six to eight months between 1930 and 1934, and one to two months from 
1934 to the end of 1937.  This happens while the discount rate is above the call loans 
rate. After 1937, when both rates were at the same level, the response is negative. Thus, 
the increase in the discount rate led to a relative higher increase in the call loan rate in 
the first part of the sample, and this pattern reversed since then, when the Fed and the 
Treasury tried to keep short-term rates low to finance government spending.  The 
response of C-D to an OMO shock (Figure A.4.13) is negative for the entire period, 
although for 1928 the response becomes positive after two to four months. Therefore, 
purchases in the open market decreased short-term rates and consequently, the spread. 
Last, the response of OMO to a discount rate shock (Figure A.4.14) is negative for the 
whole period, as it would be expected. 
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A.2 - 1958-2007 
The response of M1 to a F-D shock (Figure A.7.7) is very similar to Figure A.7.1 Thus, 
for those years with positive spread banks increased borrowing and lending, increasing 
M1. After 1986, as already commented, there was another large spread. However, as in 
Figure 1.7.1, now the response is not as positive as in the other cases29. From 1970 to 
1990 the positive response is significant (Figure 1.8.1). After 1995, when the spread 
was positive again, the response becomes more positive. Surprisingly, after 2003, 
although the discount rate was above the federal funds rate, and even above inflation 
after 2004, the response of M1 becomes increasingly positive. This time, however, it is 
not significant (Figure 1.8.1). The response of M1 to an OMO shock (Figure A.7.8) has 
a positive effect for the entire period but is not significant (Figure 1.8.2). The positive 
peaks occur when the federal funds rate and discount rate are at similar levels after their 
local maximum. This could indicate that when the Fed observed low borrowing at the 
discount window, possibly a signal of low credit growth, it purchased more in the open 
market to boost lending with lower rates. 
 
                                                        
29 Using K-P algorithm and two lags, the impulse response shows even an initially negative response after 
1985, although it turns positive shortly after. 
Figure A.7.7 – M1 impulse response to a F-D shock.  Note: Posterior means. 
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 This hypothesis is reinforced by the response of F-D to an OMO shock (Figure 
A.7.9), where the positive peaks coincide with periods of a small (positive or negative) 
or zero spread between rates, what occurs just after those rates have been in local 
maximum30. It seems that despite this pattern, the Fed extended its purchases a little 
more during the years of positive spread between 1969-1971. In 1990 the almost-zero or 
zero spread did not avoid Fed’s purchases due to the recession. This is in line with 
Figure A.7.8, as after the 1980s is observed that despite having positive spreads in the 
periods 1986-1990 and 1994-2000, it seems that, likewise, the Fed purchased 
significantly in the open market, as the response of M1 to an OMO shock is positive. 
This could be related to the decrease in borrowing after the 1980s. Figure A.7.10 
confirms the results of Figure 1.7.3, as the response of M1 to a discount rate shock is 
positive for the entire period, pointing out that despite the increase in the discount rate, 
M1 still was raising because of the purchases in the open market and increases in 
borrowing given the positive spreads. Both figures share significance for almost the 
same periods (Figure 1.8.3). Analysing the inflation response to an M1 shock (Figure 
A.7.11), it is negative almost for the whole period, not being the expected result. The 
negative peaks (except for that between 1960-1962) occur some time after the 
maximums of the federal funds rate. Hence, it seems to be capturing the following: 
when there were maximum in the federal funds rate (Figure 1.1), which normally 
coincided with large spreads, it was when M1 was in its highest levels. Subsequently, 
rates were lowered, because the economy could not endure those high rates and lending 
decreased. However, the higher supply of money was already in the market and it was a 
matter of time that prices increased. When it happened, the money supply had already 
begun to decrease (this is what the model is capturing here), as positive spreads had 
disappeared, together with the decline in borrowing and loans. Thus, the relationship 
M1-CPI may need more lags to capture the right effect. Beyond that possible 
explanation, the behavior changes after mid-1998. Inflation responds positively initially, 
although after two quarters, it goes to zero or slightly negative.  
 
                                                        
30 Although this effect is not clear, as the model estimated with two lags show a negative response, OMO 
impact is more likely to be captured with one lag. Hence, I consider the results with 1 lag more reliable in 
this case. 
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Figure A.7.8– M1 impulse response to an OMO shock.  Note: Posterior means. 
Figure A.7.9– F-D impulse response to an OMO shock.  Note: Posterior means. 
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Figure A.7.10– M1 impulse response to a discount rate shock.  Note: Posterior means. 
Figure A.7.11– CPI Inflation impulse response to an M1 shock.  Note: Posterior means. 
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The response of the IPI to an M1 shock (Figure A.7.12) is initially negative, but after 
three or four quarters the response becomes positive, although this only starts to happen 
after approximately 1966. Subsequently, the initial negative response diminishes until 
disappearing at the end of 1987. After 1995, those initial or belated positive peaks occur 
when the spread was almost zero or negative. Again, the initial negative response could 
be a delayed effect, pointing out the necessity of more lags. 
 Last, the discount rate shock to F-D (Figure A.7.13) has a positive response for 
the whole period, showing that when the Fed increased the discount rate, the federal 
funds rate increased more in relation to the discount rate. The response of OMO to a 
discount rate (Figure A.7.14) shock is negative, as expected. 
 
Figure A.7.12– IPI impulse response to an M1 shock.  Note: Posterior means. 
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Figure A.7.13– F-D impulse response to a discount rate shock.  Note: Posterior means. 
Figure A.7.14– OMO impulse response to a discount rate shock.  Note: Posterior means. 
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 Appendix B - Counterfactual methodology 
 
The impulse response analysis for the second period shows that Fed’s instruments, 
OMO and the discount rate, only have a regime switch around 1965. Moreover, the new 
variable F-D seems to present quite a dynamic behavior in relation to inflation, the IPI 
and M1.  While during the 1970s the difference between the discount rate and the 
federal funds rate was not managed adequately as it increased inflation, around 1990, 
the sign of the response in Figure 1.7.1 is the opposite, negative. Hence, it seems that 
policies did not change and the banking sector modified its behavior. To support this 
hypothesis and discover whether different policies were applied, in this section I carry 
out a counterfactual analysis. 
 For that task, I have used the posterior mean of the average value of the 
parameters between 1995 and 1999, representing Greenspan’s policies, and between 
1971 and 1977 for Burns’ policies. These values are used to simulate new ones for the 
rest of the parameters and for the other periods of the sample. Thus, the new values 
obtained for the parameters can be interpreted as those that would have been observed, 
had those policies been applied to the rest of the sample. In this case, unlike other works 
that draw the average of the posterior distribution from the monetary policy rule 
equation, meaning, the federal funds rate equation, here I draw the average values from 
the OMO, discount rate and F-D equations. In this type of analysis, the Lucas’ critique 
arises as expectations and the private agents’ behavior could have changed, had policies 
been modified at some point. However, given the Bayesian framework, in which policy 
is random and the model presents stochastic time variation of policy, the issue is hugely 
mitigated. Apart from that, I have included a new variable in the model, which is 
intended to capture inflation expectations. A new posterior distribution will be created 
for this variable every time that I introduce the new averaged values from Greenspan or 
Burns’ policies. Thus, new expectations about inflations will be created for each 
counterfactual exercise. This new variable is inspired by Goodfriend (1993, pp.5-6), 
where he explained that the long-term yields should be a sum of the short-term rates 
with a variation, perhaps between two or three percentage points, plus the expected 
inflation. Thus, when the long-term rates increase more than the short-term rates, it is 
because the inflation expectations are higher. Consequently, the variable for the 
inflation expectations is built as follow: first, I take the difference of the short-term rate 
(3-months Treasury Bill rate) between period t and period t-1, and the same is done for 
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the long-term rate (10-years government bonds yields). Once I have the difference of 
both rates, I use the difference of those two values. Then, the inflation expectations are 
captured when the long-term rate has increased or decreased more than the short-term 
rate. This variable is located in the fourth position of the VAR, before M1 and after F-
D, as during Volcker and Greenspan’s mandate, they targeted long-term rates to control 
inflation. The results obtained are displayed in Figures B.10.1 (Greenspan’s 
counterfactual) and B.10.2 (Burns’ counterfactual). The CPI response to an F-D shock 
under Burns and Greenspan’s policies are very similar. Under Burns’ policies, the 
positive values are more positive than under Greenspan’s policies, and for those periods 
when the response is negative, Burns’ policies would have decreased inflation less. 
Apart from that, there is not significant difference between both figures and I cannot 
claim a change in Fed’s policies after the 1980s or 1990s, despite Figure 1.7.1 shows a 
regime change for those years. For the rest of the impulse response analysis, figures are 
all almost identical for both counterfactuals. The same counterfactual was carried out 
with the 1960-1965 parameters, when Martin was the chairman of the Fed, but the 
results are alike. This casts doubts on the possible regime change observed for that 
period in Figures 1.7.2 and 1.7.3. 
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Figure B.10.1– CPI Inflation impulse response to a F-D shock (Greenspan).  Note: Posterior means. 
Figure B.10.2– CPI Inflation impulse response to a F-D shock (Burns).  Note: Posterior means. 
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Appendix C – Convergence tests I 
 
In this section, convergence of the Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm is assessed for 
the baseline models. First, I present the inefficiency factor (IF), which is the inverse of 
the relative numerical efficiency (RNE) measure developed in Geweke (1992), for the 
posterior estimates of the parameters. RNE is a function of the serial correlation 
characteristics of the chain. The estimate (IF) is performed using a 4% tapered window 
for the estimation of the spectral density at frequency zero. Values below or around 20 
can be considered as satisfactory. For space reasons results are not presented for the 
hyperparameters. Also, because they behave better than the parameters and all the 
values are below 20. 
 Second, to reassure that after the initial discarded sample and thinning of 
the chain the sample generated adequately represent the posterior distribution of 
interest, I calculate the I-statistic from Raftery and Lewis (1992b) that measures “the 
increase in the number of iterations due to dependence in the sequence” (Raftery and 
Lewis, 1992a). It is obtained from the formula (M+N)/Nmin, where M is the initial 
number of iterations that should be discarded, N the number of iterations stored and 
required to achieve certain precision, and Nmin the minimum number of iterations to 
reach convergence (Raftery and Lewis, 1992a). In this case, I apply it to the sample 
already “cleaned”, so that I can evaluate if more iterations are needed, burned or it 
needs more “thinning”. Those numbers are calculated for the quantile 0.025 of the 
posterior distribution of the parameters, estimated to within ±0.005 with probability 
0.95. That is, 95% intervals with posterior probability between 0.94 and 0.96. Values 
greater than 5 indicate dependence problems. Again, and for the same reasons as for the 
IF, the figures are presented only for the parameters. Figure C.11.1 and Figure C.11.2 
display the results for the parameters B, α, and σ for the interwar period, and Figure 
C.12.1 and Figure C.12.2 for the second period. 
 In general, all the parameters reach convergence for the number of 
iterations indicated in section 4.1, as their values are below 20 for the IF estimate and 
below 5 for the I-statistic. Although the convergence of the Bs for the interwar period 
with K-P algorithm is not as good as for the other parameters, the IF estimate has a 
mean of 28.062, which can be considered as satisfactory. Regarding the I-statistic, only 
a few values are higher than 5. 
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Figure C.11.1 – IF estimate for parameters B (Panel 1), α (Panel 2), and σ (Panel 3) 
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Figure C.11.2– I-statistic for parameters B (Panel 1), α (Panel 2), and σ (Panel 3) 
  
 
175 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.12.1– IF estimate for parameters B (Panel 1), α (Panel 2), and σ (Panel 3) 
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Figure C.12.2 – I-statistic for parameters B (Panel 1), α (Panel 2), and σ (Panel 3) 
Appendix D - Convergence tests II 
As in the previous appendix, convergence of the Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm 
is assessed for the baseline model. Again, for space reasons results are not presented for 
the hyperparameters and because they behave better than the parameters. Figures D.20 
and D .21 display the results for the parameters B, q and D 
In general, all the parameters reach convergence for the number of 
iterations indicated in section 3 .3 .2, as their values are below 20 for the IF estimate and 
below 5 for the I-statistic. 
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Appendix E – Data 
 
 
The data sources for the variables are “Banking and Monetary Statistics 1914-1941”, 
“Banking and Monetary Statistics 1941-1970” available in FRASER, and last, the 
FRED database.  
 
 - Nonborrowed reserves are those reserves that are not borrowed from the 
central bank at the discount window. It is measured in billion of dollars. 
 
 - Required reserves are the reserves that a bank must hold in their vaults or at the 
Federal Reserve, depending on amount of deposits. It is measured in billion of dollars. 
 
 -Excess reserves are those reserves held in excess of what is required by 
regulators. It is measured in billion of dollars. 
 
 - The prime loans rate is the base rate used by banks to price short-term business 
loans, posted by a majority of 25 insured U.S.-chartered commercial banks. The prime 
loans rate appears officially in 1934 defined as “the rate that banks charge their most 
creditworthy business customers on short-term loans. It is the base from which rates 
charged on loans to other business customers are scaled upward. Generally speaking, 
the prime rate has not been considered a sensitive rate that fluctuates daily in response 
to short-terms changes in demand and supply as measured by a national market.” 
Further, “ Primer rates are “formally” posted only by largest banks. A nationally 
publicized and uniform prime rate did not emerge until the depression of the 1930’s. 
The rate in that period -1.5 per cent- represented a floor below which banks were said to 
regard lending as unprofitable” (Banking and Monetary Statistics 1941-1970, p. 642).  
Thus, from 1934 to 1949, the data for this variable is collected from the source just 
mentioned. Since 1949, the data is collected directly from FRED. For the periods 1919-
1929 and 1930-1933 the rates on customers’ loans and commercial loans in New York 
are collected respectively. These rates, despite not being the prime loans rate, are the 
most similar once there are data available for it. 
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- The short-term rate of reference has been changing through the period under analysis, 
depending on the sources from which banks obtained funds. For the period 1919-1933 
an average of the most important short-term open-market instruments is used. These 
instruments are: 4- to 6-month commercial paper and prime 90-day bankers’ 
acceptances (loans based on commercial transactions) and 90-day Stock Exchange time 
loans and Stock Exchange call loans, new and renewal (loans based on security 
collateral). Given that after 1931 there is a decline in commercial and bankers’ 
acceptances holding and an increase in short-term Treasury bills, for the period 1934-
1954 rates on 3-months T-bills are collected instead. Last, after 1954 the federal funds 
rate is considered the short-term rate of reference. 
 
- The “Loans” variable is not homogeneously available for the entire period and 
different data needed to be plugged and extrapolated. From 1919 to 1947 the quarterly 
amount of loans from “member banks” have been collected. In some cases, some 
quarters are missing. To fill those quarters, I have calculated the average of loans 
between t-1 and t+1. However, “member banks” does not represent all commercial 
banks, for which there are only semi-annual data. Thus, for those periods when data is 
available for both series, I have calculated the proportion of commercial banks’ loans 
regarding member banks’ loans. The resulting number is multiplied for the amount of 
member banks’ loans for the quarters missing in the commercial banks’ loans series, 
until the next datum in the semi-annual series for commercial banks is found, when the 
proportion is calculated again. This series comprises loans on securities, real state, 
banks and other loans. Since 1948, the data has been collected from FRED “Loans and 
Leases” series, which includes commercial, industrial, consumer and real state loans 
and other loans and leases. It is measured in billion of dollars. 
 
RC, MAX, GDPD and DEBT have been already described in sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix F - Robustness tests 
.O> 
--- --
0 • •• 
95%CI 8V'UctUr"&I ft"f 
.OOO 
0 -- ------ 006 
, o , "'""~-------~ -------~ -------~ --------~ -------~ 
0 • 0 ,. , o = 
stet:> 
96%.CI 
11.il. Ro_STA, MAX. 
·" -- ---.  -----
.• 
0 
0 • •• .. 
strvoturol lrl 
.G 
.• 
. . 
0 
0 • • •• •• 
step 
95%.Ct etruotu r'al frl 
Figure!S.6.l!iillmpulseliesponses!llolan!RC·STRliihockll:R,INBR,!MAX,!andllR·STRlinlj,anelsl!l,el,iSlandlilt; 
respectively.!l!I 
182 
·""" 
0 -----
--
0 • 0 ,a 
step 
95%CI s t n.,ctural lrt 
.002 
·"'" 
0 
-00·~---------------------------------------------~ " • • , . step 
EiH5% CI !i:truotur'ul irl 
Mi . MAX. AC_ STA 
., 
0 
9 5% CI atn.JC1u re.1 i('f 
-- ------ -------
.o a 
0 
0 0 
s tep 
9 6%. Ct 
Figure!l'.6.2Hmpulse!iesponseslllooilMAXlilhock.!ER.INBR.lllC-STR.landll.R-STRlinlpanelsa.12,1Sandilci 
respectively .!Ill 
183 
·"" 
,02 
0 
- .02 
step 
tStn.JC"h ,.1ra l irl 
... 
O • 
~. 01 ,._ _____________________________________________ _ 
0 • 0 , o = 
stop 
Q5%CI structural lrl 
M B U81 . LR_8TR. MAX ., 
0 ----.. , 
.. -~-----------------------------------------------0 • • , . , e 
step 
95%CI atn.te1, ..u•a 1 i rt 
stop 
struct\,.lral irl 
Figurell'.7.lllflmpulse!iesponseslllo!inll.R·STRBhock.!ER,INBR,!MAX!indlltC·STRlin!pauelsl!l.,12,ISland!ll!l 
respectively.!l'eriodl{l 922· 1960)EI 
184 
lzl 
MS\J0"1, RC_ STA. c'.U_ EA 
.06 
.oo 
·-
. 02 
0 
0 8 ,. •• 
step 
a~~A>c, e.truoturol irf 
.o 1ft 
.o , 
.urn, 
0 
. OOG -._,-------~-------·~------~-------~-------~ 
0 • • , . ,. = 
95%.CI etn.aetur-al ir"f 
MSU8'1, R C ,_STA. MAX 
.~ 
.• 
. ' 
• 
step 
95%CI atn.tC1t.n•a 1 i rt 
·" 
.06 / ---------------- ----- --0 
0 • • •• 
step 
95%CI ett"Uetural lrl 
Figure!l1.7.2follmpulseliesponsesllo!in!RC·STRliihock.11:R,ll!IBR.!MAXland!lR·STR!inlpanels!l,12,IS!and!lffi 
respectively.!Period~l 92 2 · 1960) El 
185 
MSU 8 1l , MAX, <'H_ ER 
.04 
·°" 
0 -----=----- ---------
•. o.: " ~ --------~ ---------- ------------------ ----------
0 • • 
step 
a~~A> c, 
M 1 . MAX, dL_NBA 
0 
•,UO:le 
-----
. ......._ ------------ ------~---------~----
. 008 '-,-------~-------·~------~-------~-------~ 
0 • " 
95%.CI 
. 
. , 
.• 
. ' ~ ----o-J----------- ---
D • • 
step 
95%CI 
s top 
,. '" = 
etn.aetu r-al ir"f 
•• •• 
atn.tC1t.n •a 1 i rt 
stn.Jctural irl 
Figure!l'.7.3effmpulse!iesponsesllooilMAXlilhock.!ER.1NBR.lltC·STR!andllR·STRlinlpanelslU.!..ISlandi!ll:I 
respectively.!l'eriodl{l 922· 1960)1:1 
186 
lzl 
M1 .- dl_ N81:'i, c'.,I_ EA 
·"" 
. .,.. 
.oa 
0 
0 
s tep 
a~~A>c, e.truot1,.1ra, I i rf 
. 3 
.• ----------------., 
0 
0 • 0 •• , o = 
95%CI s tructura l irf 
M 8 U 8 1 , c:lt_ NBR., A C _ S TR .• 
., 
"'------------0 
.. , ~---------~---------------------------~--------~ 
0 • • ,e 
S tEIIP 
atn.tctu r"al i t1' 
M8U B -i .., dLNBFI. L R_STFI .• 
·' ------------------- --===--------------~~ --ot------=======-~-- ---- =======~-=-=-=--=-=-=-----===~=l 
.. , ~---------~------------------- --------~--------~ 
0 • 0 •• = 
s tep 
96%. Ct 
Figure!l'.7.4 flffmpulse!iesponsesllowi!IIBRoihock.lER,IMAX.lilC·STR!l.nd!I.R·STRfinlpanels l!l.,12,IS!l.ndfll!I 
respectively.!l'eriodl{l 922· 1960)EI 
187 
s tep 
tSt n.JC"h ,.1ra l irl 
M8UB1 ,. OLEA. M AX .• 
ol =--=...._ ________ ~---J 
.. , ' ----------~---------------------------- --------~ 
0 
.Off 
0 
• • 
9 5% CI etn.tctur'al irl 
. ' 
0 -- --
. ' 
.• 
.. , . .., ___________________________________________ _ 
0 • • 
S tEIIP 
atn.tctu r"al i t1' 
M S U 8 1 . d t_ E R . t-A _ STA 
, e 
... ~- --------~-------------------------------------
0 • • ,. , . = 
s tep 
96%. Ct 8tn.JC1.Ur"41 ill"f' 
Figm·ell'.7.Sl>ilmpulseliesponsesllolin!l:Rli!bock.l!IIB.R.IMAX.IRC·STRlandllR·STRlin!pauelsl!l.,12,ISland!ll!l 
respectively.!l'eriodl{l 922· 1960)EI 
188 
M S UB2 , LR_ ST"A, d LER 
.o .::. 
.o , - ------
0 
• • Q t 
0 • • , . 
step 
:.t ructuro.l irl 
.oo, 
0 
.. 002 
. 0 04 
·OOO 
0 • • ,. , . .. 
s tep 
95%CI s t ructural lrt 
.o 
.• -------.• 
0 
0 • • •• •• = 
s t ep 
9 s 04c1 8tn.lC1:Uf"Q I lrf 
.e 
.• 
. z 
0 
0 • •• , . 
Figure!l'.8.l!iillmpulseliesponseslllolan!LR·STR!ibock.!l'R,ll!IBR.IMAX!audllRC·STRlinlpanelsl!UZ,ISiaud!ll!I 
respectively.!Periodl{l 960· 2006) 1:1 
189 
lzl 
·"" 
·"·" 
.o~ 
0 
0 
s tep 
a~~A>c, e.truot1,.1ra,I irf 
00d 
002 
.. 002 
-.uu .. .,_ ________ ~-------~-------~----------------~ 
0 • ,. ,. = 
95%CI s tructura l irf 
M SUB2. FIC _ STA . MAX 
, 2 
o -l---- --------.• 
S tEIIP 
atn.tctu r"al i t1' 
.• 
.. , 
0 • • .. • • 
step 
95% C l 
Figure!l'.8.2Hmpulse!iesponseslllo!an!llC·STRliihock.JER,llllBR.!MAX!lndllR·STRfinlpanelsl!l.,12,IS!lndfll!I 
respectively.!l'eriodl{l 960· 2006) El 
190 
M 8 V 82, MA><., 0 1 .. G R 
o• 
00 
oz 
~---c 
.o, 
0 
0 • 0 •• ,o 
step 
structural lrt 
MSU82, MAX, cn_ NBA 
.002 
0 -~~-
_________________________ ...,_-
• OOc 
·-= -._.---------.---------.---------,•.---------,·.--------~c 
.• 
0 
0 
. 3 
.• 
. , 
0 
0 
s t ep 
95% Cl atr'Uctu,.al irl 
MSU82, MAX. AC_ STA 
8 
S tEIP 
• • 
s t ep 
===---0-s-.,.,- c-,-
---------- --
•• , . 
atn.tctur-al i t'I' 
•• ,-. 
structur~ 
Figure!l1.8.3i!illmpulseliesponsesllolalMAX!shock.!t:R.!NBR,lltC·STRlandll.R·STRlinlpanelsii.i:t.131andl!lci 
respectively.!Period~l 960· 2006) cl 
191 
MGV92. d L NO,R, dl_ EFI 
,00 
• .U !> 
0 • • "' ,o step 
structural lrt 
MSUB2, ,al._NBA. MAX 
.o 
.• 
--
, 2 
0 
0 • 8 •• ,e 
s t ep 
95% Cl atr'Uctu,.al irl 
MSU82. <IL N&A, AC_ STR 
. o 
.  
/\_~ _____ ------._-------~~~ 
--------
., 
atruciu r'a.l i r"I' 
.,. 
·' 
,06 ~------
0 
•• (16 
0 • • , a •• 
etructu.-al irl 
Fignre!l'.8.4flffllpulse!iesponseslllofin!IIBRaihock.11:R,IMAX,lllC·STRland!I.R·STRfinlpanelsl!l.,12,ISlaudlll!I 
respectively .!Periodl{l 960· 2006) El 
192 
step 
tStn.JC"h,.1ra l irl 
. G 
.• 
. a 
0 .J.. 
0 • 0 •• ,o = 
stop 
Q5%CI structural lrl 
M 9U92. d l_.E.A. A(l_STA .• 
" 
.• 
_, ~o"· ---------.---------0----------,-,---------,,o----------.~-
stop 
struct\.Aral irl 
.,. 
.06 
v -------- -
0 
0 • • ,o 
s:rn..01u ral irl 
Figurell'.8.Sl>ihupulseliesponseslllolinll.R-STRBhock.lllBR,IMAX.lllC-STRlandllR-STRlinfj>anels!ll,f.Ul!l 
aodfilliespectively.ll'eriod!f l 960-2006) 1:1 
193 
  
 
194 
 
Appendix G - Primary Sources 
 
· National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
  NBER Macrohistory Database: 
  -Section XIV. Money and Banking  
  - Section XIII. Interest rates 
 
· Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) 
 
· Bureau of Labor Statistics  
 
·  Reserve Archival System for Economic Research (FRASER): 
  -Banking and Monetary Statistics 1914-1941  
  -Banking and Monetary Statistics 1941-1970  
  - Federal Reserve Bulletins from 1970 to 2003 
 
